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     The “modern world” as we now know it is quite different from that which was emerging in 
Western Europe and began to accelerate in its development under the impetus of revolution and 
wars at the turn of the nineteenth century. Not only were material conditions in the process of 
shifting from those grounded in more traditional, rural and agrarian ways of life to those 
developing into more urban and industrialized ones, but the “social ontology” and cultural forms 
of “mapping” and communicating about reality were also changing.  
     This study employs a “macro-historical” framework which incorporates complexity and 
complex system principles to investigate some of the patterns of these highly transformative 
systemic changes as they impacted Germany and France in particular in the long nineteenth 
century. These societies are employed in this investigation for two reasons: 1) because they were 
among that handful of communities that directly participated in the emergence of modernization 
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as a rather explosive and rapidly developing phenomena in that historical moment (whose 
consequences also included the emergence of new social movements and forms of social 
structuration as expressed in nationalism and the modern nation-state), and 2) because, as 
directly neighboring communities, these two illustrate in a microcosm some of the dynamic 
operations of closely co-existing complex systems themselves. 
     Consideration of the lives and selected literary works of pairs of German and French writers 
at three different time points in the century grounds the discussion, because these artists are 
themselves viewed as important innovators who both embodied and expressed signs of the new 
forms of society and culture that were then emerging. These particular writers (Heinrich von 
Kleist and Germaine de Staêl; Heinrich Heine and Honoré de Balzac; and Heinrich Mann and 
Stéphane Mallarmé) are particularly suitable for this study because of their notably protean 
capacities for vision as well as their positions “on the margins” of their communities which not 
only afforded them insightful perspectives on the shifting sociocultural landscape but also 
challenged them to employ their talents to give the latter some novel narrative shape. 
     After an initial chapter which outlines much of the theoretical framework for the discussion, 
chapter two considers Staël and Kleist who expressed creative visions of (potentially) new kinds 
of social agents and their relationships to (those virtual) societies that were then appearing to be 
on the verge of emerging after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. The third chapter 
discusses Heine and Balzac as artists trying to develop new aesthetics in a kind of (implicit) 
service to their respective German and French communities’ post-war efforts at recuperating and 
reconfiguring  a new “social order” trending towards the “new modern.” And the fourth chapter 
considers Mann and Mallarmé, who are viewed as confronting some of the new adaptive 
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challenges in the latter part of the century arising from continued progression of the powerful 
(and perceptibly impersonal) self-organizing forces of modernization and many Europeans’ 
disillusionment with (and withdrawal from) them, to which these writers responded with their 
own creative strategies for trying to actively address these challenges and provoke their 
contemporaries to do the same. 
     The final chapter reflects upon the value of using a complex systems interpretive lens for 
understanding the roles and work of such writers, who are regarded via this lens as significant 
innovators who responded particularly meaningfully to the individual and communal challenges 
raised by the self-organizing forces operating in their historical moments in the nineteenth 
century. It also briefly considers the pros and cons of employing such a “holistic” perspective for 
appreciating such artistic work more generally.  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Chapter 1:  
Complex Systems and the Roles of Six Writers 
     The “modern world” as we now know it is obviously quite different from those worlds that 
emerged in France and neighboring territories of the still extant Holy Roman Empire (soon to 
become the German nation) during the long nineteenth century. There have been numerous 
assessments of the phenomena of modernity. Some have applauded it and its effects, while others 
have been severely critical. All, however, have acknowledged the phenomena as a kind of 
process, one arising from many factors and changing in its manifestations over the past few 
hundred years but which truly began to accelerate throughout western Europe under the added 
stimulus of revolution and wars around the turn of the nineteenth century. Individual and 
collective adaptation to these transformative events, their cultural sequelae, and the quickening 
of social forces that they helped promote (such as the undermining of traditional authorities, 
increasing industrialization, the rise of a middle class, demographic shifts from provinces to 
cities, and technological advances) was apparently no small feat, as the intellectual and 
sociopolitical ferment throughout much of this long century suggests. As I will argue in the pages 
that follow, a significant part of this adaptation also involved people co-constructing “worlds” - 
making mutually intelligible sense - of the social forces that were playing out around them and 
through which they navigated. In order to do this, the discussion will focus on exploring some of 
the aspects of this adaptive process as instantiated in the persons, social activity, and writing of 
six different literary artists who were members of western Europe’s neighboring French and 
German-speaking communities during different periods of the long nineteenth century. 
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Specifically, it will consider how these three French (Germaine de Staël, Honoré de Balzac, and 
Stéphane Mallarmé) and three German (Heinrich von Kleist, Heinrich Heine, and Heinrich 
Mann) writers, though they were naturally distinguished by their own inclinations and uniquely-
situated experiences, at the same time all responded to the adaptive challenges of their respective 
historical moments in ways that, when viewed through a specific interpretive lens, may be 
understood as having certain features in common. Explicating this in some detail will occupy the 
following three chapters. 
     Before proceeding, it is important to note the principal reasons for choosing France and 
Germany (and writers in their communities) as the focus of this particular study. One is that their 
societies were among that small group of western European ones  which actually underwent the 
sociocultural transformations that have been referred to as “modernization” in the long 
nineteenth century. It is widely acknowledged that this handful of European communities 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean became the site of both innovation in various social and cultural 
domains and of new technologies because of a confluence of factors that had set the stage for 
their emergence in that particular part of the world at that time. These factors included the 
centuries’ long development of local conditions (such as those which had resulted in the interest 
in and capacity for large-scale ship-building, for example) which had led, in their turn, to the 
emergence and stimulation of exchange networks that had grown to connect widespread markets 
across the globe with this area as a central hub, the related rise in importance of commercial 
enterprise, and the igniting of the Industrial Revolution (which had sparked first in Great Britain 
but then spread rapidly beyond that country’s borders). Additional factors were those deriving 
from intellectual influences of the Enlightenment which had valorized the growth of new 
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knowledge - knowledge that was not bound by local cultures or traditions and which could be 
sought in exploration of new “territories.”  
     The convergence and interaction of these and other factors together may be seen as having 
laid the groundwork for “modernization,” whose “taking shape” as a phenomenon escalated 
under the forces unleashed by the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. But in addition to 
these circumstances within which both France and Germany (and a small group of other 
European countries) were situated and to which these two were both subject, there were also 
circumstances specific to them as neighboring communities (sharing borders, for example), 
which intermittently brought them into conflict (wars of words and other weapons) and provoked 
them to (re-)assert their identities and positions of power relative to each other.  
     One way of appreciating these kinds of dynamic processes is through a theoretical framework 
based on consideration of what are referred to as “complex systems.” A “macro-historical” 
perspective which specifically incorporates complex system notions (and complexity principles) 
will, in fact, constitute much of the interpretive lens by which this study is undertaken.  
     Thus considering specific French and German writers for the present work is regarded as 
particularly advantageous because of the changes that took place not only within but also 
between, and in a superordinate sense across, these two communities at the moment when 
Western Europe became the historically fortuitous (from a complexity and complex systems’ 
perspective) site of local conditions coalescing and “emerging” in the form of “modernization” in 
the world. That is, in them we can observe in a sort of microcosm some of the profound 
concentration of forces that in their interaction were propelling sociopolitical and cultural 
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transformations (together deemed modernization) expressed at different levels of scale during 
this century-long period of radical change in western Europe. 
     In addition, the six writers targeted in this “case study” should be noted to have been 
specifically selected because of features that they shared despite their individual (locally-
differing) circumstances. As will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters that follow, all six 
of these writers manifested notably protean capacities for expressing themselves and their 
visions, and all operated “on the margins” of the communities in which they participated, which 
afforded them a non-mainstream (also called “second order”) perspective on the shifting 
sociocultural landscape of their eras thereby challenging each of them to articulate their 
perspective in a novel narrative shape. In other words, all of these writers themselves may be 
seen as both personally and circumstantially well-situated for being able to integrate the 
confluence of forces that were impacting their “worlds” at the time and express them in cultural 
products (literary works) which were simultaneously innovative and potentially adaptive in the 
context of their era’s dynamic (and unstable) conditions.  And while the selection of these writers 
is not meant to imply that they are the only ones who could be fruitful for this kind of analysis, 
there are, in other words, good reasons for selecting them (but future work may want to  
investigate other artists through a similar theoretical lens). 
     We should now proceed to also clarify more of the details of the interpretive lens to be 
employed for the discussion. For one thing, the phenomenon of complexity itself may be seen as 
operating in the objective world across different durations of time and extensions in space, in the 
manner that the historian David Christian and his colleagues from a variety of other disciplines 
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have discussed in their work on “big history”  (which will be described in somewhat greater 1
detail in consideration of modernizing trends taking place in Europe in the nineteenth century in 
chapter four). For another, complex entities (such as human beings and nation-states themselves) 
may be understood as containing diverse components that are arranged in very particular ways 
such that, when they emerge from the “assembling” of their components into particular patterns 
that allow them to work, they have new (so-called emergent) properties that cannot be explained 
by simply referring back to consideration of the separate components from which they derived 
(as a side-note here, “flows of energy” appear to be required to help maintain the emergent 
pattern and structure of complex things no matter the domain in which they arise; consequently, 
in order for complex entities to (continue to) exist, they cannot be completely isolated; they must 
have boundaries/borders that are somewhat loose or only partial relative to their environments) 
(Christian et al 5-6). 
     Inherent in this perspective is the belief that complexity also characterizes the minds (brains) 
of human beings and how they engage with and behave in their social and material worlds, 
which are made up of other complex entities (like cities and communication, transportation, and 
economic/financial systems, for example) that manifest complex properties and behave 
according to complexity principles themselves. While many of the details of the development of 
particular complex systems and interactions between them (like those between human beings and 
their social groups and the latter with their “environments”) are incompletely understood and 
Particularly useful texts for gaining an overview of this work include Maps of Time: An Introduction to 1
Big History, 2nd ed. by David Christian (U of California P, 2011) and Big History: Between Nothing and 
Everything by Christian et al (McGraw-Hill, 2014).
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remain objects of intense investigation, for this particular study a relatively small “part” of the 
objective world will be examined for some of these kinds of issues. 
     Thus, the study will target a relatively delimited region (the neighboring countries of France 
and Germany) for signs of patterns in emergent (cultural/literary) products that were expressed 
by the six selected writers, who were themselves both subject and responding to the growing 
complexity (here “modernization”) of their environments in their eras.  
     Others have referred to such complex phenomena and their interactions as those to be 
discussed here, but described them in somewhat different terms. One finds, for example, 
references to a kind of compression of time and accompanying sense of “social 
acceleration” (suggested by Hartmut Rosa) as well as to an individual and collective experience 
that “all that is solid melts into air” (as per Marshall Berman) as the various forces of 
modernization in their complex interactions altered life in Europe and then, some time later, 
spread around the world. Others have also noted that modernization was also accompanied by 
social activity that fostered the related rise of the spatially more expansive concept of 
“nationalism” that became a new (in the nineteenth century) “totalizing project” for interpreting 
“national autonomy or identity” (and that is now, in its turn, being challenged by even more 
expansive “totalities” such as “the global” and the “Anthropocene”) (Nir 236-237).  
     As I will also be contending here, however, many of the shared conventions arising in the 
non-theoretical knowledge of communities in the nineteenth century that were involved in 
understanding and communicating about social identities which were tied to these changes in 
temporal perception (in considerations of work, for example) and matters of social scale 
(whether as national identities or class-based ones that now subsumed both male and female 
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industrial workers, for example) were not stable during the nineteenth century either. That is, 
they too were undergoing change at an unprecedented rate. And these six writers arguably sensed 
some of the patterns of these changing circumstances and their implications for people’s 
changing identities. 
    The real world, of course, is actually inherently dynamic and constantly changing (so to 
speak), though our being able to perceive it as such depends upon the level of scale at which it is 
viewed. In other words, rather than being constantly aware that matter in the world is always in 
motion - coming into existence and fading away, whether extremely slowly as at the scale of 
geologic time or extremely quickly as at the atomic scale - we as a species tend to rely on 
perceiving all sorts of phenomena as being and remaining stable within a range that we can 
recognize and engage with so as to be able to function and act in the world.  
     For human beings, it is thus more a matter of being able to notice and recognize change in the 
sense that something appears different. That is, we tend to perceive when phenomena violate 
expectations of what is (simply) the case or “conventional” and attempt to deal with such change 
with a persistent capacity to act. Perceptible change in this sense may range from the relatively 
slight, mildly surprising, and easily accommodated, all the way to the quite disruptive, shocking, 
and traumatic. Perceptible change also depends on local conditions and prior experience with 
features of one’s environment, such that these have led to the establishment of memories and 
points of reference for what is to be expected and used as the grounds for acting in particular 
circumstances. And, what will be argued in the present discussion is that the writers discussed 
here may be understood as having had a sense of the pattern of how their worlds were changing 
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(becoming different) and yet were able to respond meaningfully with new narratives regarding 
the changes they perceived taking place. 
     In essence, therefore, the discussion will be directed at trying to show how these writers, 
living their lives in situationally-specific but related sociocultural contexts, gave creative 
expression to cultural products that had the potential for being meaningfully shared with others 
(of reasonably similar constitution and experience) through giving some form as well as 
communicable content to the “complexity” of the changing worlds that they and their fellows 
inhabited. As this statement suggests, the discussion itself will involve multiple threads, and 
these threads will be pursued for how they interrelate with each other, as discussion of a process 
may be said to warrant. In other words, the discussion will not only describe some of the 
conditions and expression of these writers in a typical linear fashion. It will also try to 
“demonstrate” (in a more or less performative sense of illustration) some of the 
multidimensionality of the social complexity converging on these writers as they experienced 
such complexity in their own lives and worked to give some manifest (emergent) shape to it. 
This will be undertaken by not only analyzing some of these writers’ literary work but also by 
providing certain biographical details and historical context that will hopefully help convey a 
sense of some of the interactions taking place between these different levels viewed here as 
different levels of scale (or what certain systems and complexity theorists refer to as different 
domains of complexity, which will be more fully described in what follows).  
     Before moving on to the actual discussion of the six writers and their works in this manner, 
however, certain historical aspects of systems and complexity theories themselves, as well as 
certain concepts that have emerged from working with them, should also be made more clear.    
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     Unlike some other originally scientifically-conceived models whose motifs and details 
gradually found their way into the broader culture and have since come to have notable influence 
on artistic expression and criticism (think: Freud’s theories of psychoanalysis, for example), 
there has been relatively little attempt to relate systems and complexity theoretical perspectives 
to much art-related phenomena, particularly to analytic considerations of work by artists, literary 
or otherwise. (The work by Niklas Luhmann is a notable exception to this dearth of application, 
though its predominant focus on issues of systems’ growth and maintenance (rather than change) 
has been viewed by some as rather limited and arguably “reactionary.” [Cramer 4])  
     The fact that both systems and complexity theories themselves have undergone significant 
evolution since their essential inception in the middle of the twentieth century (Richardson and 
Midgley 163-168) likely partly explains why they have tended to receive relatively little 
dedicated attention by those interested in the arts.  Because of these theories’ conceptual 
evolution (and for related reasons), it is also difficult to speak of established conventions 
associated with even the most recent systems and complexity theorizing perspectives. 
Nonetheless, the latter have had important impacts on multiple disciplines and research groups, 
from those physical, biological, and computational-scientific ones where they originated to 
social-scientific, business, and other scholarly groups where the theorizing and application of 
such perspectives have continued to advance. It is this very wide-ranging extension that has 
resulted in some disciplinary boundary fuzziness, however. Despite the latter, the work’s 
extension has been associated with the establishment of not only some common vocabulary and 
use of terms such as system, emergence, dynamic, nonlinear, adaptive and hierarchy, but also a 
shared belief that there are universal principles underlying the behavior of all systems (Phelan 
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237).  And perhaps most intriguingly for the purposes of the current discussion, it has also led to 
some relatively recent conceptual contacts with issues raised by members of knowledge 
disciplines which are concerned with various aspects of the arts, including aesthetics. These 
contacts currently remain tentative and rather few. But deriving as they do from several different 
scholars and critical directions, they appear suggestive enough in their convergence to warrant 
further exploration, which is the position that will be adopted here. 
     For example, the scholar of English and American literature Clifford Siskin in his recent 
System: The Shaping of Modern Knowledge (2016) indicates that a major aim of his study is to 
show how the concept of system as well as systems themselves came and are continuing to gain 
increasing attention for how they operate and exert effects - epistemological as well as 
sociopolitical - in the increasingly modern world after the Enlightenment. He describes his work 
as offering “a specific, historical argument about system…an explanation of how system became 
a primary form for shaping knowledge during the Enlightenment and where it might be headed 
in the future” (8). In his prologue, he begins, however, by stressing that, to this day, there is no 
single concise definition of the concept of system (which systems and complexity theorists 
themselves also readily acknowledge and do not regard as necessarily counter-productive to their 
work [Richardson and Midgley 167-168]). Siskin argues that this is due in large part to the term’s 
“primitive” quality and the “fundamental questions” it has raised “in so many realms” in men’s 
efforts to know the world (2). Consequently, as he goes on, it has taken on various “incarnations” 
over time (ranging from Galileo’s observations on the sighting of Jupiter’s lunar system, to 
Newton’s and other proliferating theoretical and classificatory systems that promoted the 
Enlightenment, to Darwin’s algorithmic system of survival, to our own “plethora” of increasingly 
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specialized applications of the concept to biological and “nervous,” and various “social” and 
“computing,” systems, to name just a few) (2). Thus, as he says, while it has contributed to 
“altering how we know the world, system has [also] changed it” - leading through much intra- 
and cross-disciplinary work to an appreciation now of its versatility “as being both scalable 
(systems within systems) and adaptable (to different conditions and substrates)” (2-3). But while 
he acknowledges the absence of a single concise definition, he does provide a working one for 
his overall discussion - which is of system “as a genre - as a form that works physically in the 
world to mediate our efforts to know it” (1). Thus, while his emphasis is on system as a “form” 
viewed as a “genre” or mode of explanation in knowledge disciplines, it is at the same time on 
describing various manifestations of this genre’s (form’s) effects as: 
     shap[ing] knowledge over time by transforming wholes (previous systems) into  
     parts (the new system)…thus enabl[ing] a mix of continuity and discontinuity, 
     bringing existing ideas forward but altering their meanings and effects through  
     this change of scale….as in the Enlightenment project of the encyclopedic  
     scaling up of separate systems into ‘complete’ records of what was known… 
     [and] participat[ing] in the process of error correction that the physicist David 
     Deutsch (in The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World  
     (2011, 130) has identified as central to the Enlightenment effort to produce better 
     explanations - explanations that benefited from adjustments to scale…[being]  
     better matched to the specific problems they were supposed to resolve. (Siskin 41)  
Siskin’s work is, in fact, a wide-ranging analysis that includes several illustrative examples of 
system both as an influence on various writers from the Romantics to post-modernists 
(predominantly in Great Britain) and as an actual force for promoting increasing specialization in 
various intellectual disciplines and facilitating their contributions to modern expert knowledge. 
And, though Siskin devotes little attention to the term’s use and effects in sociopolitical domains 
specifically, he does indicate that Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) seemingly laid the 
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“groundwork” for regarding societies’ functioning as “Master Systems” and, thus, being able to 
view these systems as objects that could be “blamed” in political debates (particularly by those 
resisting social reform and change), beginning with highly contentious ones that took place in the 
British parliament at the end of the eighteenth century (Siskin 163-168).  
     Siskin’s study, however, appears as just one example of how certain scholars with interests in 
the (literary) arts have recently undertaken work addressing systems and their “working” in the 
world, as Siskin himself has put it. Coming from a somewhat different disciplinary background 
and with a focus on complexity rather than systems-thinking itself (to which, as has already been 
noted, complexity theorizing is related), the narrative theorist Richard Walsh along with 
computer scientist Susan Stepney have compiled a multi-author work entitled Narrating 
Complexity (2018). In it, they present essays by various scholars interested in offering proposals 
for how narrative theory from the humanities and ideas from complexity science might inform 
each other, while also noting some of the inherent challenges of doing so. Walsh as narrative 
theorist (with a cognitive bent) frames the undertaking and challenge this way: “we are 
concerned with narrative as a primary mode of thought, one that has a specific form and 
therefore constitutes a specific kind of logic…a basic way of making sense that is central to our 
ordinary engagement with the world and each other… [but which is also] a significant constraint 
upon our ability to make sense of phenomena that resist its logic—notably, the behaviour of 
complex systems” (Walsh 12). As already noted, phenomena that can be understood as complex 
systems include such entities as the human brain, organisms and ecosystems, social and 
economic organizations like cities, and many other networked entities having significant 
!  12
interdependencies with their environments. And as Walsh and Stepney point out, some of these 
systems’ behavioral properties include:  
• Feedback and temporal “loopiness,” which does not allow any simple linearisation of 
cause and effect  
• Emergence, where the behaviour of the whole cannot be readily deduced from the 
behaviours of the parts, and where the whole affects the parts  
• Relational nature, where the many-to-many interactions between the component parts are 
more pertinent to the system behaviour than are the parts themselves  
• Openness, in that a complex system cannot be understood in isolation, because of its 
essential interactions with its environment  
• Reflexiveness, in social systems, where narratives of the system are also within the 
system, affecting it  
• Stability in the face of change, where the stability is not passively static, but an active 
self-maintenance that needs to be supported  
• Tipping points of rapid unexpected change in the face of small perturbations, as a 
seemingly stable complex system is finally pushed beyond its limits  
• Multiple timescales, fast and slow, many beyond human perception  
• Multiple spatial scales, large and small, also beyond human perception  
(Walsh and Stepney 319-320) 
     It is worth noting these various commonly acknowledged properties of complex systems 
(several of which Siskin also mentions) for several reasons. Many if not all of the (bolded) terms 
will recur at points in the following discussion. This insertion of a particular vocabulary (with 
meanings that are not always simply intuitive) will hopefully begin to provide a framework for 
establishing associations and some degree of basis for translation of complex system 
considerations into a domain where they have had little incorporation to date. Acknowledging 
them also helps make clearer some of the challenges arising from trying to actually “narrate 
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complexity.” As Walsh specifically notes, simple narratives have “limited ability to model 
multiple, simultaneous, reciprocal and recursive relations” (Walsh 16).  Thus, there are inherent 
challenges in even trying to construct a narrative argument such as the present one because of the 
“simultaneous, reciprocal and recursive relations” among the objects under consideration. 
Nonetheless, I will attempt to show how diverse forces at a so-called macro- level of scale may 
be understood as having converged simultaneously upon the pairs of writers whose lives and 
works I will be discussing (and considering chronologically), while the work they produced in 
their respective eras, in their turn, constituted new patterns of material (in their form and 
content) that were meant to operate in the world and have an influence upon the latter. And, from 
a “big history” perspective, I will also be trying to show how they functioned as innovators 
within the complex systems of their historical moments and worked to make contributions to the 
“collective learning” of their communities as well. 
     It is possible that one might wish to pause here and question the fundamental claim being 
made that systems-thinking and complexity principles have any relevance to the (literary) arts 
and art-making based on an argument that art is not only a unique enterprise but operates 
according to principles that run counter to the use of such an approach, which might be viewed 
as reductive. While the issue is debatable, of course, there are reasons for not viewing such an 
interpretive lens in a context such as this as simply reductive. 
     M.W. Rowe, a philosopher of aesthetics, in his essay on “Literature, Knowledge, and the 
Aesthetic Attitude” (2010), notes, for example, that: “an attitude which hopes to derive aesthetic 
pleasure from an object is often thought to be in tension with an attitude which hopes to derive 
knowledge from it…[but] this alleged conflict only makes sense when the aesthetic attitude and 
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knowledge are construed unnaturally narrowly, and…when both are correctly understood there is 
no tension between them” (emphasis added) (1). He makes an argument for construing the 
“aesthetic attitude” more broadly than some may tend to do, including by pointing out how 
knowledge and certain truths about the world may be conveyed by the (literary) arts, even though 
doing so does not typically take the form of making propositional statements about the world; 
and, among the “non-propositional kinds of knowledge” it can convey, as he says, is “learning 
how certain situations could be reconceptualized”  (which can have both perceptual and practical 
consequences) (9-10). He concludes that: while our “desire for imaginative knowledge [as] 
rational creatures… is not the same as our desire to enjoy certain formal patterns of sound, 
movement and colour…the[se] two desires show remarkable formal similarities, and both are a 
part of our desire for aesthetic experience,” so that there need be “no conflict between aesthetic 
interest and curiosity about life” (emphasis added) (23). Our desire for “aesthetic experience,” in 
other words, can (according to this argument) accommodate a desire for appreciation of the 
richness of an art work’s plethora of details (as in such works’ “patterns of sound, movement and 
colour”) and a desire for “imaginative” (that is, non-propositional) forms of knowledge which 
can address our “curiosity about life.” And, in a complex systems framework, some truths about 
the world may be said to specifically appear via processes that are “emergent.”  
That is, we can appreciate more about the world (“life” itself) in the discernment of patterns in 
processes of reconceptualization to the extent that they appear new to us. In other words, we can 
learn from them. And while these patterns with new properties may very well appear abstract 
and less rich than the detailed components from which they “emerged,” by their very nature, 
they are neither inherently “simplifying” nor simplistic. 
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     Such a stance allows one to see how an interpretive lens employing systems-thinking and 
consideration of complexity principles may actually be compatible with “aesthetic interest” and 
need not be understood as completely reductive or inappropriately “simplified.”  
     An “aesthetic interest” has been voiced, in fact, by some systems and complexity scholars 
themselves. Systems-theorist Gerald Midgley, for example, in his recent (2016) reflections on his 
primary field’s decades-long theoretical developments, has observed that the philosophical 
underpinnings of “critical systems thinking” (heavily influenced by Habermasian theories of 
linguistic ontology) have proven useful in the study of four “domains of complexity”; however, 
its framework has also left gaps in certain areas. He distinguishes the four domains as 1) “natural 
world” complexity (the complexity of “what is,” whose ideal of inquiry in historical traditions 
such as science is truth), 2) “social world” complexity (the complexity of “what ought to be,” 
whose ideal of inquiry is rightness), 3) “subjective world” complexity (the complexity of what 
any individual (self or other) is thinking, intending or feeling, whose ideal of inquiry can be 
called understanding subjectivity), and 4) the meta-level complexity of the other three domains’ 
interactions (Midgely 3). He provides this classificatory framework while also offering personal 
musings on whether it was appropriate (now in hindsight) to exclude beauty as an ideal of 
inquiry. He also observes that, since the establishment of the critical systems framework, most 
attention has been directed to the natural world domain while much less has been devoted to the 
normative social domain, and comparatively little to the domain concerned with subjectivity, 
thus leaving “major opportunities for developing new theories” related to both of them (4-5). He 
singles out David Snowden (who “advocat[es] the collection of multiple individuals’ stories and 
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then look[s] for patterns across them”), however, as a notable exception to the “subjective world” 
domain’s dearth of investigation (5). 
     Snowden, originally an IBM researcher, and Karl Weik, a social psychologist, have actually 
both created managerial models and research programs that use narrative as “a sensemaking 
response to complexity” in organizations (Browning and Boudès 32). Though their approaches 
somewhat differ, they are similar in that both place “the person” at the center of their models and 
observe that, if the communication practices among individuals interacting locally with each 
other “are in fact vulnerable and attentive to the margins” of their organizations, the “best self-
organized solution” may emerge and become a model for further action by the group (Browning 
and Boudès 37). In an analogous fashion, as I will be trying to show, all six nineteenth-century 
writers to be discussed were also each in his or her own way, through their personal situations 
and respective “communication practices,” vulnerable as well as attentive to the margins of their 
respective self-identified communities; and it was from these positions that they observed the 
forms of relating shifting in their societies and were able to put the sense of these changing 
patterns of relating into words and afford narratives of notable aesthetic quality by which others 
could “learn.” 
     Finally, one more highly influential thinker in the humanities whose own work has not only 
included a significant focus on the “person” but has also recently been re-interpreted as bearing a 
significant relationship to systems-thinking and complexity principles as these may be applied to 
the literary arts is Michel Foucault.  
     Some scholars, for example, have noted how aspects of Foucault’s philosophy have several 
similarities to, but also important differences from, the Habermasian ontology (outlined in 
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Midgley’s 2016 paper) that has framed much of recent critical systems thinking. Brocklesby and 
Cummings, in their 1996 paper on the subject, observe that both perspectives embody forms of 
so-called emancipatory thought in critical theory (traceable back to Kant), but that they differ in 
the meanings that they apply to emancipation, in a manner that these scholars summarize as 
follows: 
     The Habermasian…is primarily concerned with developing theoretical 
     approaches that can be applied to collectively emancipate others from a 
     'worse' to a 'better' state. In this mode, experts intervene in situations with the 
     aim of improving the human condition by creating better holistic systems. The 
     genealogy to Foucault, on the other hand, concerns itself more with providing 
     tools which individuals can use themselves…to free their minds to alternatives 
     by highlighting the way in which power within systems subjugates them. This 
     approach seeks…to make visible, the unwritten categories and rules of the 
     system(s), so as to enable individuals to develop responsive strategies to 
     them… Fundamentally, the issue is human emancipation or self emancipation. (741) 
As the authors point out, however, the two views are not mutually exclusive, and the 
emancipation in both cases may be regarded as a kind of freeing move based upon acquiring 
conscious knowledge of those social forces that converge upon and control people’s behavior 
(and “dominate” and “subjugate” them, as Foucault often put it).  
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     Mark Olssen, a scholar of political theory and educational policy who has written extensively 
on Foucault, also specifically refers to Foucault as a “complexity theorist” . Furthermore, he has 2
discussed the role of literature in Foucault’s  thinking as such a theorist. Olssen points out that 
much of Foucault’s early writing focused on writers (notably Sade, Roussel, Artaud, and 
Blanchot) and their works, and that, despite his writings’ later shifts into social critical 
discussions emphasizing power and resistance (the “political”), it continued to show the 
influence of his thoughts regarding the literary (“Exploring Complexity” 83-86). Most pertinent 
to the present discussion, Olssen cites the early Foucault who asserted (in his 1969 essay “What 
is an Author?”) that: “the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle 
by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses” and that “perhaps it is time to study 
discourses not in terms of their expressive value or formal transformations but according to their 
modes of existence. The modes of circulation, valorization, attribution, and appropriation of 
discourses vary with each culture and are modified within each” (qtd. in “Exploring Complexity” 
86). Olssen also observes, however, that for Foucault, the so-called “author function” of writing 
is something of a paradox in that it actually ”differentiates” and “individuates [authors] as 
socially and historically constituted individuals,” thus making writers appear as if they preceded 
Olssen details his considerations of Foucault as a complexity theorist in his book Michel Foucault: 2
Materialism and Education (Bergin & Garvey, 1999, and expanded edition, Paradigm Press, 2006) and 
several articles, including his 2008 paper “Foucault as Complexity Theorist: Overcoming the Problems of 
Classical Philosophical Analysis.” In the latter, he explores parallels between what he calls Foucault’s 
Nietzschean view of history and models of complexity developed and utilized in the physical  and social 
sciences in the twentieth century. Specifically, Olssen argues that Foucault rejects mechanical atomist 
epistemological world views (Hegelian, Marxist, and structuralist ones) that are based upon a Newtonian 
conception of a closed universe operating upon the basis of a small number of invariable and universal 
laws by which all may be predicted and explained and posits instead a radical ontology whereby the 
conception of the totality or whole is reconfigured as an open, relatively borderless system of infinite 
interconnections, possibilities and developments that emphasizes notions such as self-organization and 
dissipative structures; time as an irreversible, existential dimension; and a world of finite resources but 
with infinite possibilities for articulation or creative re-investment. (“Foucault as Complexity Theorist” 
96)
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their work (“Exploring Complexity” 87). This is because their writing, like action in general (in 
a Foucauldian move that Olssen argues anticipates complexity science which was still embryonic 
at the time of the philosopher’s writing), “renders reversibility impossible” and “establishes the 
agent [author] as absolutely unique” (“Exploring Complexity” 87). Thus, as Olssen puts it, rather 
than the author, it is the writing itself which is “that material activity which spatializes, 
individuates and alters, thus is a mechanism for creativity, novelty and uniqueness” (“Exploring 
Complexity” 87). 
     While Foucault turned his attention away from particular writers and their works by the end 
of the 1960’s, his early thinking on literature and the activity of writing clearly foreshadows 
some of the themes in his later discussions on discourse analysis wherein he specifically 
addresses aspects of signification and its relationships to (social) systems-in-transformation. In 
these discussions, he specifically argues, according to scholars McHoul and Grace, that 
discourses are said to be made up of groups of statements that “do things” and “bring about 
effects rather than merely ‘represent’ states of affairs” (37). Interestingly, this point recalls the 
position taken by Siskin in his study that “system” may be understood “as a genre - as a form 
that works physically in the world to mediate our efforts to know it” (1). That is to say, both 
seem to converge on a view that acknowledges writing as a form of acting whether through 
“statements” (Foucault) or by means of a “genre” (Siskin) that does a kind of work in the world 
which “bring(s) about effects.” As the following chapters will lay out in their respective 
discussions, the writers in each case are also to be understood as engaging in their writing as 
actions meant to bring about certain effects - effects largely to be derived from providing their 
fellows with a new perspective on their world and some of the details of its shifting 
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“ontology” (including the nature and relationships between social identities) thereby constraining 
in their turn the ongoing workings of their societies. Or, as Snowden has summarily 
characterized an aspect of “complex adaptive systems” (CAS): “while these systems are 
constrained, the constraints are loose or only partial, and the nature of the constraints (and 
thereby the system) is constantly modified by the interaction of the agents with the system and 
each other; [that is] they coevolve” (Snowden 225).  
     In much the same way, as the present study will try to show, Staël and Kleist, Heine and 
Balzac, and finally, Mann and Mallarmé may also be said to have engaged their modernizing 
worlds in this more abstract sense of an “author function,” employing writing as a form of acting 
that was both creative and novel, and producing literary works that inter-acted with their 
increasingly complex worlds in processes of co-evolution.  
     While the discussion will touch upon several of these writers’ works (including essays), it will 
also incorporate close reading of particular ones: The Mannequin: A Dramatic Proverb in Two 
Acts by Staël; Prince Friedrich of Homburg by Kleist; Deutschland: A Winter’s Tale by Heine; 
Père Goriot by Balzac; Man of Straw by Mann; and Conflict and A Roll of the Dice Will Never 
Abolish Chance by Mallarmé. 
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Chapter 2:  
The Creative Destruction of Staël and Kleist 
     In his essay “What is the Contemporary?” (2008), Giorgio Agamben describes 
“contemporariness” as a kind of stance, or relationship to one’s historical moment, that involves 
adopting a particular mode of thought which confronts both existential and epistemological 
challenges: 
     Contemporariness is, then, a singular relationship with one’s own time…it is that 
     relationship with time that adheres to it through a disjunction and an anachronism. 
     Those who coincide too well with the epoch, those who are tied to it in every 
     respect, are not contemporaries, precisely because they do not manage to see it; 
     they are not able to firmly hold their gaze on it. (41) 
In his view, those who are most fully contemporary overcome the difficulties in “holding their 
gaze” on “[their] own time” by “not allow[ing] themselves to be blinded by the lights of the 
century, and so manage to get a glimpse of the shadows in those lights…perceiv[ing] the 
darkness of [their] time as something that concerns [them], as something that never ceases to 
engage [them]” (45).  
     This capacity for “contemporariness” has the potential to arise, I would suggest, from the 
kinds of significant “crises of agency” that pressed Staël and Kleist (and the other writer-artists 
whom I will be discussing later) towards the margins of their societies while compelling them at 
the same time to dig deep into their natural abilities and respond to these pressures creatively. 
That is, through the convergence of the “force relations” (per Foucault) that impinged upon them 
and “darkened” their worlds (as Agamben says) by throwing up new challenges to their 
aspirations and abilities to act, they arguably became highly attuned as well as motivated to 
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engage with the discourses of their times but in a “disjunctive” way (per Agamben) by altering 
the narratable and articulating some of the potentiality they perceived in their “contemporary.”  
    Staël and Kleist were radically different from each other in so many ways, of course, some of 
which will be pointed out in this chapter. Yet, despite these differences, aspects of what we know 
of their behavior as well as of some of the work that they produced also evince signs of their 
direct experience with and sensitivity to features of complex systems, as these were beginning to 
manifest in the dynamic workings and intellectual climate of Western Europe during their 
lifetimes. 
     For one thing, both were notably concerned with “limits” that various “powers” (in the 
Foucauldian sense) placed upon them. Among these limits were those engendered by increasing 
insecurities surrounding their positions in the aristocracy as well as what they encountered as so-
called common knowledge - that is, cultural conceptions of the  “womanly” or the “humanly 
possible” (as these were being disseminated through the work of intellectuals like Rousseau and 
Kant, respectively). These limits may be seen as the inverse of affordances - the options and 
opportunities for acting - that their social milieus offered them at the time. Just as systems may 
be understood as existing at different levels of scale such that “systems” at lower levels nest 
within those at higher levels, and the latter afford relatively more (or less) expansive 
“environments” to those below them as one proceeds upward along the hierarchy of such nested 
relationships, individual human beings - like Staël and Kleist - may be viewed as embodied 
systems embedded in broader social and cultural systems of varying kinds - that could range 
from family systems defined by kinship (blood relations) and rules of marriage to larger 
communal systems of varying exclusivity and “qualified” membership that were prevailing at the 
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time, such as the salons in Paris (in which Staël and her mother before her were high-profile 
participants) or Prussian military organizations or state bureaucracies (like those in which Kleist 
briefly took part during his lifetime). In other words, from such a “complex systems” 
perspective, human beings may be understood to operate in a “world” of interrelated “systems” 
that they create, co-constitute, and understand along with others as the ones in which they 
operate. And it was in such a nested “system” context, that Staël and Kleist may be said to have 
experienced themselves as “limited” and in some degree of crises as so-called “agents.” 
     But while many of us now living in the twenty-first century may acknowledge such a 
perspective or, at least, have an implicit sense that our world consists of such complex systems' 
interrelationships, those living at Staël and Kleist’s time could not (at least, not in such terms). 
This is obviously due to the fact that their world had not yet developed such a discourse; or, more 
specifically, the (social) science(s) for formulating the details of such conceptual knowledge had 
not yet emerged. As Siskin has argued, “system’s” ontological status - as a way of being in the 
world - and its influence on the material world and our ways of understanding how it operates, 
have both grown over time. Staël and Kleist would thus have necessarily understood the sense of 
“a system” quite differently from the specific ways in which we do. Yet, I would suggest that 
they were not only ahead of their time in ways that many others have argued (Staël as an early 
feminist, Kleist as a kind of proto-modernist), but that they were both also kinds of early 
systems-thinkers. And some of the ways in which they might be viewed as such will be described 
in what follows. 
     I would also speculate that they were even able to become productive “contemporaries” - to 
whom some others (those who had access to their works) would look to gauge a sense of the 
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times and their own place(s) in it - not only because of the so-called crises of agency that drove 
them, but also because of their own moves throughout the social and cultural systems in which 
they were respectively situated. Both were, in fact, among those handful of individuals who, 
because of their education and means, had opportunities to gain multiple and quite diverse 
perspectives on their societies, observing aspects of the latter from relatively privileged but what 
could also be called marginalized positions, so that they could appreciate much of the social 
dynamical complexity of their time and give it some meaningful narrative shape. Or, as 
Agamben might put it, from their positions of “disjunction,” they could see behind and through 
(metaphorically speaking) various “obscurities” of their time and work at trying to throw some 
light on the “shadows” arising from their period’s “darkness.” 
     Reasons accounting for Staël and Kleist's so-called social disjunction and marginalized 
positions obviously differed, however. Most notably, each clearly had some power in their 
respective societies, but that power was limited, as both of them well knew.  While Staël was an 
aristocrat with widespread connections in the upper echelons of her own and other countries’ 
societies, not only was the security of such a position under threat, but she was also a woman; 
and as a woman, her ability to act and impact others in the public sphere was highly constrained. 
Kleist, on the other hand, was a man and as such could move relatively freely in various domains 
in the public sphere, but he wanted to be an artist, and as such, presumably due to his 
temperament as well as his personal and professional choices, which were also clearly restricted 
by his having been born into a family of relatively low status in the Prussian aristocracy, he 
enjoyed little success.  
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     Though each could, of course, be viewed in isolation and on their own gender-specific or 
artistic terms (so to speak), the present aim, as I will underscore here once more, is to try to gain 
an appreciation of how they may be viewed as having something in common as productive 
“contemporaries” of their historical moment from a complex systems perspective. One way of 
framing some of their commonality is in the characterization of their period as one of “creative 
destruction” . These words together convey the sense of a significant eradication or clearing of a 3
space leaving a residue wherein new forms have the opportunity to emerge and proliferate 
(analogous to the notable devastation of an ecosystem whose remains germinate and contribute 
to the resumption of interconnected life-forms in a somewhat different state).     
     As I will be suggesting in my interpretation of some of these writers’ work, the latter could be 
viewed as efforts at reformulating aspects of the very natures of the so-called “elements” making 
up the societal “wholes” (systems) of which they were a part. But they were not just concerned 
with the so-called “building blocks.” Critical to the CAS perspective I will be suggesting they 
implicitly grasped, they also were concerned with how these “elements” could interdependently 
relate to each other and potentially yield new social “orders.” 
     As I will try to show, one way this manifested was through their reworking some of the 
connotations of social “binaries” (regarding female versus male (Staël), and the human versus 
non-human [Kleist]) in the context of the communal identities with which they were concerned. 
From a CAS perspective, a massive sociocultural ‘perturbation’ like that of the Revolution of 1789 may 3
be viewed as one of “creative destruction.” This term “creative destruction” initially popularized by the 
economist Joseph Schumpeter (and borrowed by Gunderson and Holling in their discussion of “adaptive 
cycles” in evolving hierarchical “human and natural” systems [34; 319]) refers to a phase of “release” of 
what have become “overconnected” (increasingly fragile) system elements - with some elements now 
available to try to capture “new” opportunities, just as others at the same time attempt to minimize losses, 
both however promptly engaging in efforts to try to work together to reorganize and establish a new 
“workable” order(ing) of system and environment (Gunderson and Holling 34-35).
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Thus, in this and other ways, they tried to redefine and give some discursive shape to the flux of 
nascent social structures burgeoning before their eyes.  
     Kleist and Staël lived at a particular historical juncture where the forms of social relation were 
being subject to profound challenges (and, particularly during the Napoleonic Wars, were 
threatening the very survival of many living in both of their homelands). Clearly there had been a 
massive and violent decimation of traditional French power structure(s) leading to destabilization 
of the pattern of social relationships defining France that was reverberating across western 
Europe, including the complex of German-speaking territories of the late Holy Roman Empire. 
Conventions - old answers to persistent questions of how to perceive and navigate in the world - 
were not only in the process of being rather widely and resoundingly denied, but traditional 
authorities for restoring order and promoting acceptable (and sanctioned) affordances were also 
no longer to be found embodied in kings or other monarchs.  
     With the latter’s legitimacy severely undermined, the search for answers was turning to 
alternate sources and deeper consideration of others who might be qualified to manage 
communities (like those of France and the still-embryonic “Germany”) which were growing in 
their socioeconomic complexity in the modern world. But as will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter four, these spreading challenges to monarchical authorities and attendant nobility where 
the sociocultural attentional focus was significantly tied to personages who were formally 
sanctioned as largely responsible for establishing and enforcing the social “order” (as the social 
ontology) were also being accompanied by the growth of more impersonal forces (such as 
commercialism and trade) to whose “power” increasing numbers of people were becoming 
subject.   
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     Thus questions regarding new kinds of “sovereignty” were circulating. From one 
Enlightenment perspective that was supported by Revolutionary democratizing principles, one 
possibility was recourse to new kinds of “selves,” those with the relatively newly appreciated 
powers of reason and capacities for systematizing that were, in their turn, fostering the growth of 
systems of knowledge that were changing (by means of various media and newly-developed 
technologies), aspects of the material world itself. As the sociologist and political scientist Jack 
Goldstone has put it, the French Revolution was itself of a relatively new kind in that a 
significant majority of its participants were specifically aiming to not restore social order based 
on an appeal to traditional authorities (kings and/or the Church), but wanted change (Goldstone 
61-62); and the change they created became a new kind of social organization legitimated by 
means of a constitution - akin to the American one recently created and clearly deriving from 
Enlightenment influences of valuation of reason and ideals regarding “natural rights, to liberate 
men (though not yet women) from [such] authorities” (Goldstone 66-69).  
     Thus, the Revolution may be regarded as having opened up a new space of possibilities for 
rethinking the world in which human beings circulated and by which they themselves and their 
social environments were constituted - worlds that inhered the potential for both a new form of 
systematic governance and new ways of looking at “the people” as elements in it. Agent 
categories could thus be said to have become foci of concern since they were a virtual crucible 
for affording new “forms” for the actors who would mediate the relations between large-scale 
communities (such as those between the French and German-speaking societies-about-to-
become-“nations” of western Europe). But they would also have had significance at the more 
micro-level of daily interactions between the elements of such large-scale systems - those 
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interactions sanctioned by relatively long-held behavioral customs and legal codes defining 
gender categories and their roles, for example.  
     Historian Suzanne Desan has reinforced this latter idea, pointing out that “the French 
Revolution destabilized gender dynamics in all sorts of ways and created spaces for self-
invention”; she also notes that the appreciation of this phenomenon over recent decades has 
provoked the development of a field now “informed by much subtler thinking about gender as 
culturally constructed,” and a growing trend towards analyzing women as “actors” with a view 
towards “individual motivation, and close attention to the day-by-day, play-by-play dynamics of 
revolutionary politics” (Desan 567-568).  
     We are now able to begin looking at Staël herself through such a lens, perceiving her as such 
an “actor” who, as the devoted daughter of a politically outspoken French financial minister 
under Louis XVI (Jacques Necker), wife of a Swedish Baron and ambassador to Paris (Erik 
Magnus Staël von Holstein), and colleague-confidant of several French and British intellectuals, 
artists, and men of state, was also someone immersed in and conversant with the details of 
revolutionary politics. But as a woman living in this time of questioning of social identities (and 
where her own aristocratic one was evidently on the wane), she not surprisingly struggled with 
her own. The public (social) identity she took pains to construct and promote was also of an 
unprecedented and complex kind - one which John Isbell has characterized as embodying 
qualities of a new “romantic heroine” and “political animal” (Isbell, 1996). 
     Thus, Staël herself philosophically explored and artistically experimented in her work with 
considerations of new possibilities for female identities as elements operating within the purview 
of the developing but relatively powerful and (under Napoleon) assertive French system. Kleist, 
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on the other hand, living in a German-speaking society under threat and on the verge of being 
dominated and (re-)defined by the very system (form of governance, legal codes, and other 
potential controls) of its aggressive French neighbor, was arguably more concerned in his work 
with expressing what it meant to him as a man (qua “human”) and an artist to be living within 
and operating as a part of a German (national) system-in-the-making.  
      The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to supporting these claims and, in particular, 
showing how both of these quite different individuals could be seen as experimenting with and 
promoting - to the extent social circumstances allowed - novel aspects of fundamental social 
identities with whose dynamics and instability they themselves appear to have had significant 
familiarity. 
     While the oeuvres of both Staël and Kleist were diverse in terms of genre, both wrote plays, 
which were prime media for representing social identities due to their form as public 
performance. As the scholar of theater studies, Erike Fischer-Lichte, has observed, plays (at least 
in the European tradition) were written with the conscious understanding that audiences 
understood theatrical performances as being concerned with staging such identities (4). She also 
argues, however, that such works may be understood as existing in a “dialectical relationship” 
between “theatre and the social reality of the theatregoers.” As she puts it, the sense of such 
theater could be appreciated by perceiving it as: 
          an integrated and integrating element of social reality, changes in which it  
          can decisively influence by a permanent dynamisation - for example, by  
          offering a current critique of the concept of identity or by proposing  
          alternatives, perhaps even by initiating them…Enormous tension can  
          arise [however] between the dominant concept of identity in the social  
          class which supports the theatre and the outline of identity created by  
          a drama - and its performance on stage. (5) 
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Fischer-Lichte refers here to what she regards as a long-standing tradition by which European 
theater and dramatists operated, which was also one in which Staël and Kleist worked, though 
they would have introduced their own specific stylistic nuances in the designing of identities 
working to find expression in their own plays.  
     Just over a decade ago, the cultural historian Lynn Hunt published a manifesto of sorts to 
fellow scholars in an article entitled “The Experience of Revolution” (2009) that bears on the 
related matter of how to regard and try to interpret works by artists like Staël and Kleist, who 
produced their creations during a time of dramatic social change. In it, she proposed a kind of 
paradigm shift away from scholars perceiving and describing “the world as discursively 
constructed” (a mode in which she acknowledged having herself long participated) towards one 
that acknowledges a world that is “also built through embodiment, gesture, facial expression, and 
feelings, that is, through nonlinguistic modes of communication that have their own 
logics” (emphases added) (674). She admits having come to make this intellectual move herself 
via an awareness of some recent observations in neuroscience (for which I must also 
acknowledge some bias) that reinforced the value to her of considering the impact of felt 
experience on minds interacting with each other in the cultural expressions of such a period.  
     Specifically, she notes that these neuroscientific observations 1) provide evidence for the 
“self’s” material basis in physiologic processes which act as “an organizer that arranges, 
categorizes, and manages experience” (that is, “it is not simply a discursive effect”), 2) 
underscore the reality of unconscious processes (including feelings and emotions) arising from 
bodies that interact with more or less conscious cognitive faculties of reason and decision-
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making as well as aspects of the physical and sociocultural world around them, and 3) help 
illuminate sources of the human capacity for “empathetic identification with others” - a capacity 
which allows us to have some access to (rather than being completely sealed off from) the 
feelings of others (673).  
     In addition, as she argues, attempts to understand the time of the French Revolution and its 
aftermath should include acknowledgement of its having been a time when many if not most 
individuals of the period experienced some form of revolutionary violence, whether arising from 
frightening physical threats (that Stael testified she had personally been subject to [see Hillman 
250]), the mayhem of the Terror, and/or the aggressive threats and disorientation immanent in the 
Napoleonic Wars that subsequently traveled across Europe, where “words were rushing to catch 
up” to what individuals felt and yet (in that less articulate sense) still knew (674-675). In other 
words, in Hunt’s view, this historical period of significant tumult and intermittently explosive 
violence should also be acknowledged as a time when the”irrational” and “unpredictable” were 
as present and operative as “rational calculation” and the “predictable” (675). The Revolution’s 
impact, therefore, may be understood not only in universal but also in psychological and visceral 
terms.     
     And, finally, as artistic depictions, such as prints, proliferated in that period, they “helped 
society or ‘the social’ become more visible” “as an object of experience and cognition”; and with 
their aid, “the gap grew between customary social experience and new political expectations…
[and] the uncertainty and anxiety created by this growing gap prompted new kinds of reflections 
about and new kinds of representations of social relations (Hunt 677). In sum, they captured the 
loss of “semiotic stability” in many aspects of “the social” representing itself to itself, and 
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thereby “opened the door to a new conceptualization of society itself” - a conceptualization that 
could not simply be “imposed,” but, particularly in the modern era, “must be learned, lived, 
embodied, and felt within individual selves” (Hunt 678). 
     Assuming all of this to be the case, works like Staël’s The Mannequin and Kleist’s Prince 
Friedrich of Homburg may be understood as not only having been informed by such experiences 
but also affording representational “mirrors” by which their audiences could be helped to see 
themselves and their world differently.  
    Staël lived through and experienced the Revolution and subsequent Terror directly, so that it 
would seem quite reasonable to try and discern some of the effects of such experience on her 
thinking and her work, as Hunt advocates. Yet, for her, “experience” had also included exposure 
to Enlightenment ideas and valorization of systematic approaches to thinking and behavior. This 
particular confluence of experiences may account for some of the differences between her 
thinking and that of intellectual female contemporaries who had not shared them. Thus, her 
reflections on sensibility as well as her philosophy of the passions, though not always internally 
consistent in their details (showing, as they did, signs of some reconsideration over time), did 
always demonstrate an acknowledgment and appreciation of both feelings - whether arising 
physiologically or morally (through what we would now call empathy) - and reason and logic to 
temper and guide them in their behavioral expression. As French and Enlightenment scholar Tili 
Boon Cuillé has observed: 
          Unlike Mary Wollstonecraft, who continued to oppose sensibility and reason, 
          billing the one as feminine and the other as masculine, Staël considered the 
          two qualities to be complementary, and their combination to be an essential  
          attribute of all citizens - men and women alike - if the republican ideal was to 
          become a reality. (9) 
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Staël’s consistent acknowledgment of this complementarity as an “essential attribute of all 
citizens,” I would argue, was yet another manifestation of how system was proceeding to operate 
as a (still in many ways unconscious) form working in the world to “mediate our efforts to know 
it” (Siskin 1). Going beyond simply advocating their complementary relationship, Staël (unlike 
Wollstonecraft and many others who took the latter’s position) promoted a neutralization of the 
connotation that “sensibility” was to be associated with the category of the feminine and 
“reason” with the masculine. That is, she was systematically trying to rework the “binarism” of 
the feminine/masculine social identities of her period by articulating new connotations for the 
“signed” differences between them in the future she envisioned. Her work also had the potential 
to impress certain people in the western European world of the time because she had made a 
name for herself as a so-called “scandalous” woman as well as a celebrated public intellectual 
virtually on a par with other public intellectuals like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, whose 
work Staël generally admired and knew quite well (for a discussion of Rousseau’s own use of the 
terminology of systems as a significant form in his Confessions, see Siskin [177-178]). 
     There are various reasons for focusing on one of her plays entitled The Mannequin: A 
Dramatic Proverb in Two Acts in the present discussion. Though it has typically not been viewed 
as one of her major works, Staël appears to have considered its details as thoughtfully as she did 
those which achieved wider attention. As use of the word “proverb” in its title implies, Staël 
regarded it in some ways as being a work of that literary genre of proverbes that were forms of 
morality plays that had been popular in England centuries earlier but which were becoming 
popular again “in the drawing rooms of France in the nineteenth century” (and particularly later 
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in that century through the works of Alfred de Musset)(Neuss 1). Such plays could often be 
comedies, though they were intended to be “educational, designed to be read as a truth of the 
proverb the playwright chose to illustrate,” though they could be “amplifications of proverbs” 
rather than being explicitly based on one (Neuss 1-2). In this particular work of Staël’s, no 
explicit proverb is mentioned in the title or the play itself. But reference to a “mannequin” did 
have special significance for many at the time who were “in the know” regarding prevailing 
social and political debates. And the linking of the gender category of the feminine with 
connotations of mannequins - notably their “dummy” qualities, such as silence, and lack of 
movement or willful self-direction - was, by all accounts, anathema to Staël. There is little doubt 
that she would have wanted to oppose such notions gaining traction in this time of unstable 
social identities,  
     Staël had also already written two of her most famous and widely read novels Delphine 
(1802) and Corinne (1807) when she wrote The Mannequin in 1811. In those novels, she had 
examined the limits of women’s freedom in an aristocratic society and as an artist in western 
European culture (contemporary England and Italy). In Corinne specifically, as Maria 
Fairweather, one of Staël’s biographers, indicates, Staël had given her heroine a “strong voice” 
and had “tackled head on the image of the ideal woman as a submissive creature who remained 
silent or at best only uttered polite commonplaces”; yet, despite this forthright quality of her 
character, the novel ends tragically for Corinne, leaving one “with questions rather than 
answers,” as it “demonstrates yet again that the society of the time would not tolerate such 
women” (327). At the point she chose to write The Mannequin, Staël had already been exiled 
without a trial, banished to a distance of no closer than 200 km from Paris, by Napoleon, who 
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used various means to discredit her and her work, including limiting much of its printing because 
of what he regarded as its subversive qualities. Knowing of her extensive network of foreign and 
domestic connections that included diplomats and many of his political opponents, he perceived 
her as a significant threat to the government he was in the process of trying to establish, where a 
woman’s voice such as hers would not have been welcome.  
     Despite such pressures, Staël did return in The Mannequin to the dilemma of an intellectually 
gifted woman who feels highly constrained in speaking her mind publicly. In it, however, she 
changes the manner of presentation of this theme. The changes she makes point not only to her 
versatility but also suggest some additional circumspection on her part regarding how to go about 
the writing and portrayal of such a then-provocative female character. As we will see, this 
character (like Staël herself) is obliged to use round-about methods to achieve a goal that she 
views as ultimately beneficial to “all concerned.”  
     This play was actually written for her private theater at Coppet - the home her father had built 
and to which he and his family had retreated just prior to the Revolution, after his own temporary 
banishment from Paris and the employ of Louis XVI when he attempted to explain aspects of his 
views as finance minister in a public debate and disclosed embarrassing details (in the king’s 
view) regarding the French national debt. Staël apparently learned many lessons about social and 
political discretion (or possible consequences of the lack of it) from her beloved father. French 
scholar Joyce Johnston has stated that Staël never even sought to have her plays staged, which 
may have been because (as she indicates John Isbell also proposes), she wished to “maintain a 
private persona in response to her political influence” (14). In the privacy of her home, however, 
where censors had no place and she could be selective of her audience, Staël could proceed to 
!  36
stage this short satire  - which has been summarized by Fairweather as a “comedy” in which 
“Sophie, the talkative and feisty heroine, persuades an unwanted suitor to fall in love instead 
with her pretty and demure ‘cousin’ who, happy to sit at the back of the room” and never broach 
“her own opinion about anything” turns out to be a “cardboard doll” or mannequin (327).   
     Staël’s own political savvy and pragmatism could thus be said to be in evidence here, as they 
were in the penning of many of her other writings including those that were not set for the stage. 
That is, she recognized her place in her own patterned system of social relations and appears to 
have engaged in specific maneuvers to navigate this very system so as to avoid reprisal and 
protect herself, while continuing to do her utmost to impart her then radical views to help 
refashion the social identities comprising it. Knowing herself to be an official outsider and 
incapable of participating in the programatic formulations and policy directions of her own social 
system, and in some real danger herself from those (like Napoleon) who disagreed with and may 
have felt in some ways threatened by her, she allowed men (including some trusted members in 
her own extensive social circle) to present some of her ideas, if indirectly (Johnston also notes 
that “[Staël’s] plays were adapted by male authors of the time” including E.T.A. Hoffman and 
somewhat later Jacques Offenbach who “borrow[ed] elements” of The Mannequin’s plot to 
"overturn social codes” in their own work - Der Sandman (1815) and Les Contes d’Hoffmann 
(1880), respectively) [Johnston 14]).  
     Vivian Folkenflick also points out in the introduction to her translation of selected writings by 
Staël that The Mannequin has been interpreted as a “light-hearted comedy” with a feminist 
theme, but that Staël subsequently took up its theme more seriously in her Second Preface to her 
Letters on Rousseau (in 1814, two years before her death), where “she warns that a woman who 
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cannot find intellectual freedom ‘is nothing but a doll’” (32). This latter comment may be 
understood as being in response to Rousseau’s paternalist discussions of dolls in the context of 
women’s education for which he was “notorious among progressive thinkers [like] Germaine de 
Staël and Mary Wollstonecraft” (Douthwaite 280).  
     It is presumably in this context that Staël’s proverbial mannequin may be appreciated. Though 
an acknowledged admirer of much of Rousseau’s liberal thought with whom she shared “the 
Enlightenment project to reform society and the arts in light of a revised notion of human nature” 
(Cuillé 6-7), Staël obviously differed with him on several of the details of how to achieve these 
reforms, notably where women were concerned.  
     In The Mannequin, she also employs several techniques for simultaneously portraying and 
conveying her deeply intertwined philosophical and political views. Staël was obviously an 
accomplished writer who not only prided herself on her own literary skill and rhetorical 
eloquence, but also regarded these capacities - for communicating via speaking and in writing - 
as tools with and to which artists (and particularly educated women) were highly suited (this 
view is one she articulates at great length in her De la littérature dans ses rapports avec les 
institutions sociales (1799), which is “sometimes hailed as one of the founding texts of literary 
criticism” [Hillman 237]). As Suzanne Guerlac, scholar of French literature and culture, has 
noted, Staël reported that her own experience in the Paris salons imbued her with a view that 
“power is achieved through a force of language and character is revealed through words,” and 
that it was by means of such expressions of power and character that women could find real 
influence; as Staël saw it, such expression also had the potential for opposing Napoleon’s 
military empire with “an empire of speech” that was informed by “passions” of a virtuous, 
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“loving” and “persuasive” kind (Guerlac 53). By refashioning “the feminine” into the portrayal 
of what she regarded as a more authentic female character, she appears to have envisioned a new 
role for women, one by which they could be understood as reasonably included within the 
discourses (qua multiplicity of force relations per Foucautl) of the systems of the new western 
European societies on the sociocultural horizon.  
     It is thus not simply comical but also ironic that she would portray the heroine of this play 
The Mannequin as one who stages a social identity but through her very performance illustrates 
the real undesirability of a superficially attractive but, in fact, unfeeling and soulless doll 
(“dummy”) who is completely incapable of expressing any character or identity. Considering the 
play thoughtfully, one can appreciate and see through some of the “shadows of the time” (per 
Agamben) which tended to obscure the full humanity of women, according to Staël. 
     It should also be noted, however, that as Staël has created this play, what matters are not 
simply gender identities and how her audience might have understood their sociopolitical 
construction. Apparently recognizing much of the complexity of Identities (and the challenges 
associated with trying to manage their interrelations in practice from her own experience during 
her tumultuous time), she complicates this relatively brief and simple narrative with an 
interweaving of identity concerns grounded in ties to one’s family and homeland as well. 
Tensions between perspectives rooted in (now-) competing classes and livelihoods (those of the 
traditional aristocrat, more modern businessman, and “enduring” artist) are also present. 
     The play consists of just four characters whose interactions take place exclusively in a 
domestic space in Berlin, the home of a young woman Sophie and her father, M. de la Morlière, 
a prosperous businessman with his own composite identity as a French émigré who now lives 
!  39
and conducts all his work in Germany and in German. Such a framing is significant on several 
levels, including the fact that it appears as an interesting recalling of Staël’s own situation as a 
privileged individual with complex social affiliations arising from ties to diverse geographically-
dispersed communities existing in some tension with one another.  
     Despite his ties to France by ancestry and cultural preference (which he repeatedly 
underscores in the dialogue), but because his religious faith as a Huguenot conflicts with that of 
French Roman Catholics, M. de la Morlière has been obliged to continue to reside in “Protestant 
Germany” on which he now depends for his livelihood. Born and raised in this socioculturally 
hybrid environment, Sophie tries to satisfy some of her own inclinations while navigating 
between and being obliged to meet demands arising from two of the three other (all male) 
characters who are portrayed as largely caricatured members of these various French and 
German communities. 
     In the opening scene, the crux of the plot is immediately established as a conflict between 
Sophie’s desire to marry a young German artist, Frederic Hoffman (who loves her and 
appreciates her intellect) and her father’s desire (and the promise he has already made) to have 
her marry a particular French gentleman, the Count d’Erville, whom Sophie dislikes. She 
indicates to her father that her strong distaste is based on the Count’s giving no indication of 
recognizing or caring anything about her feelings (offering no signs of empathy, seemingly in 
another recalling of Staël’s own conflict with Napoleon) and his never acknowledging her or 
other people’s real characters (which the Count himself subsequently affirms, as when he 
casually responds to a question posed to him that “frankly, I really wasn’t listening” [330]). 
Sophie explicitly notes that she loves her “Papa” and regards it as her duty to abide by his 
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wishes. But her fondness for the young German Fredric becomes clear in the tone and reciprocal 
flow of their dialogue as well as in their ability to devise and stage the mannequin plot for 
misleading the Count together. With these character maneuvers, we see the beginnings of a 
potential re-arrangement of relationships between the play’s “elements” - that were initially 
established on the basis of M. de la Morlière’s “promise” and Sophie’s uncertain position in the 
space of relations. 
     Along one dimension, the play’s staging of embodied national identities and alliances 
resonates yet again with Staël’s own apparent struggles to reconcile homeland allegiances. 
Though the offspring of Swiss parents, in public settings she tended to proclaim herself French 
and it was from such a stance that she actually opposed Napoleon, France’s leader. But as the 
historian Susanne Hillman has put it: 
          as de Staël conceived [the term nation], it connoted a spiritual and  
          cultural homeland, a place where one’s friends dwelled, and a land for 
          which one might need to sacrifice oneself. What it was not was a  
          specific territory with precisely delimited borders. Instead, it constituted 
          an imagined entity, an idea that inspired feelings of love and belonging 
          regardless of its geopolitical shape and that demanded one’s loyalty,  
          ultimately for the benefit of humankind. (252) 
Such a conception of the nation, in an age when concerns regarding this new category of social 
identity and its defense were being sparked by Napoleon’s own expansionist aggression, was a 
difficult one to publicly defend. In a kind of mirroring of this problem, Sophie’s initial argument 
with her father that she be allowed to marry Fredric fails - as the limits of the possible, 
established by his promise and the form of “nationalism” he defends, are too strong. Thus, 
despite his own birth and continued residence in Germany, his particular form of French 
“nationalism” asserts itself in his maintaining that “I may have happened to be born [in 
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Germany], but birth is an accident; it counts for nothing in the life of a man. My real country is 
France,” where he regards his ancestors as having been “full of glory” when they left (327). He 
will only agree to her choice of husband if she can find a way to absolve him from his promise of 
engagement of her to the Count. Hence Sophie’s plan to dupe the latter with Fredric’s help 
emerges.  
     At the same time, the narrative’s specific lauding of Sophie’s willingness to maintain and 
strengthen her German identity (via marriage to Fredric) appears as purposeful as does the 
design of Sophie’s ruse. During her period of exile, Staël traveled extensively in Germany, 
clearly admiring much of its culture  (particularly that of Prussia, which she referred to as “la 
patrie de la pensée” in her De l’Allemagne [1813]); and, as Hillman also notes, Staël’s 
“celebration of the splendid tapestry of national cultures, woven of all the intellectual riches of 
mankind, carries undeniable Herderian overtones” (244-245). That is, by all accounts, Staël 
herself respected and felt great affection for this Other culture, and could portray her heroine as 
seeking happiness in this commingling of national affiliations. Thus, the emphatic nationalism in 
the context of this matter of her engagement, which the male authority (father) figure and the 
French Count in her play embody, will only be amenable to a kind of softening and re-
negotiation of their positions if she can find a way to convincingly illustrate the value of an 
articulate female - who prefers a more diplomatic solution (like that which Staël had tried to 
articulate to Napoleon) - to them.   
     The Count is portrayed through the dialogue, however, as a self-absorbed man of questionable 
morals (as when he states, for example, “I’ve already been in love lots of times, and lots of 
people have been in love with me” [334]), who frankly has no love for wealthy Sophie but has 
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“lots of debt,” which he ascribes to “the custom in France” [331]). He appears, therefore, to be a 
man who will be difficult to convince by any conventional means or methods of diplomacy. 
Thus, Sophie must design a different strategy, but notably she also does this with the full 
awareness and support of her fellow artist Fredric. 
   Then as the plot unfolds, and in the course of being subjected to the staging of her device, the 
unsuspecting Count actually expresses his preference for a mute, immobile, and unaccomplished 
“woman" (who “never bothered much about reading,” “doesn’t think it quite right for a woman 
to draw,” and has no [singing] voice at all” [345]), who shortly thereafter turns out to be simply a 
mannequin.  
     We see, however, that in the process of fooling and then “illuminating” the Count, Sophie’s 
character also becomes transformed, from one with very limited social agency - completely 
subject as she is to what her father and the Count have decided for her - to one who has played a 
significant role in deciding her own fate. Sophie’s newly-found “agency” may also be understood 
as her having re-negotiated aspects of the “boundaries” between her German female character 
and the French male character of the Count (a move which also recalls Staël’s own desires for a 
more peaceful rapprochement between Germany and France). One appreciates this reconciliation 
in the Count’s final comments wherein, for the first time, he not only “listens” to Sophie (his 
tendency to not “listen,” particularly to her, has been emphasized repeatedly up to this point), but 
also directly acknowledges her presence and her “wishes” (347). The demarcation that has also 
been maintained (with some satirical humor) by the male characters in their expressed 
preferences for French versus German cultural values and identities has also been softened, as 
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Sophie’s father relinquishes his wish for a French son-in-law and will allow young Frederic to 
take the Count’s place. 
     Staël obviously recognized the challenges she confronted in trying to publicly stage the 
performance of such a play - one that, despite its overt light-heartedness, could easily be 
interpreted as taking a “stab” at the militaristic form of nationalism and disparagement of the 
female voice embodied in the Napoleonic regime. But she was also something of an idealist, 
whose aspirations appear to have included effecting various maneuvers to re-form the various 
social systems (in all of their complexity) that she observed in flux around her. Thus, even with 
this “secret” play, she articulated a vision of a world where the happiness and well-being of 
individuals could be aligned with the happiness and well-being of the communities qua nations 
in which they lived (a vision she also projected as a second part of her De l'influence des 
passions sur le bonheur des individus et des nations (1796), but which she never completed 
[Guerlac 44]). In contrast to Staël’s novel Corinne then, which ends tragically with more 
“questions than answers” (Fairweather 327), The Mannequin offers a different kind of ending 
and suggests an alternate set of connotations for addressing the traditional “binarisms” of 
masculine and feminine and opposing national identities within its narrative system of meaning.  
     It would also seem to be worth noting that the clever dialogical tool of employing insincerity 
in Sophie’s and Fredric’s combined efforts to fool the Count had the potential to exert a similar 
effect on her intended audience. As the philosopher Andreas Stokke has discussed at length in his 
recent book Lying and Insincerity, insincere speech is one among several ways of circumventing 
the general expectation most of us have that speech is used to inform others by communicating 
truths about the world. Unlike frank lying, however, which is an example of a kind of speech that 
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is often regarded as asserting a non-truth from purely selfish motives to deceive, other forms of 
insincerity can, at times, serve valuable purposes, as in the case of implicating or communicating 
things indirectly and/or obliging ordinary speakers to engage in meta-linguistic reasoning and 
surmise a truth without harming them or hurting their feelings (Stokke 3-5). Thus, we find, in the 
play’s concluding scene, that Sophie offers a lengthy explanation of her behavior to the Count 
whom she implores to “not make a simple joke into something horrible,” but rather to now 
understand her motivation and desires to which he has previously been oblivious. With such a 
maneuver, Staël has again demonstrated her rhetorical and verbal skills, cleverly revising the 
thinking and altering the controlling behavior of this French male character (who now releases 
her from her engagement) without in any way demeaning him and at the same time illustrating 
what we might call the moral of this tale to her audience: that our heroine, like the Count 
himself, constitutes a genuine person - that is to say, an element of their social relational system 
with actual agency and thus a “force” (à la Foucault) to be reckoned with - and not a cardboard 
or “living doll” (347).   
     Finally, I would suggest that Staël employs another related technique in this play that 
illustrates her significant appreciation of not only the nuances of interpersonal dynamics but of 
how systems  - at multiple levels - operate. It involves the element of surprise. 
     In her recent book Elements of Surprise: Our Mental Limits and the Satisfactions of Plot, 
scholar of cognitive literary studies, Vera Tobin, has observed that despite conceptions of 
surprise covering a wide range of phenomena that differ significantly in their degrees of 
unexpectedness and contrast with held beliefs, “well-made” surprises in narratives “produce a 
flash reinterpretation of events together with the feeling that the evidence for this reinterpretation 
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was there all along” (1-2). Staël’s The Mannequin could certainly be viewed as such a “well-
made” play constructed around an intentional induction of surprise and “flash reinterpretation” - 
such that the Count abruptly comes to change his thinking (and, in the audience’s witnessing of 
this moment, they may also change theirs).  
     Surprise as an emotion has also been extensively studied by psychologists, though it has 
recently begun to receive greater attention by scholars in other disciplines, such as cognitive 
science, linguistics, and philosophy (see, for example, Expressing and Describing Surprise, 
edited by Agnès Celle and Laure Lansari, John Benjamins Publishing, 2017 and Surprise: An 
Emotion?, edited by Natalie Depraz and Anthony J. Steinbeck, Springer, 2018). Despite there 
being no complete scholarly consensus, surprise seems to differ fundamentally from other 
emotions and specifically those that elicit typical, and typically overt, behavioral responses. 
Surprise has been conceived to operate more as a “general interrupter to ongoing activity” or, 
metaphorically speaking and in its most intense form, as a kind of “circuit breaker” (Tomkins 
107).  
     The term surprise is also used by some, however, to refer to certain phenomena in the 
scientific field of complex systems (see, for example, Uncertainty and Surprise in Complex 
Systems: Questions on Working with the Unexpected, edited by Reuben R. McDaniel, Jr. and 
Dean J. Driebe, Springer, 2005). The term as used in this context is not simply meant 
metaphorically, but actually refers to phenomena at levels of scale beyond the individual, 
specifically at the level of “people in organizations” who, as (members of) collectives often tend 
to “view surprises as unwelcome and generally dysfunctional occurrences, prompting actions to 
avoid or manage them” (McDaniel and Driebe (7). In other words, they are perceived by such 
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groups of individuals as significant disruptions of a status quo that then promote some alternate 
course of action. 
     Staël knew herself to be a self-interested individual, but she also knew herself to be a part of 
broader systems - a family as well as a (set of) communit(ies) whose survival and well-being 
were of great concern to her. Though she had personally experienced massive surprises and come 
face-to-face with aspects of the fundamental disruption of  the western European social order, 
she (like many others subject to the same experience) was concerned in her work with making 
creative efforts to regroup but on a new course of action after this experience. In her case, this 
regrouping and redirection took place not only at the personal level of her own family but also 
within her writing projects, whose themes had obvious connotations suggesting greater roles for 
women at the broader collective levels of society and in the debates surrounding French 
nationalism.  
    Staël’s forward-looking vision, despite its being a relatively influential one at the time, was 
just one of those “in the air,” however. If Staël aspired to being a “part” of a new kind of nation, 
a new kind of “France,” one where its men and women (qua system elements) engaged with each 
other in a space where both were agents (probably citizens) motivated by the Enlightenment 
ideal of reason and “sensibility” working together, this was her own unique expression of an 
ideal for a potentially new social reality. She recognized that change was inevitable, and she 
seems to have been driven to try to alter at least one connotation of the feminine in the discourses 
of her time. That is, she tried to re-form the alternate (and largely prevailing male) conception of 
women as “living dolls” with little (if any) capacity for reason who, if they acted at all, it was as 
a consequence of being driven by their inherent (comparatively less rational) sensibilities which 
!  47
required firm external (that is, “male”) direction for their proper guidance. Thus, without denying 
many of the clear differences between women and men, or contesting the idea that women were 
motivated by unique sensibilities, she worked at reframing the details of gender categories in a 
manner that could raise the possibility of women’s co-participation in the political governance 
and development of rational economic and other social policies of the new French republic (qua 
system organized on a foundation of various rationally structured sub-systems).  
     Kleist, a notoriously conflicted but talented soul whose life would end tragically early (and 
infamously) in a highly calculated suicide pact with a woman, also had a forward-looking artistic 
vision influenced by certain Enlightenment ideals. Akin to Staël’s, it could be said to have arisen 
in part from a sensing of certain threats to his agency. But unlike Staël, who was quite concerned 
with “who” would be able to participate in her society’s “systematic” reconstitution, Kleist, as I 
will try to show, was more concerned with the question of “how.” That is, how might men create 
a new “system” or form of community, going so far at times as to even question the very 
feasibility of the latter. 
     While the “destabilization of gender dynamics” that Desan refers to was obviously acutely 
felt by Staël in terms of her social identity as a woman - thus influencing several aspects of her 
proposed version of social reform - masculinities themselves were far from immune. In 
particular, on the German side of the conflicts related to the various Napoleonic Wars that arose 
in the aftermath of the French Revolution, questions of male identities along with national 
identities were also at issue. Renewed “thinking about feeling” and debates regarding such 
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identities’ relationship to agency that the French Revolution fostered , and that much of Staël’s 4
own work could be argued to have epitomized (from a female perspective), also found 
expression in this other world of largely German-speaking peoples who sensed the growing 
French threat. Kleist’s passionate male voice may be seen as among those concerned with how to 
address various challenges - including, though not limited to, those for which men would have 
been militarily responsible - engendered in his own society by this physical and sociocultural 
threat. 
     But, from what we know of his life (and the details are relatively limited, since he was a more 
enigmatic and socially isolated individual than was Staël), both his personal and intellectual 
concerns centered less on the details of pragmatic differences between men and women and their 
implications for politics (his vision seems to have had no kinship with any kind of early 
“feminism”) and more on the constitution of aspects of human - still very much qua “male” - 
nature. 
     Born in 1777 into a family occupying a lower rung of the Prussian aristocratic hierarchy that 
had traditionally produced men entering the military, and then orphaned in his early adolescence 
(his father, a captain in the Prussian army dying unexpectedly, followed three years later by his 
mother, who had been denied a pension as well as her request for her son Heinrich’s entrance 
into the military academy), Kleist appears to have occupied a world effectively on the outer 
margins of privilege and the mainstream from a relatively early age. Initially home-schooled, he 
entered the Prussian army as a corporal at age fourteen where he met two young men who would 
 See Rosenfeld, Sophia. “Thinking about Feeling, 1789-1799.” French Historical  4
 Studies, vol. 32, no. 4, 2009, pp. 697-706 for extensive discussion.
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become his life-long friends, but where he also apparently felt an “unbearable” dissonance 
between his ideals and his daily life experience, so that he left vowing never to return to the 
military (though he did so briefly, years later, on a couple of occasions related to personal 
ideological conflicts involving Napoleon) to educate himself and pursue an administrative career 
(Fischer 2-3). Early in the process of following his avowed plan, Kleist underwent what has been 
referred to as his “Kantian crisis” - a dramatic response to his understanding (that may have 
involved some misinterpretation) of some of Kant’s work on the “limits” of human reason. What 
specific works Kleist read remains unknown, though signs of his tormented disenchantment with 
what he understood Kant (an intellectual hero of his and of many others of the time) to mean 
appear in some of his regular correspondence with his half-sister Ulrike (a confidante who also 
often came to Kleist’s rescue when he was in financial straits, which occurred frequently). While 
further elaboration of the known details of the personal difficulties Kleist experienced in his 
early life goes beyond what can be included here, it may be stated in summary that these 
adversities were among those which many scholars regard as most influential in provoking 
Kleist’s altering his career plans, turning to writing, and in firing his artistic ambition. 
     But his well-known struggles to subsequently establish and “define” himself as a respected 
artist (that is, one viewed by others - including Goethe - as one worthy of the “name”) were also 
accompanied by similar and ongoing struggles to become an established “part” of any particular 
- and socially sanctioned - community in his society. He apparently suffered from a stammer that 
contributed to bouts of social anxiety. And between bursts of creative activity (as well as within 
the themes of some of their products), there are signs of his inclination towards recurrent 
movement, so to speak, and accompanying identity ambiguities, so that he truly could be said to 
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have “adhered” to his historical moment via a “disjunction” (as Agamben might put it) and as a 
“denizen of the in-between” (Mehigan and Fischer 4). 
     Thus, though he was briefly engaged to a young woman, for example, that arrangement was 
ultimately broken off for unclear reasons; at the same time, feelings he expressed in some of his 
correspondence with male friends have raised questions about his own sexuality, though whether 
he was actually homosexual or was simply significantly engaged in the so-called “cult of 
friendship” of the period remains a question of debate (Pfeiffer 215-217). Contributing to these 
controversies are arguments surrounding his motivation to also address matters of “male (or 
veritable human) nature” from an intellectual position. Some scholars see Kleist as having a 
resistance to the scientifically-grounded (Humboldtian) discourse that was shifting from a one-
sex to the two-sex and “complementary gender system” emerging in the early nineteenth century 
that has persisted till today (see Pahl’s Sex Changes with Kleist (2019) for full discussion) as well 
as a fascination with “androgyny” and “simultaneously constructing and disrupting binaristic 
gender categories” both in his fiction and in his correspondence (where, at one point, for 
example, he expressed the desire ‘to fashion a wife’ “[out] of his bride as a still formless ‘mass’ 
which he [would] sculpt into a perfect being”) (MacLeod 208-209).  
     Along with these apparent concerns regarding the forms of sociocultural categories of (kinds 
of) persons, however, were Kleist’s aforementioned even broader ones centered on constitution 
of “the subject.” That is, there are various signs that he was interested in the processes 
underlying the latter’s capacity for thinking and understanding, and thereby also characterizing 
(the extent of) one’s autonomy. These concerns were, of course, central to Kant’s own widely-
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circulated philosophical project grounded in his three Critiques: those of Pure Reason (1781, 
1787), of Practical Reason (1788), and of The Power of Judgment (1790).  
     But while Kant’s highly influential work (and major contributions to the discourses of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in particular) consisted of a systematic exploration of 
these phenomena characterizing the subject and his subjectivity in a philosophical sense, Kleist’s 
artistically assertive response was a complex one, which manifested in both his creative fiction 
as well as in what have been deemed his “unorthodox philosophical essays” (Fischer 15).  
     In the former, he seems to have often experimented with dramatic characters (as in his Prince 
Friedrich of Homberg to be discussed below in more detail), many of whom are depicted as 
subject to obscure or conflicted (paradoxical) motivations, at the same time that he tried his hand 
at “structural innovations” that provided “cues which alert the audience or reader to the presence 
of a creative disturbance of patterns that had grown all too familiar and predictable” (Stephens 
72). Some of these latter have even been interpreted as bestowing a “parodying” (Stephens 72) or 
“ironic” and ‘“comedic” (Frye 229) form to the narrative shape of what could otherwise be 
viewed as serious existential and potentially disturbing themes.  
     At the same time, through his essays (discussion of which may be argued to provide some 
useful background for appreciating the general tenor of his intellectual stance - though given his 
own range of expression and “unsettled” tendencies, none will be suggested to hold the 
monolithic key to his fictions), Kleist does articulates a quite prophetic vision of “complex 
systems” and of man himself as a “being” within them. Specifically, I mean to suggest that with 
(at least) two of his most widely-read essays, Kleist not only affords his readers with some 
intriguing perspective on his own “contemporary vision” (again, per Agamben) but also 
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expresses his rather prescient view of man‘s nature as a kind of self-reflective as well as socially 
reflexive being which would become recognizable as a kind of “complex system” itself in certain 
scientific discourses many decades later. At the same time (as he portrays it and as we now also 
understand it), this individual “complex system” may also be seen as one (nested) within and 
subject to the manipulations of such “systems” (like bureaucracies and nations) operating 
simultaneously but at higher scales. 
     In his brief essay “On the Gradual Construction of Thoughts During Speech” (1806), for 
example, Kleist challenges the “traditional image of thought - of thinking as conscious retreat 
into the interiority of reason,” portraying it instead as a kind of self-organizing process which, 
once instigated, emerges in its full form “outside the mind,” “materializ[ing] in speech and 
writing” where it is “shot through with impersonal energies that undermine the integrity of 
subjectivity” (Gailus 245). As Kleist himself states, “I have only to begin boldly and the mind, 
obliged to find an end for this beginning, transforms my confused concept as I speak into 
thoughts that are perfectly clear, so that, to my surprise [one might recall here the significance of 
“surprise” in the operation of “complex systems” discussed earlier], the end of the sentence 
coincides with the desired knowledge” (42). As a part of his formulation, he also states that he 
views this process as an unconscious “energetic” one associated with a sudden “well[ing] of 
immense possibilities break[ing] through into consciousness” (43), so that “it is not we who 
know, but at first it is only a certain state of mind of ours that knows” (45), and that speech is, 
therefore, not to be understood as an “impediment, a sort of brake on the wheel of intellect, but 
like a second wheel running parallel with it on the same axle” (44).  
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     This veritable externalization of the “construction of thoughts” as an emergent process 
involving the interplay of simultaneously operating forces would have been a particularly radical 
philosophical position in his own time, but as the German scholar Bernd Fischer has stated, it 
“not only anticipates much of today’s pragmatic and structuralist language theories but also 
confronts the reader with the problem of intended and unintended consequences of speech-acts in 
a manner that is almost reminiscent of chaos-theoretical assumptions” (Fischer 15). For the 
purposes of the present discussion, it is also important to note that “chaos-theory” is a branch of 
mathematics that focuses on dynamical systems whose behaviors may superficially appear 
unpredictable (that is, random or “chaotic”) but which are actually explicable through 
appreciation of their high sensitivity to initial conditions - as in the case of the so-called 
“butterfly effect.” 
     Arguably much like Staël, with her drive to alter the perceived connotations of the feminine 
(or female) in the discourses of her society, Kleist could also be seen as driven to articulate a 
(then-) unconventional conception or connotation of the human “subject” - going so far as to 
limit the value of reason and foreground the role of unconscious processes in a re-working of the 
binarism between the Enlightened sense of the human and the non-human (or animal qua 
“inhuman”). We see additional, and perhaps even more pointed, evidence for this in his later 
essay “On the Marionette Theater” (which Kleist published in four installments in 1810 in the 
daily journal Berliner Abendblätter that he himself edited, but which lost financial support and 
whose publication ended after less than a year in 1811 not long before his suicide).  
     This longer essay, which has been subject to various scholarly interpretations, is  written in 
the style of a dialogue arising in a public park (where puppet theater performances are staged) as 
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the narrator encounters an old friend and master dancer who is the chief interlocutor. In this 
hybrid story-speculative essay, the interlocutor proposes, to the narrator’s surprise and confusion, 
that non-sentient beings like puppets can be made to dance, and to do so with such grace and 
beauty that they actually have “an advantage…over living dancers” (4); and when asked by the 
disconcerted narrator why and how this could possibly be the case, the dancer replies that it is 
because the marionettes: 
     would never be guilty of affectation. For affectation is seen, as you know, when the 
     soul, or moving force, appears at some point other than the centre of gravity of the 
     movement. Because the operator controls with his wire…only this centre, the 
     attached limbs are just what they should be…lifeless, pure pendulums, governed 
     only by the law of gravity. This is an excellent quality. You’ll look for it in vain in most 
     of our dancers. (4-5) 
     There is an ironic tension apparent in this dialogue, which has been suggested to illustrate the 
juxtaposition of Romantic “idealistic notions of freedom and a nightmare suspicion of 
determinism born of Enlightenment ideals of total, rational order” - one that opposes "hopes for 
the autonomous self and fear that the individual in society may end up as a determined 
automaton” (Block 65). On related notes, the philosopher John Gray in his The Soul of the 
Marionette: A Short Inquiry into Human Freedom (2015)  and literary scholar Kenneth Gross in 5
his introduction to his collection of multi-authored essays On Dolls (2018) both emphasize the 
essay’s concerns regarding the impact of human subjectivity and capacity for self-awareness on 
aspects of the human condition and behavior. As Gray observes, for Kleist “puppets represented 
a kind of freedom that human beings would never achieve” - “controlled from above by 
puppeteers,” their movements are “effortlessly grace[ful]” specifically because they “cannot 
 Gray’s discussion (pp. 2-5) of Kleist’s essay refers to the David Constantine translation of “The Puppet 5
Theater” in the latter’s edited volume of Kleist’s Selected Writings, Hackett Publishing, 2004, pp. 
411-416.
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know they are unfree” (2-3), while Gross notes that “it is the human actor who turns clumsy, 
graceless, wooden, affected, embarrassed and even violent in his self-consciousness, in his 
anxious wish for grace, his uncertainty about where to locate his soul” (xv) - that is, as a 
consequence of turning his quest for knowledge (and more specifically, for knowing how to 
“act") back upon himself and interrupting the flow of ‘natural’ grace that non-thinking puppets 
are privy to. Bernd Fischer also sees Kleist as concerned with (and opposing) influential 
tendencies towards ‘hyper’-rationalizing the Enlightenment project, describing this essay as 
participating (along with two other lesser-known works) in offering an “ironic recapitulation and 
simultaneous dismissal of the whole project of idealist philosophy of history” (Fischer 15) (that 
is, as basically challenging the overall “Hegelian” project(s) asserting construction of reality by 
the human “mind” [understood as the mental or Spirit]). 
     While these scholars emphasize the ironic stance and existential angst that Kleist’s essay 
suggests, another scholarly interpretive thread has focused on additional details of the essay that 
raise the possibility of a resolution of the aforementioned tensions. These details appear in the 
interlocutor’s recounting of an incident when he was effortlessly bested in a bout with a 
performing bear, after he (the speaker) had been goaded by some other men into challenging the 
animal with his sword. In the essay’s conclusion, the interlocutor attributes the bear’s “success” 
to a kind of supremely natural grace - as he puts it: “grace appears most purely in that human 
form which either has no consciousness or an infinite consciousness. That is, in the puppet or in 
the god” (Kleist 10). And it is the latter which the animal embodies, since he effects no 
“interruption” of “the unstable feedback loop that links us [humans] to the gaze of the other” so 
that, unlike us, he is able to see “the infinite” (Kittler 292). And when asked by the narrator 
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whether human beings “must again eat of the tree of knowledge in order to return to the state of 
innocence,” the dancer-interlocutor replies in the affirmative, noting, however, that “that’s the 
final chapter in the history of the world” (Kleist 10).  
     The German scholar Wolf Kittler has, in fact, proposed that this essay participates in a 
Kleistian effort to “rehabilitate” the Enlightenment’s “knowledge project” (Mehigan and Fischer 
6-7). Kittler argues via numerous illustrations that the essay includes multiple covert references 
consistent with the mathematical theorizing (the differential calculus) of Kleist’s time (in its 
metaphorical references to the movement of “pendulums,” for example), while at the same time, 
it (quite presciently) outlines this “simple physical system [as] a model case of chaos and 
complexity theory” (Kittler 289). And with its summary lauding of the value of “no 
consciousness” or an “infinite consciousness,” the essay (like the mathematics of differential 
calculus itself) has “dared to use,” according to Kittler, “infinitely small” and “infinitely large…
quantities as operators [to] provide a model for a new understanding of ‘the history of the world’ 
between paradise and redemption” (Kittler 292). 
     One could suggest, therefore, that here again, in another demonstration of Kleist’s creative 
imagination, we find more evidence not only for the aesthetic-philosophical concerns raised by 
his so-called “Kantian crisis” but arguably also for another artistic response to some of the 
various sociocultural forces pressuring the re-shaping of perception of, and discourses regarding, 
embattled (social) systems moving towards operating at unprecedented scales in the German-
speaking societies of the early nineteenth century. In Kleist’s final work and what some argue to 
be his finest play Prince Friedrich of Homberg (written shortly after the Marionette Theater 
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essay and completed only a few months before taking his own life), even more enigmatic 
challenges confront spectator-readers. 
     If Staël’s The Mannequin contributes to the so-called “opening up” of a discursive space for 
trying to re-configure connotations of the category of the “feminine” in the context of a broader 
communal effort at re-shaping the socioeconomic and political systems of her changing nation, 
Kleist’s Prince Friedrich may be said to work in a somewhat analogous fashion, but with a 
narrative naturally made up of very different details and grounded in a sensibility informed by 
Kleist’s own singular and specifically German male character. And whereas I would suggest that 
Staël’s simpler work, which is obviously more playful, appears rather optimistic in its hinting at 
such “reforming” possibilities, Kleist’s play evinces a rather different sensibility - one grounded 
more in a vision of paradox that reflects the simultaneous promise as well as “threat” arising 
from the sense of new systems as he felt them to be emerging in his locale in the same historical 
period. 
     In Kleist’s play, the historical figure, Prince Friedrich, culturally-established as the hero of the 
battle of Fehrbellin (1675), is portrayed with a degree of psychological and relational complexity 
that one would hardly expect in the case of such a cultural icon. Understood at one level as a 
political statement (Craig 13-16) or “patriotic drama” as Kleist himself asserted the play to be 
(Peters and Peters ix), the staging of the Prince character’s and his fellow officers’ military 
success against the Swedes might seem intended to support the idea of the Prussian “nation’s” 
hoped-for win over Napoleon’s forces with whom they were engaged at the time. But as all 
scholarly interpretations also recognize, this battle appears to serve merely as the dramatic 
backdrop against which another kind of “battle” operating within Prussian society is at play. This 
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level of interpretation focuses on the very ambiguity arising from the “fleshed-out” characters 
themselves. That is, their ambiguity could be said to derive from their very complexity as 
embodied individuals of thought and feeling with hopes, dreams, and fears, who are also men in 
ambivalent relationships with the authorities of their own state. Precisely this kind of 
relationship was to be found in the patriotic but potentially rebellious group of soldiers led by 
Neidthardt von Gneisenau (with whom Kleist is said to have had a “temperamental” kinship), 
who objected to the cautious line of policy against Napoleon pursued by the Prussian Prime 
Minister Hardenberg (Craig 16). But for spectator-readers, there remains the question of what 
this latter battle signifies, and how the very disorder that it generates within the narrative might 
resolve - and for which there seem to be no straightforward or easy answers. 
     From the outset, we find Prince Friedrich, who is the play's primary focus, evincing signs that 
his character’s personal and relational boundaries are, in fact, not completely stable. For an 
iconic Prussian officer and military hero, he appears quite strange. As the German scholar 
Lawrence Frye has observed, the Prince appears in the opening scene as a virtual “fool” and that, 
in his view, this may be seen as one among several ironic twists which recur throughout the play, 
including in the final scene as the Prince effects an “ironic self-annihilation” in the making of a 
“grand gesture” (submitting to his death sentence) as he simultaneously regains “good 
fortune” (the admiration and the romantic interest of others) in this, the play’s, final “joke,” 
which effectively “takes the sting out of humanly manipulated assaults of irony.” Thus, through 
such an interpretive lens, Frye perceives a predominantly “comedic lighting of [this] political 
icon” (Frye 229-251). But though I would agree that an ironic stance seems clear, I would 
suggest that an alternate, or at least complementary, view of the narrative arc and its resolution is 
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possible - one that focuses more on the problem of the instability of the lead character and his 
relationship to both the state authority and other members of his community. 
     This instability, I would argue, manifests in various ways until the final scene of Act Four 
(where he writes the letter in which he “decides” his own fate) as he moves between different 
states of consciousness (waking and dreaming) not only while alone but also in the presence of 
others, and shows clear signs of distraction so that he has difficulty staying on task when 
exhorted by others, and exhibits behaviors that signal strong emotion and acting on impulse 
rather than according to social expectations and directives.  
     Thus, in the first scene, as the Elector and his entourage, including his fiancé Natalia, descend 
from a castle and approach him in a garden, the Prince appears sleep-walking, absorbed in 
“dreams of his own future,” all the while whispering to himself and “wind[ing] himself a 
splendid wreath of glory” (6). The group observes that he “must be very ill” (6), but that he also 
appears like a “fool” or a “madman” (8), so that, as the scene ends, the Elector encourages them 
all to quickly “get away from him” and commands: 
          Back into the darkness with you, Prince of Homberg! Into nothingness!  
          Nothingness! If it suits your convenience, we’ll meet again upon the field 
          of battle. The things you seek cannot be won by dreaming. (8-9) 
As we and the Elector see here, the Prince appears to be relationally disconnected. 
This dissociated quality of the Prince’s character then continues to manifest in subsequent 
scenes. It appears, for example, when he leaves the garden appearing “bewildered” while 
pressing the glove he has snatched (unobserved) from Natalia’s hand to his forehead (9), and 
subsequently, despite being awake, is unable to recall where he obtained the glove (12-14); and, 
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in a later scene, he looks to others (a couple of fellow officers) as if he is notably distracted and 
unable to transcribe the Elector’s battle orders for his troops to follow the next day (17-19). This 
latter moment is particularly significant for its bearing on what the social authorities in the play 
will deem “insubordination on the battlefield” but which, in light of his previous mental state 
(which the audience has observed), may be interpreted as oddly unwitting and almost accidental.  
     A view of the Prince’s character as one assertively bent on repudiating the authority of the 
Elector (qua state) is also belied midway through the play in Act Three in his obvious expression 
of “unmanly” fear and lengthy expression of disbelief that the Elector, who has “love[d] him like 
a son” (49), would simply fulfill “his duty as required by the law” (48) and not overturn his death 
sentence for his questionable insubordination. Portrayed as caught up in the harsh machinations 
of a legal system - nested within the larger workings of a nation he had supported and believed 
himself to be a part - the Prince appears strangely akin to an actor who (in contrast to a true 
marionette) finds himself existentially uncertain about “where to locate his soul” (as Gross put it 
[xv]). In the midst of such a quandary, I would argue that the Prince’s character only achieves 
coherence and some grace as he asserts an extremely unconventional (and, to some, morally 
questionable) kind of agency and chooses to relinquish his own status as a material being who is 
both flawed and suffering as a result of his own self-consciousness (akin to the ideal that the 
dancer-interlocutor promoted in the conclusion to the marionette theater essay). That is, perhaps 
Kleist wished to assert what he viewed to be the ultimate irony, as his Prince character is being 
led blindfolded to his death: “Now, immortality, you are totally mine! You are streaming toward 
me with the radiance of a thousand suns through the blindfold on my eyes. Wings are growing on 
my shoulders, and my spirit is already soaring through the calm ethereal spheres…[while] 
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everything beneath me is lying in a mist” (90). Thus, rather than simply submitting to the system 
qua state, the Prince claims to have achieved a new form of (godlike) consciousness - as he 
approaches a more sublime state that involves becoming part of a totality at a virtually 
incomprehensibly larger scale (akin to the infinite or absolutely large that Kant described). 
Ironically, then, narrative order returns as the Prince finds himself about to become a part of a 
non-human system (one  beyond human ken) in which he will lose his human self.  
     Arguably, we find here another instance of Kleist’s dramatic (some have said “romantic”) 
response to his “crisis of agency” - in this case with a virtual neutralization of the binarism of the 
human and non-human, but in a manner which could be viewed as both ironic and uplifting. It is 
tempting to speculate that Kleist may have even understood his own quite purposeful dual 
suicide (with a terminally ill female friend/possible lover) as a way to find transcendence, to 
achieve a kind of grace he felt was denied him in life but which, as he said, “appears most purely 
in that human form which either has no consciousness” like a puppet “or an infinite 
consciousness” like a god. Obviously unable to become a real puppet and seemingly disinclined 
to submit to the “fear” of potentially becoming a socially-“determined automaton” (Block 65), he 
may have sought greater fellowship and communion in his ideal of a different form of being.  
     Staël heard of Kleist’s death in November 1811 and reacted quite strongly though not 
particularly sympathetically, as she drafted her Réflexions Sur Le Suicide that would come out a 
year later in Stockholm (without naming Kleist specifically) and “ce faisant à proposer une 
théorie du « savoir-souffrir » résolument moderne” (Foerster 129). Her théorie included 
questioning the motives of those who would take their own lives when, as she saw it, there was a 
fatherland to die for. 
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     Thus, while their views about the world around them at the time differed significantly in 
many of their particulars, Staël and Kleist were both clearly deep thinkers about their places in 
that world as well as deep thinkers about feelings. Such “thinking about feeling” had been 
renewed and fired by the French Revolution as Rosenfeld has pointed out. At the same time, 
“words were rushing to catch up” to what individuals felt and yet (in that less-articulate sense) 
still knew, according to Hunt. And among those things that they were increasingly coming to 
know was the general “shape” of “the social,” as I would call it. But the latter’s still rather vague 
conceptual shape was aided in becoming more graspable not only by increasingly popular artistic 
media such as prints, which depicted scenes of the social strife then ongoing and “helped society 
or ‘the social’ become more visible” “as an object of experience and cognition” (Hunt 677), but 
also by such narrative works as those by these writers, whom we now recognize as having been 
astute observers of their “contemporary” (as per Agamben). 
     As a final point here, I would also suggest that both Kleist and Staël strove each in their own 
way to express “knowing how to suffer” in a resolute yet modern fashion. At the same time, they 
also maintained a sense, even if only subconsciously, of the “creative destruction” (as per 
systems-researchers Gunderson and Holling) taking place in their world, which involved some 
genuine loss, of course, but also afforded opportunities for re-imagining other kinds of “order” 
that might be on the horizon.  
     In the next chapter, I will move on to discuss two other artists (Heine and Balzac) who were 
concerned with the experience and articulation of signs of new “order” actually emerging in their 
time - a time of some regeneration that included development of new forms of social 
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connectivity which would support heading toward a more expansive world of nations-in-relation 
and warranted very different aesthetics.      
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Chapter 3:  
Heine and Balzac Regrouping after the Wars 
     After nearly twelve and a half years, the Napoleonic Wars that had swept across vast portions 
of the face of Europe and involved belligerents as far-flung as the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, 
and the Russian and Ottoman Empires had finally come to an end.   With treaties signed and the 
Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) completed, beleaguered monarchical authorities throughout 
nearly all parts of Europe found themselves restored, if only tentatively. That is, in this new dawn 
of so-called peace, the calm was actually an uneasy one. And German-speaking regions and 
France itself were no exceptions in this regard. Austrian statesman Prince Metternich essentially 
now held sway over several still disparate German-speaking territories and Louis XVIII of what 
was deemed the Bourbon Restoration relatively weakly managed the new constitutional 
monarchy of France, but the particular communities over which they exerted their respective 
authority (along with those in other locales in the surrounding Europe) had drastically changed, 
thus posing unprecedented challenges to their administrations and efforts at restoring a sense of 
social “order.”  
     Thus, while the forms of the political systems which were overseeing the practical social 
organizational efforts at resuming life as “usual” harkened to the recent past for their models and 
social supports, there was now a “new normal,” so to speak. Wartime events had not only 
ravaged significant portions of the physical landscape and their respective populations, recent 
pressures from the promotion of democratic ideological principles along with new forms of 
economic organization, whose effects were continuing to impact class distinctions as well as 
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people’s sense of material security, had dramatically altered the social and cultural landscapes as 
well. Having shared the common experience of living through these events and under these 
pressures, whether they were situated in one of the several localized German states that 
continued to vie with each other in their “cooperative” relations or in the French capital or its 
provinces where inhabitants had their own long-standing mutual differences, the people in these 
neighboring social groups inevitably perceived their “worlds” differently and found themselves 
confronting an uncertain future. 
     Some of the uncertainty arose from pressures impacting the very forms of social organization 
itself. That is to say, while German and French political authorities and the forms they 
preliminarily re-assumed maintained some continuities with their societies’ recent pasts, 
Enlightenment influences promoting rational systematization of various social domains aimed at 
encompassing and managing worlds of objects on ever-larger scales, such as the social 
systemization of lawful behavior (by means of the new Napoleonic Code adopted on a pan-
European scale) and establishment of codes and regulations for facilitating the growth of 
commerce and finance (grounded in analytical ways of thought, manipulation of large numbers, 
and ideals of risk-reduction and error minimization), were at the same time pressing these 
collectives’ organizational moves forward.  
     In addition, despite the fact that the sociocultural details internal to each social system’s 
functioning (which were grounded in their respective histories and were naturally resistant to 
change) differed dramatically, both of these systems were being subjected to outside forces 
pressing them to compete in an increasingly modern world. And while from a complex systems 
perspective, societies qua systems are always somewhat “open” (that is, they are necessarily 
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open to exchanges of energy and information with their environments in order to survive and 
grow), at this historical moment in this European locale, I would argue that the kind and degree 
of “openness” of these social systems were also being pressed to change such that inter-national 
(larger scale) forces could impact them and still be accommodated (in other words, the forms of 
more traditional internally “over-connected” systems were being felt to be more vulnerable and 
insufficiently resilient, so that adjustments were required). But, as Lynn Hunt might put it and I 
am suggesting, “words were still rushing to catch up,” and more social and cultural work was 
required to support these “adjustments.”    
     Times had unquestionably changed, and the narratives by which people understood them were 
necessarily evolving. But who was responsible, so to speak, for creating these new narratives? In 
contrast to the sensibility of just a few decades earlier, when the programs of ruling authorities 
had had a more absolutist quality and socially-prescribing and defining power (in the sense that 
Niklas Luhmann has described of the nobility essentially determining the social ontology), 
political leaders were now obliged to recognize the broader world-stage on which their own 
actions could be witnessed, judged, and for which they could be held accountable. They 
themselves were subject to unprecedented pressures to recognize and acknowledge extra-
systemic forces.  
At the same time, members of the recently impassioned as well as besieged populace were 
unlikely to forget the actions of those whom they had regarded as revolutionary heroes clamoring 
for a new order based on “liberty, equality, and fraternity” or the laying waste of their own or 
neighboring communities. And, as is the human wont, though people in these societies would 
have gone on with their daily lives, they (except for those too traumatized to speak of them) 
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could also be expected to have enjoined others to listen and share in the telling of stories of those 
transformative times. While the intensity of revolutionary fervor had diminished, the experiences 
of that turbulent period could not be simply erased from the minds and memories of those who 
had deeply felt them and whose lives had been upset by them.  
    In making his own case for a significant role for popular narratives driving economic 
fluctuations in our contemporary society, economist Robert J. Shiller notes that his colleague 
Ramsay MacMullan has also “implored” his fellow historians in his Feelings in History: Ancient 
and Modern (2003) to appreciate that gaining “a deep understanding of history requires imputing 
what was on the minds of those people who made history,” and “if we try to understand people’s 
actions, we will need to replicate in ourselves as best we can the feelings they themselves 
experienced” (Shiller 6). Along these same lines (and following Hunt’s lead to some extent), I 
would also suggest that making a certain kind of empathetic effort may be useful in this context 
of considering the actions of people in the German-speaking and French communities in this 
post-revolutionary period. And, what I’m at the same time suggesting is that “the people making 
history” in this period were something of a new “breed.” Thus, as the nobility and its discursive 
norms were losing traction, a new mix of proscriptive narratives were being promulgated which 
were no longer almost exclusively from the ruling aristocratic groups (top-down) but now 
included significant input from the commoners (or so-called bottom-up). In other words, in this 
post-war period, despite the “best efforts” of those in power, long-standing traditions related to 
hereditary entitlements and associated conventions of comportment were clearly being 
questioned; at the same time, commercial forces and technological developments directed at 
modernization were simultaneously channeling “picking up the pieces” of material as well as 
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human resources and reshaping the forms of people’s daily lives about which commoner 
(popular) voices were having an increasing say. 
     This ability to even have “an increasing say,” however, itself depended not just on intermittent 
rioting and local revolts that continued to crop up and take place throughout much of this early-
to-mid-century period. A growing “say” in this moment of what I have been referring to as “re-
organization” also depended upon new forms of connectivity and the emergence of new self-
conscious identities that these fostered. And these were made possible not simply by the 
flourishing of print-making (and its consumption) and the rise of the publishing industry that 
Lynn Hunt and Benedict Anderson have respectively described (photography would actually be 
invented in 1826 and emerge as a popularizing force by the mid-century, while electricity, and 
media like radio, which it made possible, would not be technologically harnessed until many 
decades later). New narratives by voices capable of capturing people’s attention and resonating 
with their experience were also required. 
     Two such voices were those of the German Heinrich Heine and Frenchman Honoré de Balzac, 
whose work will be discussed in some detail in this chapter. In addition to temperamental 
qualities and innate talents that are likely to have contributed to both men’s creative urges and 
literary output, it will be argued that it was at the interface of their felt experience of those 
modernizing “systemic” pressures to which they (like their contemporaries) were subject and 
their own subjective responses to them in the expression of their own social identities that they 
helped begin to “flesh out” the sense of these pressures both for themselves and others. In other 
words, they helped begin to provide glimmerings of the sense (the form and content) of the 
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complex systems their own collectives were participating in but for which few members of the 
populace yet had words or mental images.    
     Heinrich Heine, German poet, essayist, and social critic, and Honoré de Balzac, French 
novelist, short story, and occasional non-fiction writer, were among the most visible public 
figures who were also artists in this period, which also happened to be the first one in which 
writers, due to socioeconomic developments and the emergence of the publishing industry, could 
actually make a living from their writing. Thus, for those literate individuals (whose numbers 
were also on the rise) who were seeking both mirrors and mouthpieces for perceiving and 
communicating narrative forms for realizing an authentic sense of themselves in that moment, 
the works of these highly prolific and engaging wits were now available via expanding media 
forms (including newspaper articles and serial fiction) for them to begin to turn to. 
     Heine (1797-1856) and Balzac (1799-1850) were members of the same historical cohort, but 
circulated through largely different - though both spatially and culturally overlapping - societal 
systems. Their life-experiences and social identities were thus subject in many ways to 
sociocultural influences that were naturally singular, but also quite similar and interrelated. As 
young men, Heine, a native German speaker from the Rhineland, and Balzac, a Frenchman 
whose boyhood was spent in Tours and Vendôme (relative “provinces” at the time in France), 
both came to reside in Paris, where their sense of social life in the urban environment of that city 
contrasted sharply with that provincial one which each had known where they had been reared. 
As will be discussed later in greater detail, these contrasts in sensibility, between those associated 
with the provinces and their traditions and those associated with the (aside from London) most 
modern city of its time, had profound impacts on them and their work. Heine effected a  self-
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imposed exile in Paris as an aspiring artist who also had liberal political views. He recognized 
that he would have a greater capacity for personal expression and political voice in that city than 
in his German homeland where he had been subject to significant censoring (since Prussian 
authorities were now themselves beginning to depend increasingly on print culture to support 
their own political agendas). For his part, Balzac’s temperamental energy and apparent 
dissatisfaction with what he perceived to be the “signs of his times” (including a decline in 
monarchical authority and traditional values) drove him to observe and critique widely diverse 
aspects of Parisian society itself. In other words, despite their differences, both men appear to 
have been impelled to afford themselves of opportunities to “create” in that urban (complex 
system) workspace and try to produce literary works with “more modern” aesthetics which could 
speak to their respective communities that were themselves undergoing still largely tacit but 
widespread change. 
     Literary scholar Peter Brooks has argued in his book Enigmas of Identity that “who you are—
in the sense of what you can legitimately call yourself, and what others call you—seems to have 
become a problem with entry into the modern age in a way that it wasn’t before…identity is in 
fact a large problem that stamps not only novels but all sorts of social issues in the nineteenth 
century, and up to our own time” (4). As he intimates here and I have suggested as well but 
through a systems lens, modern identities became a “problem” in the long nineteenth century as 
they engaged phenomena at levels within systems “above,” “below,” as well as “at” the (so-
called) “level” in which they themselves operated, that is, at the superordinate level of “social 
issues,” at the “output” level of production of literary and popular narratives that portrayed 
characters with their own identities, as well as in the very persons of those who mediated 
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between these two - the writers-artists-intellectuals who wrestled with their own identities in 
these systems as well. Modern identities, in other words, were beginning to be experienced and 
recognized as “problems” that became loci where changes in understanding of self and other 
were being both enacted and narratively debated, notably by those writers-artists-intellectuals 
who I am arguing were sensitive and attentive to these issues. 
     As the German literary scholar Anthony Phelan has asserted in his Reading Heinrich Heine, 
“Heine’s importance two hundred years after his birth is closely tied to his self-understanding, 
his understanding of the process of modernity, and to twentieth-century readings of the forms in 
which these understandings were articulated” (x). As Phelan puts it, Heine defined his position in 
relation to the tradition of Romantic poetry, while at the same being committed to the 
development of a “modern writing” (xi) wherein he “dismantl[ed] the poetic language of 
selfhood” (xiii)….so that style itself bec[ame] the instrument of the most rigorous and scathing 
political analysis” - and modern critics, like Jacques Derrida, regard him as the “famously 
‘elusive poet’ deriving the strength of his encounter with Paris and Parisian politics from 
‘knowing how not to be there’” (xiv). As Phelan argues, despite Heine’s legacy being substantial, 
it has at times been controversial in its purported value in part because of this very 
“elusiveness” (sometimes called “vagueness”), but which Phelan himself and the poet Helmut 
Heissenbüttel (whom Phelan also cites) both attribute to the style of Heine’s writing and its 
textual effects such that Heine “plays a kind of hide-and-seek with the expectations of 
autobiographical reference" (xiii). And though his very “elusiveness” and style have also been 
subject to much critical interpretation, I would suggest that one way they could also be viewed 
would be as a form of expression of the very “self-understanding” Phelan indicates Heine 
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developed (or worked at developing), which arguably arose in turn from the well-known identity 
challenges he personally confronted. The latter will be described in greater detail in pages to 
follow, but they included his being a native German from a minor kingdom within a fragmented 
set of German-speaking states dominated by Austria and Prussia; being Jewish but pressured in 
his adulthood to convert to Protestantism; and being an aspiring artist in an increasingly modern 
world where work-identities (like other “identities”) were becoming an increasingly problematic 
social issue (as Heine’s cousin Karl Marx, whom he knew, also famously emphasized). That is to 
say, this persona which Heine seems to have often projected - as an “elusive” poet - was 
appropriately elusive since it was truly unsettled. At the same time, this being unsettled could 
also be said to be consistent with the broader dynamics of his historical moment which, despite 
being at relative peace, continued to move forward with modernizing changes on an unstable 
forward edge.  
     Unlike Heine, one could surmise that Balzac was able to be comparatively secure in speaking 
frankly about his French national identity, given his country’s long-standing centralized political 
structure and current social policies permitting relative freedom of expression. But, as his 
biographical details and literary project suggest, he found himself subject to and a critical 
observer of the problems of “identity” internal to French society after Napoleon’s defeat. As will 
be discussed further, he proceeded to dissect these problems in unprecedentedly “realistic” detail, 
portraying a society whose political system with its formal tensions between monarchy and 
republicanism had an uncertain future as well as a burgeoning bourgeois middle class concerned 
with defining itself but which, in the eyes of many, was also becoming an increasingly 
anonymous urban crowd with few signs of individuality. Brooks has suggested that Balzac 
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actually felt himself to be confronted with a generalized semiotic crisis wherein every bourgeois 
man attired in black appeared like  every other one, and that he regarded the nineteenth century 
as a “stupid” one associated with rampant “pathology of social life” (which was also the title of a 
never-finished manuscript Balzac worked on throughout his career) (Brooks 17).  
     Evidently Heine and Balzac both experienced a sense of dissonance with the tentative “status 
quo” of their (overlapping) modernizing social systems and were thus (and for other reasons to 
be detailed) on some of the “margins” (as per Snowden and Agamben) of their social groups. At 
the same time, however, it apparently was imperative to both of them to respond creatively to try 
to articulate and leverage the latter’s nascent, though still largely covert, forms according to their 
respective visions. They may also be said to have been addressing the “system-wide” needs of 
their societies understood as complex adaptive systems (CAS), which I’ve suggested were to 
essentially “regroup” and produce new forms of communicating and effecting social connections 
commensurate with the circumstances of their age, but which in this historical moment also 
necessitated helping enlighten their contemporaries regarding this “abstract” activity. That is, 
they were trying to help promote a greater awareness and grasp of the new social “ontology” that 
was in the process of emerging but which (in a reflexive sense) the populace itself (and not 
simply the nobility) was also becoming increasingly responsible for actually establishing. These 
writers did this, I suggest, by “modeling” aspects of these complex systems themselves through 
particular aspects of their writing.  
    But how might one understand such “modeling”? A useful and illustrative discussion of this 
issue has been offered in another context by biosocial-systems scientist Graeme Cumming and 
philosopher of science John Collier in a “synthesis” paper (“Change and Identity in Complex 
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Systems” [2005]) wherein they address “the problem of how we can capture the dynamic, 
changing nature of complex systems, including ecosystems, social systems, and economics, in a 
cohesive conceptual framework” (emphasis added) (1). While their discussion primarily speaks 
to scientists and their research concerns, it includes what I would argue are points that are more 
broadly applicable to human tendencies to produce certain kinds of “models” in order to act in 
the world of complex (social) systems. They speak specifically of “metamodels” (rather than 
simply “models”) because this term includes the sense of “captur[ing] the essential ingredients 
of many interrelated models in symbolic form” (emphases added) (5). It acknowledges the 
presence of complexity and the presence of dependencies and ongoing interactions between and 
among the components of various systems as well as systems within systems. That is, such 
“metamodels” may be regarded, these authors suggest, as “a kind of specific metaphor: a way of 
thinking about things that serves as a powerful tool” (as they note, this tool for scientists would 
be for generating hypotheses for testing in their research) (5). It is in this sense of an implicit 
search for such a “metamodel” with its resulting helpful “way of thinking” that I am suggesting 
many Europeans of the nineteenth century also sought narratives to aid and support them, 
embroiled as they were in an historical moment when “commoners” were becoming increasingly 
responsible for not only comprehending but also for participating in the shaping and managing of 
the complex social systems that were then involving them.   
         Cumming and Collier also note, however, that one’s “subjective interest” in particular 
systems is in many ways critical for not only representing and “defining” the particulars of those 
models we (need/want) to construct, but also and more specifically for “establish[ing] the natural 
properties” that constitute the “identity conditions” of our system(s) of interest “over time and 
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space” (2). We choose, that is, to construct certain models (of complex systems) for their 
functionality and for certain purposes we have in mind. But while continuity through space and 
time is a central component of identity, as these authors also point out, a significant “problem is 
to find suitable dynamical relations that determine system identity by binding the system 
together” (emphases added) (3). At the same time, “suitable dynamic relations” are, in fact, those 
“natural properties” that need to be ascertained (“rather than localized properties that are found 
in every part of the system” [3]). In other words, and with these considerations applied 
specifically to the case of those nineteenth century post-war Europeans under discussion, their 
most so-called “useful” ways of thinking were likely to have involved individual and 
(sufficiently) group-wide quests for models that one might say “suited” the particular forms of 
relating in their time but that were also sufficiently widespread that they could at the same time 
actually help “bind” them and their “systems” together in order to do the kind of collective work 
that seemed necessary for their group’s survival and future progress.  
     Though such abstract notions might at first seem far afield of useful considerations of Heine 
and Balzac, I am suggesting that they are, in fact, not. Rather, in thinking (and trying to imagine 
and feel) the complex historical situations of these artists and their contemporaries with these 
needs and modeling notions in mind, one can better appreciate the adaptive challenges and 
nature of the tasks confronting them - both as social individuals and as regrouping collectives. 
Unlike scientists, and other scholars, however, who use various means to try to distance 
themselves from their “objects of study,” these German and French people of the nineteenth 
century were quite limited in means at hand for them to try to do this. That is, they were 
essentially inextricably involved - one might go so far as to say “entangled” - in the 
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phenomenology of that which they fundamentally needed (and, in the case of many, consciously 
wanted) to know. But some of what they needed to “know” were the aforementioned “natural 
properties” that existed in “suitable dynamical relations” and “determined system identity by 
binding the system together.” In other words, they needed to see more clearly who they were as 
well as how they did and might relate to each other so that they might have the possibility of 
influencing and making more informed decisions about bonding themselves and binding their 
system together.  
     In the midst of such complex systems, however, with their inherent feedback loops, 
reflexiveness, and other system-wide properties, relatively few could (or were likely motivated to 
try to) capture and convey such (implicit) knowledge. Individuals like Heine and Balzac were 
thus relatively unique as they (akin to those other writers Foucault discussed) attempted to do 
much of this sociocultural “heavy lifting” by producing narrative fictions whose content and 
form could afford some representational “capture” of their own and their contemporaries’ social 
reality. 
     As both talented and now-working artists, however, they also understood the importance of 
making contact with the feelings of their audiences, and entertaining them, so that they could 
hopefully keep them engaged (and reading!). They, therefore, designed their explicitly endorsed 
“new aesthetics” in ways to do so. But in trying to actively stimulate their intended audiences’ 
interest as well as their efforts at modeling their worlds’ dynamics and their own identities within 
them, notable details of Heine’s and Balzac’s “new aesthetics” necessarily differed.  
     One of the particularly notable differences between the collective concerns of these writers’ 
respective German and French communities that their literary work reflects, I would suggest, 
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pertains to that level of so-called national “identities.” German-speaking groups did not yet 
cohere as a (social) system with a “national identity,” while the French did. This difference had 
significant implications for what the two collectives could hope to achieve and actually do as 
they struggled to compete in the increasingly “modern” world (which Heine clearly recognized). 
On the other hand, though “the French” could already act qua being “France,” the so-called 
“natural properties” (ontology) of their internal dynamical relations had become more 
problematic after the revolutionary period. This, I would argue, determined the outlines of much 
of their identity questing which Balzac could be said to have tried to address. Consequently, one 
would expect that specific ingredients, so to speak, of Heine’s and Balzac’s narrative models 
aimed at capturing the sense of the social “complexity” then-embroiling their respective German 
and French communities would themselves be somewhat different. Specifically, I will try to 
show how the former emphasized properties of language, shared memories, and traditions in 
order to support the nascent bonding of “German” individuals and promote their collective 
coherence as a system with a “national” identity which would be necessary for establishing them 
as a significant player on the increasingly global and competitive world-stage, while the latter 
focused on the post-revolutionary burgeoning forms of relating that were starting to characterize 
but were also challenging French society’s internal dynamics at that particular historical moment 
(though Balzac’s writing naturally invoked many of the shared memories and traditions of 
France’s recent past as discursive touchstones in order to help maintain a coherent and 
continuous sense of French identity as well).  
     So how did Heine and Balzac actually do this? I have chosen to consider select works by 
these writers to try to address this question. Though both men wrote extensively throughout their 
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careers, I am focusing here primarily on Heine’s relatively late-in-life epic poem Deutschland: A 
Winter’s Tale (written in 1844) (but with some additional reference to a few other works that 
illustrate some of the evolution of Heine’s own thought over his lifetime); and, in Balzac’s case, I 
will consider select pieces from his multi-volume collection La Comédie Humaine (which was 
written over a span of many years around the same time as Heine’s work but targeted both the 
periods of the French Restoration (1815-1830) and the July Monarchy [1830-1848]) with 
particular attention to one of his most acclaimed novels from this collection, Père Goriot. 
Essentially, I view their ability to “capture” some of the sense of the complexity in their world(s) 
as arising primarily from the very forms of their respective narratives which, I will argue, 
reflected some of the properties of complex systems that were being increasingly foregrounded 
in social and cultural milieus in their lifetimes (and are consistent with properties of such 
systems as we understand them today). 
     Before proceeding to discuss Heine specifically, however, there is one more noteworthy 
commonality of early adult life-experience to which these writers seem to have responded rather 
similarly in the subsequent execution of their art. In their earliest efforts at writing, both suffered 
setbacks imposed by authorities who aimed to effectively silence them. Heine was repeatedly 
censored by the Prussian authorities in his native country, while Balzac was discouraged from 
writing (initially for the theater) by a professor at the Collège de France for his supposed lack of 
talent and then subsequently by his unsuccessful attempts at trying to write for the general public 
under a pseudonym which contributed to the failure of a publishing and printing house he had 
established that also left him in tremendous debt for the remainder of his life. Both men, 
however, were irrepressible. Heine’s solution to achieving his outlet for creative expression was 
!  79
to move to Paris but continue to maintain a productive connection with his supportive Hamburg 
publisher Julius Campe, while Balzac’s was to be remarkably persistent and virtually throw 
himself into writing at all hours of the day and night and produce writing that finally gained 
attention for some of its (then-) novel qualities.  
     Both men’s identities and very agency as writer-artists were thus initially significantly 
challenged and subjected to kinds of “force relations” like those Foucault has described that 
often constrain modern identities. But as the philosopher Charles Taylor has also pointed out in 
his Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989), there is another side, so to speak, 
of modern identities. This consists of the subjective one, which may or may not be consonant 
with externally imposed designations, and when it is not, can engender a striving for a sense of 
personal authenticity. It is in this setting of such a dissonance experienced at the dynamic 
interface where these two so-called sides meet in practice that efforts at social change may occur, 
and which I am specifically suggesting contributed to at least some of the drive promoting these 
writers’ interests in contributing to modeling the dynamics and structure of the social systems to 
which they were essentially subject throughout their working lives.  
      Reflecting the fact that “the stability [of complex systems] is not passively static, but an 
active self-maintenance that needs to be supported” (Walsh and Stepney 320), Austro-Prussian 
authorities in Heine’s lifetime worked to reassert their own vision of a “status quo” by promoting 
traditional models of political rule and keeping liberal and nationalist ideas like his, which were 
thought to be fundamentally challenging to their state(s), at bay. Their efforts at preserving the 
social order in the forms with which they were then- established not only manifested in such 
activities as the physical suppression of the republican Revolutions which took place throughout 
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Europe in 1848 (just four years after Heine wrote his epic poem), but also in various forms of 
policing activity, including censoring, and the detention of those viewed as subversive (often 
identified as “criminals”) as well.  
     In Heine’s native German environment, not only his writing but the censoring act itself 
identified him as a potential threat to his country, though with his idealism and vision of what he 
felt his native land might become, he would not have felt comfortable assuming such a negative 
identity. He also experienced overt anti-Semitism and, after “much soul-searching,” in 1825 he 
made the conscious decision to convert to Lutheran Protestantism. He saw the latter as being 
associated with more liberal politics than Catholicism, and very practically “as an entry ticket to 
regular employment,” so that this choice also seems to have “laid the groundwork for his later 
denominational identity games” (Joskowicz 70). Thus in order to continue to work, and as one 
who was inclined to write and wanted to speak as “authentically” as he could given the 
circumstances of his time, he went elsewhere, moving to Paris in 1831. His subsequent activity 
there also offers some insight into his view of himself and what he was actually about as he 
seemingly tried to elude that uncomfortable sense of identity conflict and dissonance he 
experienced at home.   
     He arrived in Paris less than a year after the July Revolution (1830), which had resulted in the 
dethroning of Charles X along with his reactionary policies and his replacement by the “Citizen 
King” Louis-Phillipe. This political move signaled to many that the French capital was now a 
haven for more independent and progressive minds. Heine was already “notorious” for his Book 
of Songs (1827) and his Travel Pictures (1828-1831), which consisted of “witty, sometimes 
nasty” travelogues in poetic prose (Zantop, “Introduction” 2). His first publications after his 
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move to Paris, however, were feuilletons on the subject of French painters (who were presenting 
at the annual art exhibitions (Salons) in the immediate aftermath of the recent revolutionary 
power shift) that he subsequently compiled under the title Französische Maler (French Painters) 
in his volume Salon I and published for a German audience (1834).  
     German studies scholar Susanne Zantop observes that these essays on French painters and 
their paintings appear to have been written in a spirit that questioned the effects of such a 
political revolution on art itself. But, despite Heine’s siding with the revolution in principle, this 
initial work from a position of self-imposed exile did not have the tone of a political pamphlet 
per se. Rather, it was “a text deeply suspicious of ideologies and troubled by the idea of violent 
change. It is certainly not a text for aesthetic purists but a curious, elaborate mixture of 
descriptions, narration, aesthetic theory, historical and political commentary, dramatic enactment, 
enthusiastic celebration, and sitcom burlesque” (Zantop, “Introduction” 3). That is, it suggested 
that Heine was “less interested in innovations in the field of visual arts than in developing his 
own literary innovations…and that the paintings he discusses are being used as “metaphors or 
referents…as raw material to work with in order to solve aesthetic-political problems that—
according to Heine—affect art at all times” (Zantop, “Introduction” 5-6).  
     Bent on his career as a writer, he thus appears to have been highly committed to developing 
his own voice - one which he regarded as promising a new aesthetic which was capable of 
“truly” addressing problematic social issues of the times as he sensed them from his own unique 
perspective. In this his first Paris-based work, Heine discusses many paintings, though he was 
clearly struck by Eugene Delacroix’s The 28th July: Liberty Leading the People, whose 
fascination for him (as Zantop interprets it) lay in his perception of its “relationship to his own 
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aesthetic-political project [with] its focus on contemporary history, its ironic relationship to 
convention (traditional history painting), and its depiction of dialectical opposites that challenge 
rather than affirm accepted beliefs” (Zantop, “Liberty Unbound” 37). That is, within its “space” 
as a work that is both “history painting” and “genre painting,” it holds the “lofty” and the 
“lowly” in creative tension, so that one can appreciate the “free play of communication between 
different levels and modes of artistic creation”; as Zantop puts it, “In Delacroix, Heine 
rediscovers himself” (“Liberty Unbound” 37). One might also say that he saw the integrative 
identity challenges confronting his own person refracted through the complex interactions of his 
perspective with that of a fellow artist who saw the world of their shared historical moment much 
as he did.  
     This was just one of many works Heine produced while living what turned out to be the 
remainder of his life in Paris, however. He actually continued to write more books for German-
speakers and translated German works into French for the French public (including publishing 
what he viewed as a corrective response to Staël’s popular D’Allemagne (1813) (Die romantische 
Schule [The Romantic School]) in 1833 for the latter audience). By such means, he seems to have 
essentially embraced a role as mediator between France and Germany in order to promote 
increased mutual understanding of the two cultures. He also appears to have maintained a 
perspectival dualism in the process, however, adopting a kind of intermediary position between 
the German and French cultural systems (their languages, intellectual, artistic, and popular 
traditions) without actually settling his allegiances on either.  
    To reiterate, a complex systems perspective is concerned with system-wide phenomena and 
how these operate. Adopting such a lens, Heine (as a “part” or “element” of various complex 
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systems of his own time) may be perceived as having been driven by personal concerns but at 
the same time by a sophisticated and highly-informed vision by which he understood his 
situation in a broad collective context. He recognized much of the complexity of the dynamics in 
which he and his contemporaries were caught up, and moved to express his acknowledgment of 
this complexity in a “modern aesthetic” that others could appreciate as he did. By means of his 
facility with cleverly and skillfully expressing such a sensibility in his own literary art, he 
contributed to addressing current group (communal) challenges in modeling the dynamics and 
forms of relating between the embodied “lofty” and “lowly” perspectives of members of German 
and French societies who were themselves pragmatically engaged in trying to maintain the 
integrity of their respective social orders while also creating new identities more resonant with 
the felt experience of their time and particular circumstances.  
         Perhaps there is no better Illustration of this virtually simultaneously conflicted and 
integrated vision emerging in Heine’s work than in his epic poem Deutschland: A Winter’s Tale. 
I refer to the vision emerging from this literary work as having these virtually simultaneous 
qualities because, on the one hand, while the various moves and interactions of the multiple 
“lofty” and “lowly” forces operating in the social circles in which Heine moved did actually 
occur simultaneously in “real-time,” they could not do so within the “linear logic” of the literary 
narratives he constructed (this being one of the real challenges of “narrating complexity” that 
Walsh has noted). Nonetheless, by the skillful use of literary and specifically poetic techniques at 
his disposal, Heine was able to capture a sense of the complexity inherent in his vision for his 
intended readers and their imaginations. That is to say, via a singular voice, the poem’s tone and 
poetic structure, along with his narrator’s individual perspective alternating with that of “his 
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group” (that is, switching references to “I” and “we”) and its broader thematic content, Heine 
captures the (for him) contemporary sense of being unsettled by being faced with the new 
modern challenge of managing multiple identities, some of which could be readily adopted while 
others were being imposed and from which individuals (depending on their particular 
circumstances) were likely to be relatively alienated as he was. These multiple identities were 
themselves associated with diverse incompletely separable aspects of social systems then in flux. 
For example, in Heine’s case, these “conflicting” identities were associated not only with 
German versus French cultural traditions, but also with his regional identity as a Rheinländer in 
tension with those of other German-speaking territories, changing class structures and 
economies, and different religious denominations. The particulars of such conflicts would 
obviously have been different for individuals with attachments to alternate sets of social groups.  
     But Heine does not seem to be concerned with conveying a sense of modernity’s complexity 
and the conflicts it engenders within individuals alone. Rather, he seems at the same time to be 
attempting to offer an integrated response to this palpable problem and its consequences for the 
group. And, in this poem, he is primarily addressing the German-speaking group, with whom he 
maintained an ambivalent relationship as his native community. Heine effects this group-directed 
message by pointing to a questing for a kind of solution to a problem that he senses many others 
residing in the disparate German-speaking territories of his time sought as he did. That is, he 
skillfully captures the sense of a search for representing an ideally integrated and coherent 
modern group (national) identity that could afford some sense of social stability as well as 
community. There is arguably some irony, however, in engaging in a quest for such an ideal 
which can never be “absolutely” realized. An acknowledgement of this “painful” irony (which 
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Heine seems to suggest that it was for him) appears to declare itself in the poem’s concluding 
stanzas, which will be discussed in some detail as well. 
    Heine wrote his Deutschland poem thirteen years after moving to Paris and a year after he 
made a brief return to his native country and visited his mother in the winter of 1843, when his 
homeland was still in the political grip of the Austrian Metternich and Prussian authorities. On 
the one hand, the poem has been variably praised as a masterfully-composed vehicle for 
conveying Heine’s progressive and seriously subversive political agenda whose clever 
construction allowed it to circumvent the German censors and reach his intended audience. On 
the other hand along with the remainder of his writing, it has also been criticized at other times 
(as by Kraus and Adorno [see Phelan (2007) for chapter-long secondary discussions of such 
criticism]) as being “an involuntary reflex of his experience of the modern” (Phelan 46), 
demonstrating particularly in its style a kind of character weakness and acquiescence to growing 
marketing demands and trends towards commodification of publications appealing to popular 
tastes.  
     While the view proposed here does treat his work as being related to his “experience of the 
modern,” it does not endorse it as either a simple reflex or an involuntary one arising from an 
inherent weakness. Rather it regards his work (at least that under discussion here) as expressing a 
relatively conscious and deeply-felt concern for developing a modern aesthetic that addressed 
some of the now-recognized features of “complexity” emerging in his time which individuals 
attempting to “come together” as a new kind of collective themselves embodied. With such 
concerns in mind, Heine formulates satirically veiled polemics against what he regards as the 
reactionary and repressive political and religious forces then in power, but at the same time 
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poetically works to promote a sense of bonding with and among his readers, while chiding them 
for what he views as their political passivity in the face of such repression. 
     Thus, he employs the theme of a journey along with several other devices that suggest both a 
material body as well as a mind in motion, promptly engaging readers’ senses along with their 
curiosity about what is about to unfold. Even for a twenty-first century reader who might have 
little knowledge of the historical details of his time, one can quickly appreciate a sense of 
“lightness" to Heine’s touch, a pleasant almost playful quality to his voice which, as the 
translator Reed says in his introduction, lends a casual, almost conversational quality to the 
narrative, so that one could almost feel as if one were sitting alongside the narrator in the 
carriage as he proceeds to make his way home (Reed 16-17). This feeling of being drawn in to a 
companionable position is enhanced by the poetic rhyme scheme of iambic stresses and the 
“spring-heeled” rhythm that easily accommodates German (as well as English) vernacular 
speech forms (Reed 22). At the same time, the stanzas Heine employs were a staple form of 
German folk (volk) poetry of ballads and lyrics that were themselves likely capable of eliciting 
mnemonic echoes of a shared cultural tradition in his German readers. While all of these devices 
would have tended to promote a sense of intimacy and potential sense of people’s bonding 
together, signs of the poet’s whip-smart and genuinely entertaining wit pop in and out, 
encouraging readers to sense their own minds in motion as well.  
     Along with applying these socially engaging maneuvers grounded in language use (that are 
also specifically valorized as personally meaningful in the poem’s first lines - see below), Heine 
promptly begins to interweave “lower” and “higher” concerns. Thus, while the poem’s opening 
lines have an admittedly sweet almost sentimental quality, Heine goes quickly beyond the 
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potentially “saccharine,” switching the narrative focus to satirically-presented and cleverly-
veiled political concerns indicating that this narrator is not simply preoccupied with nostalgic 
feelings. Thus (from Caput I) : 
In the dismal month of November it was,           It did strange things to me when I heard 
the gloomy days grew shorter,                            the German language spoken - 
the wind was tugging the last leaves down        like nothing so much as if my heart 
as I left for the German border.                           was pleasantly being broken. 
And as I came nearer German soil,                     A little girl was playing the harp 
I felt my heart beat quicker                                 and singing with genuine feeling 
within my breast, and I even think                      and out of tune, but still the song 
a tear began to trickle.                                        she sang was most appealing. 
(three stanzas deleted) ———————————————- 
I know the tune, I know the words,                   Why shouldn’t we be happy on earth                         
I know every single author;                               why should we still go short? 
I know they tippled wine on the quiet               Why should the idle belly consume 
while publicly preaching water.                         what working hands have wrought? 
A different song, a better song,                        There’s bread enough grows here on earth  
will get the subject straighter:                           to feed mankind with ease; 
let’s make a heaven on earth, my friends,        and roses and myrtles, beauty and joy, 
instead of waiting till later.                                and (in the season) peas. 
(three stanzas deleted) ——————————————— 
The maiden Europa is betrothed                     That’s wedding enough, and I’ll sing my song                
to that handsome Genius, Freedom.               to help the solemnising. 
They lie in each other’s arms embraced          Deep in my heart I feel the stars 
it warms my heart to see them.                       of consecration rising.   
No priest will bless their vows, but the pair    They are stars inspired, they wildly glow, 
have taken and will fulfill them.                       Dissolving in streams of fire -  
Here’s to the bride and here’s to the groom,   I feel I could break an oak, my strength 
and to all their future children.                         miraculously grows higher. 
                                                                         (excerpted from Heine 29-33) 
Thus, in a lyrical spirit and, as he indicates, virtually “singing,” the narrator turns his attention 
and his own “tune” away from the “appealing” but clumsily “out of tune” one of the child to the 
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more informed, though still craftily playful, one of a mature man of vision who knows the wider 
world. Slyly attacking the Catholic hierarchy and their traditions (“I know they tippled wine on 
the quiet while publicly preaching water”), he bemoans their religious “message” which he 
suggests is actually heartless and aimed at extorting the poor while it advises the latter (those 
with “working hands”) to defer their own earthly gratification. Then employing symbolism from 
Greek mythology, he optimistically suggests that his and his compatriots’ then-“maiden 
Europ(a)” should be wedded to their continent’s enlightened hero “Freedom,” which the poet 
portrays uniting with and rescuing “her.” Thus, here again bringing together the “lofty” and the 
“lowly,” he, the inspired and vigorous poet (strong enough to “break an oak”), offers the 
tantalizing glimmerings of a new world with a more promising future potentially emerging.  
     However, as the narrator-poet proceeds on his journey through various hamlets and towns on 
his way home, his mind also begins to wander into and out of different states of consciousness 
(sleep and wakefulness) in which the dream content consists of highly-detailed scenes conveying 
a sense of being haunted. This dreamy feeling of being haunted arises from run-ins with various 
specters including with a “dark companion” who accompanies him on a “nocturnal” walk 
through Cologne where he is reminded that: 
The French and the Russians have shared out the land,   Here we enjoy a hegemony,  
Britannia rules the oceans;                                                 for once we are not divided.    
we reign unchallenged in the realm                                    Other nations have kept their feet 
of dreamy abstract notions.                            on the ground with which they were provided.  
(excerpted from Heine 61) 
That is to say, as his “companion” also affirms, he (Heine) and other Germans may together 
(“undivided”) excel at “dreaming,” but this contrasts with the practical achievements of other 
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“grounded” nations whose coherence has allowed them to  become “rulers” in the world of 
material reality.    
     And then as their walk proceeds into the Cologne cathedral and the Three Kings’ Chapel 
where Heine speaks to a skeleton king, he informs the latter: “I see you belong in all respects / to 
an age that’s dead or dying,” and his companion who has affirmed his preference for “action,” 
“…with one blow / the three poor skeletons shattered, / all the old bones of false beliefs / he 
mercilessly scattered/…and [with that, Heine’s] dream/ [is] abruptly terminated.” (excerpted 
from Heine 65-67). This episode underscores Heine’s respect for German intellect and 
imagination, but also his associated concern with its relative ineffectualness in the modern era 
where many old beliefs of his countrymen also ring “false,” warrant “shattering” and switching 
instead to a state of being awake and taking “action.” 
    This scene is followed later by another dream episode wherein the narrator encounters a 
German icon Barbarossa (Frederick I, Holy Roman Emperor 1155-1190), who was then-
idealized by many but he (Heine) disparages for any “real” ability to be of use to him and his 
German contemporaries (“Barbarossa’ - I cried in return - / ‘You’re only some old fable, / go 
back to bed, we’ll free ourselves / without you, we’re quite able” [105]).  
     Here in mid-poem we start to see a shift from the more sentimental and idealistic emphases of 
the opening to a more practical forward-looking one that will begin to acknowledge tensions 
between collective German pride in its past and a need to relinquish and move beyond “fables.” 
This tension (interspersed with moments of levity) will essentially grow in the following scenes 
as the narrator moves closer to reaching his goal (home). It will also manifest at two levels. On 
the one hand, there are signs of simultaneous tugs between a relatively passive state (dream) for 
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collective wholeness and autonomy, and a more active inclination to effect a progressive future 
in reality. At the same time, the narrator starts to exhibit signs of an internal split or conflict of 
voices within himself - a discord that is reminiscent of the dissonance arising from the clash of 
disparate identities Heine (was obliged to) assume(d) in his own life.  
     This redirected movement towards illustration of the narrator’s growing appreciation of the 
real challenges confronting his diverse German (-speaking) countrymen trying to achieve his 
ideal of unity then begins to manifest more explicitly (beginning with Caput XX), when the 
narrator finally reaches “home” (here Hamburg, where Heine had spent a significant part of his 
young adult life both as a ward of his comparatively wealthy uncle Salomon and in meetings 
with his publisher, Campe). Now with his eyes literally and figuratively more “open,” the 
narrator-poet starts to convey his growing sense of unease at the disturbing obstacles he sees 
facing him as he tries to promote his political ideal of a German nation based on French 
ideological principles of “liberty, equality and fraternity.”   
     Mixed feelings and signs of evasiveness start to become evident when, for example, his 
mother plies him with obviously tasty food while asking him about life among the French which 
he declines to answer (117-121). Subsequently he is also quite disturbed when he perceives the 
“people of Hamburg” having “changed” (“even more than the city” which had suffered a recent 
fire disaster), now appearing as “walking ruins” and “poor broken objects of pity” (127).  
     His tone also starts to become more gritty and “painfully” ironic. After having a meal with 
Campe and other “pleasant company,” he encounters “a splendid figure of womanhood” (135), a 
fantastical caricature of a prostitute who will accost and try to seduce him to come back and 
reside in Hamburg. And as the narrator here begins to drive towards his conclusions (Caputs 
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XXIV-XXVI), he finds himself drawn momentarily into a rather foul but still intriguing mess (so 
to speak) whose details hint at what the future might bring.  
     Thus, now virtually “in the arms” of this strange figure whom he refers to as a “Goddess,” in 
a scene recalling the much earlier one involving Europa and Freedom, the narrator-poet engages 
in a dialogue with her that is both revelatory and unpleasant. In “explaining” to her why he had 
returned to Hamburg for a visit (“I wanted to weep where once I felt / the bitterest tear-drops 
burning - / it’s a kind of patriotism, I / suppose, this foolish yearning.”), he acknowledges a 
“shame” that renders him ambivalent about being completely frank about such “yearning” (“I 
don’t like to mention it; at root / it’s a disease, this feeling / a wound that I’m ashamed of, and 
not a thing for public revealing.”) (emphasis added) (145). This grimmer tone associated with his 
acknowledging his “feeling wounded” then mounts, while being mingled at the same time with a 
kind of biting scatalogical humor. That is, the “Goddess” agrees to reveal Germany’s future to 
him so long as he tells no one (151), as she invites him to put his head “down the hole” of a 
“magic pot” (actually a chamber pot) in order to “view” it  (“The future of Germany you will see 
/ down there like a shifting phantasma, / but do not shudder if the filth / sends up a foul miasma”) 
(155). And as the narrator reveals that he is “revolted” not only by the sight but also by the 
“smells” (155), he now also acknowledges that “…curing a great disease / is harder than one 
supposes - “ and that he feels momentarily unsure of himself (“…the way the German future 
smelt / was ghastly, hideous - stronger / than ever my nose had bargained for - “) (157). 
     But as he proceeds to the conclusion of his narrative (Caput XXVII), he leaves the seductions 
of the “Goddess” behind and returns to the monologic stance of narrator identified as enlightened 
poet, adopting the “lofty” mantle of his Greek tragicomic and politically-committed predecessor 
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(“It is the lyre my father struck / that now his offspring uses - / the great Greek Aristophanes, / 
the darling of the Muses” [161]). Critically, he appears to regard this identity as both vulnerable 
to “the mob” who is likely to “abuse him” and the German King residing in Berlin who is 
inclined to “rub live poets up the wrong way” (163). Nonetheless, in the final stanzas, he asserts 
that despite risking “stay[ing} imprisoned forever” and burning in “Dante’s Hell” as “the poet’s 
flames…scorch and scourge and scorn him,” he will continue to raise his voice against the forces 
of the unenlightened; and in the final line, he affirms this, advising the latter to “Take care: we 
might roast you in such a hell / as an everlasting warning.” (165).  
     Thus, the narrator-poet has wended a circuitous way, by whose depiction he has also worked 
at drawing his readers along with him. Essentially he has endeavored to move all involved from 
a relatively simple idealistic (and thus distant) position to a more ambivalent but realistic one 
that acknowledges a sense of the diverse and complex challenges ahead. German scholar David 
Pugh has analyzed Heine’s well-recognized affiliative (poetic, dramatic, and political) ties to 
Aristophanes in a discussion of what he, too, regards as this poem’s depiction of an 
“ambivalence” arising from what he asserts was Heine’s philosophy, which maintains (according 
to Pugh) “that we are foolish creatures inhabiting a largely but not wholly chaotic world presided 
over by an obscure comedian-god, whose place we aspire to usurp but who will always have the 
last laugh by reminding us of our own nothingness” (Pugh 680). Pugh notes that this might seem 
a rather “unwelcome” interpretation, particularly to those who view Heine as “an icon of German 
progressive politics” (680). While my own view also acknowledges Heine’s ambivalence, it sees 
the latter as arising more from Heine’s self-acknowledged “wounded” position as one unable to 
settle on any absolute and fixed identity himself, which leaves him questioning his own 
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patriotism, as well as his own class affiliations (manifest, for example, in his conflicted 
responses towards those whom he compassionately views, on the one hand, as downtrodden 
“working hands” victimized by current sociopolitical trends and “the mob” (qua Communist 
sympathizers [Pugh 680]).  
     Heine’s sense of his world being “largely but not wholly chaotic” might also be said to have 
derived from his (implicit) awareness of his native land’s consisting of a still unintegrated set of 
German-speaking territories with their own local identities that had not yet found sufficient 
commonality in a sense of what one might call “nationhood” in an emerging complex 
(“national”) system in his lifetime . At the same time, his epic poem also hints at his being an 6
individual who feels himself fundamentally challenged with regard to having a sociopolitical/
national identity himself - this being suggested, for example, in his (the narrator’s) conveying his 
Rheinländer’s sense of being different from and upset with the Prussian military who were 
dominating and literally patrolling his homeland; we see this expressed in his veiled derision of 
Prussian soldiers and their appearance, for example (“The cavalry’s get-up I quite / approved - 
one must speak fairly - / especially that spike of steel / that crowns it all so squarely /…It’s really 
only the thought of storms / that I find a little fright’ning - / that spike on your Romantic heads / 
might attract some modern lightning.” [Heine 39]).  
     But as his own acknowledgment of “feeling a wound that [he’s] ashamed of” (145) and the 
tone of his poem’s conclusions intimate, Heine also felt himself to have been “wounded” by 
For a detailed discussion of nations understood as complex systems, whose ordered forms as distinct 6
nations emerge in large part from initial “chaos” and the subsequent “tipping” (often abruptly) of local 
behavior into a coherent movement by interactions within horizontally-oriented peer-to-peer networks 
containing distributed knowledge of nationalist ideas, see Eric Kaufmann’s article on “Complexity and 
nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism, vol. 23, no. 1, 2017, pp. 6-25.
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those social forces beyond his personal control that contributed to his conflicted state of unstable 
(historically still-irreconcilable) identities. Heine thus both embodied and presented, through his 
highly-skilled literary creations, a sense of the varied and interacting social and political forces 
that the common “man” in German-speaking territories of western European was having to try to 
address and negotiate in his lifetime. He seems to have been quite suited, in other words, to 
conveying ways of thinking about and providing, one might say, some of the sense of a model 
(even if still formally incomplete) of the complexity of modern systemic forces (or multiplicity 
of force-relations as Foucault might put it) to which he and his contemporaries contributed (but 
were at the same time subject) in the creation of the German nationalist movement that would 
formally emerge a few decades later.  
     Thus, despite Heine’s native German home clearly remaining of lifelong concern to him, by 
the very fact of his self-imposed exiling he seems thereafter to have remained in a kind of 
“flight,” as the journey in his Deutschland epic poem metaphorically suggests (and others who 
have commented upon his “elusiveness” have noted). That is, it captures the perceptible feeling 
of a body and mind in motion arising from identities that he found difficult to reconcile and the 
dissonance this irreconcilability provoked in him. 
     But if the modern aesthetic that the Jewish German Heine was working at developing 
arguably expressed some of the very instability in social identities (along with their feedback 
“loopiness”) which was related to the latter’s still-uncertain accommodation to and interaction 
with various modernizing trends emerging at the time, Balzac’s was no less relevant to the times 
or to social identities specifically. Both his style and his focus, however, were somewhat 
different. Though his work, in many ways, targeted “system-wide” collective matters as Heine’s 
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did, the sense of his literary project was not directed so much at demonstrating how to feel one’s 
way, so to speak, towards an informed (if ironic) collective uniting in order to fight for a 
communal cause, as the notoriously sensualist Heine’s was. Rather, Balzac’s aesthetic vision 
appears to have been more bound up in exposing and dissecting, so to speak, the new identities 
and forms of social communication and connection being established as well as the problematic 
discordances (“pathology” as he sometimes called it) that these burgeoning connections were 
engendering in his own modernizing society. 
     This mid-nineteenth century period in which both Heine and Balzac lived also straddled the 
literary shift from Romanticism to Realism. Heine’s work both expressed and critiqued the 
romantic, espousing while secularizing the pagan sensibility of the classical Greeks, and voicing 
dreams about, while agitating for, real political change in the service of his German-speaking 
contemporaries, for example. But while Heine personally projected the very sense of this 
unstable position (and accompanying dissonance) to his public at the same time that the form 
(aesthetic) of his work did, Balzac employed a very different voice. By all accounts, Balzac was 
much more grounded in a literal (geographical) and cultural sense, and the new aesthetic he 
offered could be said to have reflected that. Unlike the German Heine, Balzac was not obliged to 
address concerns regarding how to effect some sort of new manner of collective “connectivity” 
that would allow disparate territories to unite as a bounded national German “system” (in 
Kaufman’s sense) that could operate in an inter-national setting on an equal footing with those 
other societies (like the French and British) that were rapidly moving forward with their 
modernizing projects at the time. Rather, his concerns lay more with where his own native 
community’s concerns with “connectivity” resided - that is, with the processes and details 
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involved in picking up the pieces left by the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars and generating the 
new forms defining the social structure(s) of French society.  
     His creative attention thus targeted the social issues which directly occupied him in his life, 
though most of the novels and novellas which make up his Human Comedy are actually centered 
around recent historical events (the French Restoration and the July Monarchy) which had set the 
stage for his own present moment. His aesthetic, therefore, reflects and responds to what he 
perceived as the emergence of a new face of France. 
     But perhaps because of his own “entanglement” in the details and some (much?) of what he 
witnessed was unfamiliar in its expression and too radical in his judgment, he seems to have 
found some features of the “new order” distasteful. Nonetheless, he clearly found them important 
to expose. He was, after all, also making a living from his writing and, despite his initial failures, 
ultimately came to be a public figure of some celebrity (akin to Heine, whose work he knew and 
to whom he dedicated, with some “unjust” “spitefulness” (per Saintsbury xiii-xiv), his short story 
A Prince of Bohemia).  
     Balzac’s post-war French society was clearly changing and the systems (related to increasing 
urbanization, new forms of economic organization, and political/democratizing pressures, for 
example) were in the relatively early stages of their processes of becoming, so to speak. They 
were thus still relatively enigmatic to most of those caught up in them. As Luhmann has 
described it, a new social ontology was also under development (though his theoretical 
formulation maintains its own distinct character, which is somewhat different from the 
“complexity” lens being employed here). Here it is being specifically suggested that Balzac had 
his own discerning eye (metaphorical speaking) trained directly on these phenomena. In addition, 
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one might say that here is another instance of what Hunt has described as “words rushing to 
catch up” to what people at a more visceral and subconscious level already knew, and that Balzac 
was acting as a notable contributor to this distinctly human systemic effort of individuals and 
their collective trying to articulate a sense of themselves/itself and become a bit more self-aware 
(as he also kept his “gaze” trained on the “shadows” of his time as a “real contemporary” as per 
Agamben).  
     Heine’s model (as I’ve referred to it) may be said, on the one hand, to have been targeting 
more long-range connections through time and space (envisioning bonding connections across 
German territories and differing cultural mindsets that could support national integration and 
future progress in the global competition with other nations). Balzac’s, on the other hand, may be 
said to have targeted more local and immediate connections and their dynamics in his 
modernizing community (as he considered some of the mindsets of, and relationships between, 
those living in the provinces versus Paris, for example).  
     As a part of this distinctiveness, the two writers also sometimes adopted different points of 
view commensurate with their own circumstances. Thus, Heine in his Deutschland poem, adopts 
the first-person perspective of a “wounded” poet, one who experiences his own fragmented 
identity and envisions how his similarly divided native collective might aspire to an ideally more 
united condition as some kind of new nation. Balzac, however, typically adopts the cooler 
perspective of a (seemingly) more objective third-person narrator focused on the “object” (qua 
Comédie) of his already relatively bounded society (qua nation) whose features and workings 
were essentially laid out before him and accessible to his own imaginative manipulation. At the 
same time, while he has sometimes been depicted as a rather dispassionate observer (bordering 
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on the stereotype of a scientific sociologist), Balzac’s subjective concerns and biases (which 
were politically much more conservative than Heine’s) remain in evidence in his writing, as he 
repeatedly hints at a disillusionment with what he saw as lack of meaningful reform arising from 
the July Revolution and genuine preference for “the core values of monarchy, religion, and the 
family” (Watts 4). Nonetheless, he concentrates on depicting the details of the French social life 
coming-into-being in his Human Comedy as he saw them, while also conveying a panoramic 
sense of that society’s own complexity and connectivity across its regional and country-wide 
sweep. The virtual system which he portrayed in his literary project thus arguably conveyed, 
through many of its own formal narrative qualities, a modeling of some of the very burgeoning 
complex systems’ forms and processes that were developing and becoming increasingly (though 
still largely implicitly) evident around him. 
     These formal narrative qualities manifest in some of the very stylistic innovations for which 
he became famous. These include his being a pioneer in the modern use of flashback (a kind of 
“temporal loopiness”) which embedded stories within stories thus fostering linkages between 
representations of a past and those of the narrative present, and in the reappearance of individual 
characters (beginning with several from Père Goriot [1835]) in subsequent novels and novellas, 
thereby allowing readers to imaginatively trace the social and developmental trajectories and 
growing networks of such characters across narrative contexts shifting in time and space.  
     He employs flashback, for example, in some of his greatest novels, including Illusions 
perdues (Lost Illusions) to relate the second and third parts of this tripartite serial work, which 
portrays the different tempos and qualities of life of characters residing in, and moving back and 
forth between, the provinces and Paris while in the midst of their own quests and frustrations in 
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achieving success in love and life (particularly in the worlds of commerce and in art). He also 
uses flashback techniques in several of his shorter fictions, including Le Colonel Chabert, where 
the protagonist’s recollections of scenes from the Napoleonic Empire contrast markedly with his 
present experience of the Restoration’s pampered elite and neglect of the poor.  
     But he also exploits the technique as a framing device in many other novellas, including 
Sarrasine and Another Study of Womankind. In these contexts, as Peter Brooks puts it, he 
“renews an age-old tradition of oral story-telling, now giv[ing it] a new and knowing 
form” (“Introduction” viii). These particular novellas each have their own thematic focus, 
however, as the narrator qua story-teller engages his listener(s) for different social purposes. In 
Sarrasine, for example, an unnamed aristocratic-narrator slowly unveils the peculiar details 
regarding the identities of enigmatic fellow characters and the subject of a mysterious painting in 
an effort to pursue a romantic relationship with a Mme de Rochefide; while in Another Study of 
Womankind, another male aristocrat-narrator (in this case, a listener) avidly attends to various 
tales on the subject of the “perfect” woman being recounted by his hostess-novelist for the 
edification of her select group of Parisian salon attendees. In both of these works as well as 
others, Balzac specifically emphasizes the power of story-telling itself and the effects of that 
power on those listening, while at the same time decrying the loss of “the spirit of an earlier age 
of sociability…doomed by a world of commerce, journalism, and the devaluation of 
leisure” (Brooks viii-ix) as he reworks the forms and manner of story-telling in his own age. 
     By such means, Balzac thus appears to underscore his appreciation of such “tasteful” and 
“typically Parisian” (as he sometimes called them [Human Comedy: Selected Stories 19]) face-
to-face narrative exchanges, while implicitly bemoaning their fading away along with the loss of 
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intimate contact and (in many cases) bonding they promoted. Yet his sprawling Human Comedy 
contains covert signs of other ways of imagining social connection in the French society he is 
now directly confronting - a society increasingly dependent on new forms of communication and 
connectivity or what one might already call “virtual” human contact and narrative story-telling. 
Notable among these is that serial returning to over thirty major and minor characters (such as 
Eugène de Rastignac, Delphine and her financier husband Frédérick de Nucingen, artists Jean-
Jacques Bixiou and Joseph Bridau, and the physician Horace Blanchon) who appear and 
reappear in his fictions, “thus giving readers the impression of catching up with old friends as 
they might in the real world” (Watts 4). One might also regard such textual and character 
interrelating as a kind of early representational form of social networking activity, anticipating 
the even more expansive “virtual” form that it would take on (as technologies and media forms 
have continued to evolve) later in the twentieth century.  
     As Brooks himself also asserts, Balzac “stands as the first true realist in his ambition to see 
society as an organic system…Balzac ‘invents’ the new century by being the first writer to 
represent its emerging urban agglomerations, its nascent capitalist dynamics, its rampant cult of 
the individual personality” (emphasis added). And he continues:  “By seeing and dramatizing 
changes that he mainly deplored, he initiated his readers into understanding the shape of the 
century,” a feat for which Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx also acknowledged him (Brooks 
“Introduction” vii-viii; xiv). And though the quality of Balzac’s writing has attracted some 
criticism, his inventive aesthetic’s impact on writers and readers not only in his own time but in 
generations to follow remains unquestioned. 
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     Thus, Balzac may be said to have contributed significantly to the growing popular awareness 
of features of burgeoning complex systems and individuals’ places within them (as within cities 
and commercial enterprises) that were becoming visible in France during the mid-nineteenth 
century. Among other things, he fleshed out narrative details by which readers could appreciate 
the material form of some of the “connectivity” within French modernizing social systems. He 
pointed towards the presence of new forms of social networks that appeared to emerge 
spontaneously (through the very medium he along with other writers of the mid-nineteenth 
century were for the first time employing), along with their so-called feedback loops and 
interrelationships at different levels of scale (that is, between and “within” individuals). Balzac’s 
voluminous Human Comedy also virtually enacts the simultaneity of such complex social activity 
- an inherent aspect of complex systems - by defying the linear logic of traditional narratives 
when these are viewed in isolation. And while each novel and novella making up his literary 
project may clearly be read on its own terms and appreciated for its own literary value, it is 
primarily when they are viewed in their larger aggregate that one can gain a more totalizing 
grasp of the dynamic temporal and spatial relationships among the large cast of characters, which 
are reminiscent of those taking place among actors in the larger social system that was also 
French society at the time.  
     Despite having here enumerated some of the various ways in which Balzac’s sprawling 
project illustrated and conveyed the sense of his society as an “organic system” (as Brooks also 
refers to it), it is nonetheless the case that he occasionally also ventured to communicate some of 
this holistic sense of relationships between characters and their social world qua “system” within 
individual works as well.  
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     For example, in Père Goriot, perhaps the most renowned single work among the more than 
ninety novels and novellas that constituted the Human Comedy collection, Balzac skillfully 
employs various techniques to illustrate the broad scope of social forces arising in and operating 
during the Bourbon Restoration as well as ways in which they covertly but effectively “bore 
down,” so to speak, on individual characters (and, to some extent, vice versa).  
     While a major thematic focus centers around the eponymous character whose obsessive love 
for his two grown daughters, who have married into wealth and privilege, leads to his financial 
and personal ruin, an interwoven theme is carried along by the impoverished young aristocrat, 
Eugène de Rastignac, who witnesses the older man’s tragic story unfold. Significantly, this 
young character has come to Paris from the provinces in hopes of making his fortune and it is 
through his eyes (as a fellow lodger who befriends the old Goriot at the run-down boarding 
house which both inhabit) that readers appreciate what a relatively naive individual like himself 
learns about the machinations of a whole society whose dynamic is itself changing - from one 
defined by the aristocracy and its hierarchizing principles to one increasingly defined (at the 
same time) by capitalist values and dynamics. 
     Balzac also imparts the aforementioned sense of his society as an “organic system” by means 
of various literary devices. Not only are readers obliged to follow along with Rastignac as he 
learns various lessons from his encounters with members of diverse aspects of Parisian society, 
but they are actually confronted with a narrative structure and stylistic tactics that facilitate 
appreciation of movement between “highs” and “lows” as well as the scalar extremes of “parts” 
relative to the larger “whole” and connections among them all.  
!  103
     For one thing, the main characters are routinely portrayed as criss-crossing the narrative space 
by carriage or by foot against the relatively static backdrop of Paris’ urban space of buildings, 
streets, and neighborhoods (which is also aided in its mental representation by the author’s 
provision of a detailed map of the city at that time). While essentially all of the notable 
characters are depicted in such a mobile way, the virtual hub of this activity is the boarding house 
from which Rastignac makes his numerous forays “out” into the Paris streets, whether to attend 
classes at university in the Latin Quarter, visit members of the elite classes as a “poor relation” of 
a female aristocrat, or meet and develop relationships with the nouveau-riche Goriot daughters, 
all of whom reside across town on both the Right and Left Banks of Paris. Thus, we find the 
novel opening with an extensive (eighty-two page long) depiction of the details and 
neighborhood placement of the well-worn boarding house, whose lodgers are hierarchically-
situated across floors by the monthly rent they can pay. The form of this organizational 
arrangement is underscored by various lodgers’ moves to more prime or more wretched locations 
in the house as their fortunes change (as in the case of old Goriot who must move closer to the 
cold attic as his resources are depleted by his “self-serving” daughters). 
     But these depictions of overt physical moves and semiotically-significant spatial 
(re-)arrangements of characters are also accompanied by the more covert dynamics of 
interpersonal struggles for gaining and maintaining financial security and social status. Such 
concerns and conflicts are illustrated by nearly all notable characters in the novel but perhaps 
most flagrantly in the exploitative verbal and behavioral interactions the Goriot daughters engage 
in with their father which will ultimately lead to his death. But while Rastignac has clearly been 
seduced by the wealth and beauty of both of these young women, readers are also privy to his 
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struggles internally and morally with his growing understanding of the dynamics of the social 
system (“road to success,” so to speak) and the fateful choices he is being pressured to make 
within it. Sharpening this conflict are his run-ins with another fellow lodger, the criminal Vautrin 
who, like Rastignac will appear in several follow-up novels in the Balzac project, but in this 
novel attempts to convince the young man to collude in a murder plot in order to advance his 
(actually both of their) personal ambitions. We find that Rastignac does not remain completely 
thoughtless. He does intermittently reflect on his self and his situation, at one point noting that: 
“…in the past month, [he] had developed as many virtues as faults. His faults were prompted by 
society and the need to fulfill his increasing desires. Among his virtues was that Southern 
impetuosity which tries to resolve problems by confronting them head on, and does not allow a 
man from South of the Loire to remain undecided about anything…” (Balzac, Père Goriot 89).  
     Thus, he finds himself challenged and “pulled” in various directions. And while he will not 
succumb to Vautrin’s enticements and in the novel’s concluding pages will work to ease the 
suffering of the dying Goriot, he is also overcome with “a wave of dreadful depression” (Balzac, 
Père Goriot 263) as he realizes he does not even have the few francs necessary to pay those 
digging the grave of his friend.  With that in mind, Rastignac: 
     now, all alone, walked a few paces to the higher part of the cemetery, and saw 
     Paris spread out along the winding banks of the Seine, where the lights were  
     beginning to shine. His eyes fastened almost hungrily on the area…{that was} home 
     to that fashionable society to which he had sought to gain admission. He gave this 
     murmuring hive a look which seemed already to savor the sweetness to be sucked 
     from it, and pronounced the epic challenge: ‘It’s between the two of us now’! 
     And as the first shot in the war he had thus declared on Society, Rastignac went 
     to dine with Madame de Nucingen. (Balzac, Père Goriot 263).  
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Thus, from his panoramic vantage point in these the novel’s closing lines, Rastignac addresses 
the “whole” of the society of which he is a part, at the same time affording readers some grasp of 
the sense of a “system” which his character has come to discern, understand, and begun to 
grapple with. At the same time, readers are left with the question of how he will actually move 
forward in his confrontation with the so-called system whose details he appears to anticipate 
“savoring” but which he also finds so challenging that he virtually shakes his fist at it. But, of 
course, in Balzac’s Human Comedy, the story is “to be continued.”         
     As a final note here, one more point regarding the significance of Balzac’s stylistic tendency 
to often employ specific spatial arrangements and cues to aid visualization of abstract 
phenomena (as in the cases of the boarding-house organization and Rastignac’s view of 
“Society” noted above) should be mentioned. Andrea Goulet observes in her paper entitled 
“Balzac’s Optics of Narration” (2001) that there is a romantic versus realist tension in Balzac’s 
Human Comedy that manifests in “a continual dialogue between the competing modes of 
“vision” (as in the “visionary eye attuned to the realm of mystical revelation”) and “sight” (as in 
the “scientific eye trained for the positivist observation of details in the world”) (43). She 
supports this contention by pointing out the many narratives which emphasize the roles of 
inspired voyants (Louis Lambert, Victor Morillon, Séraphita/itus) and blind seers (Facino Cane) 
versus those with worldly heroes “whose eyes are gradually trained to perceive the workings of 
society” (Eugène de Rastignac, Lucien de Rubempré, Raphaël de Valentin) (44). The 
implications of this “textually encoded move from one mode of seeing to another in Balzac,” she 
suggests, lies in its “exploration” of the "modern observer" - that is, of the seeing subject as 
bodily, temporally grounded and implicated in a nexus of political and economic forces that strip 
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the subject of perspectival mastery” (emphasis added) (58). As I have also suggested, such a 
move would have been particularly meaningful in this historical period not only because “the 
modern observer must gain experience with the subtle, changing phenomena of social 
appearances in order to interpret them” (Goulet 66) but also because (as Goulet also intimates) 
absolutist sociopolitical perspectives were declining in their legitimacy and ability to afford 
acceptable narratives of the “ontology” of the modern world then emerging. 
     Thus, as Goulet also implies, one can appreciate in Balzac’s depictions the tensions as well as 
the tentative beginnings of a new (though still unstable) tendency in western Europeans’ 
cognitive modeling of their social world - one characterized by a growing trend towards 
incorporating a significantly visual mode that emphasized “spatial relationships” and had, at the 
same time, the potential to aid in efforts at “reworking” the sense of social relationships 
themselves. In other words, moves towards “spatialization” and the kind of abstraction it 
supports may be argued to have facilitated individuals’ relinquishing the sociopolitical focus on 
simple hierarchies and consideration of other (newer) forms of social relationships (including 
more horizontally-oriented democratic ones). By so doing, they also would have had the 
potential to “re-gain” some of the perspectival mastery in grasping the sense of their society, 
which may have seemed to be slipping away from them. Such a trend would seemingly have 
been supported not only by the use of new “tools” arising from emerging technologies and their 
applications (as with photography), but also by all of the other immediate and direct (embodied) 
encounters individuals would have had with various details of the modern complex systems 
(such as cities, communication networks, banking and other financial systems) that were 
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continuing to develop and grow in their scalar reach in the mid- to latter portions of the 
nineteenth century.  
    In the next chapter, the persistent need and pressures of the German and French populaces to 
effect what could be deemed “satisfying and useful” ways of modeling the sense of their modern 
societies will continue to be discussed, but now as they were taking place in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century after the Franco-Prussian War. Seemingly, there was less need now to imagine 
and try to describe emerging forms of social connection in their respective societies as compared 
with a few decades earlier. But, as these societies were developing, diversity within them was 
also increasing and becoming more apparent as an energetic force itself (increasing diversity 
being another feature of growing “complexity”). For some individuals then, as in the case of 
these next two writers, there were now discernibly new “problems” arising. These included 
awareness that “the people’s” concerns were now starting to differentiate and compete among 
themselves in an uneasy alliance with those late nineteenth century authorities who were trying 
to assert their own version(s) of the new social “ontology.” In this penultimate chapter, the focus 
will be on two artists, Heinrich Mann and Stéphane Mallarmé, whose careers and concerns were 
shaped both by local circumstances after the war as well as by mutual cross-cultural post-
Enlightenment developments that were beginning to promote explorations of the very nature of 
individuals’ psyches (and expression of desires) themselves along with considerations of how to 
address the systemic challenge of actually integrating the increasingly diverse segments of their 
population(s) into stable modern communities with a promising future. 
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Chapter 4:  
The Political and Poetic Forms  
of Mann's and Mallarmé’s Solutions 
     In this chapter, the focus of the discussion on select writers and their works will shift to try to 
illustrate how the form of new “problems” emerging in western Europe (and Germany and 
France in particular) in the latter part of the nineteenth century were taking on a new shape as 
well as how two artists of that period responded to such changes in their own work in their 
efforts to address them. Again, employing some of the conceptual vocabulary and principles of 
complex systems will be useful. Essentially, it will be argued that pressures leading to increasing 
differentiation and diversification of identities at different levels of scale (individual and 
collective) within these societies were at the same time beginning to lead to problems with 
integrating the elements so produced. This abstract characterization of such “problems” (which 
is common when employing a “complexity” lens) will be fleshed out in the present chapter with 
specific attention to elaboration of many of the details of their particular expression in the 
specific locales of Germany and France and the unique circumstances of the two writers, 
Heinrich Mann and Stéphane Mallarmé. From a “complexity” perspective, presentation of such 
particulars and their abstract interrelationships are both necessary for elucidating the “complete 
picture,” so to speak, of any specific (set of ) complex systems, as these two societies (and the 
two writers themselves) may be considered to be. As the historian David Christian and his 
colleagues have noted, complex entities contain diverse components but these components are 
arranged in particular ways in order for them to exist and function properly (think how the 
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component “parts” of an animal or an airplane need to connect and relate to each other properly 
in order for these entities to exist and operate, so to speak; note also how these entities are more 
“complex” than their unassembled constituents) (Christian et al 5). In the case of the German and 
French communities under discussion, the aforementioned pressures of increasing 
“differentiation” of social (including national) identities will be argued to have been leading to 
problems with their “integration” into stable and satisfying inter-related “wholes.” The latter will 
be argued to have been a significant “stimulus” to these writers orienting themselves to concerns 
with both the individual psyche (or personality) and the formation of communities at the end of 
the century.  
     Before entering directly into a discussion of Mann and Mallarmé and their work, however, it 
will be useful to offer a brief summary of the argument so far in order to situate them more 
specifically and clarify the comparative sense in which they may be understood relative to each 
other as well as those who had come before them.  
     Formally, the discussion has been aimed at elaborating some of the ways in which various 
currently recognized principles associated with notions of “complexity” may be employed for 
appreciating the activity of, and production of particular works by, select French and German 
writer-artists in the long nineteenth century. Essentially, via this lens, these writers have been 
viewed as agents - of a particularly innovative type - who participated in the dynamics of the 
“complex adaptive systems” (CAS) that they inhabited in an inherently relational fashion. Such 
agents may be said to exist as bounded subsystems (CAS) themselves (by which boundedness 
they become capable of interior processing) that typically learn or adapt in response to 
interactions and exchange of information with other agents in their environments; at the same 
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time they are constrained by and respond with further constraints upon the broader contextual 
systems of which they constitute a part. That is, as was noted in the introduction: “while these 
systems [CAS] are constrained, the constraints are loose or only partial, and the nature of the 
constraints (and thereby the system) is constantly modified by the interaction of the agents with 
the system and each other; [in other words] they coevolve” (Snowden 225).  
     While observing that complexity theorizing still exists in its early stages, complexity scholar 
John H. Holland also points out that all known CAS themselves have several hallmarks. These 
include tendencies towards hierarchization, such that particular combinations of agents at one 
level combine to form agents at the next level up (as in human brain structures interacting to 
yield mind/brains of human beings that both define the latter and allow them to act and interact 
with each other to yield groups which may, in turn, interact with other groups to promote even 
broader co-evolving complex systems). For the purposes of the current discussion, it is also 
useful to note that such complexity notions have also been adopted, and are continuing to be 
developed, by scholars from various natural and social science as well as humanities disciplines 
in the relatively new field of “big history” . The latter’s aim is to identify general patterns across 7
relatively long time-frames (from the moment of the Big Bang to the modern historical period) 
while ultimately noting and continuing to explore the singular status of the human species and its 
behavior in the context of this broader picture of developmental change. Critically, the perceived 
broad shape of such change (to the current historical moment) is one of general tendencies 
Historian David Christian and his colleagues pioneered the theoretical foundations of this new “macro-7
historical” discipline, which have been published in several works, including Maps of Time (2011) and 
Big History: Between Nothing and Everything (2014).
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towards greater complexity emerging in wide-spread domains (whether one looks at solar 
systems, life on earth, or patterns within and between human societies). 
     While it would be neither appropriate nor possible to articulate all of the scientific 
considerations that underlie this “big history” framework here, it is important to note that the 
latter does include a reasoned and empirically-grounded framework for understanding recent 
trends in human world history as signs of systems increasing in their complexity. Greater 
complexity, in this sense, does not simply mean more “complicated.” Rather, it refers to 
developing more complex entities, defined as those things that have “many diverse components 
that are arranged in precise ways so that they generate new qualities [called] emergent qualities” 
and which appear to emerge only where conditions are optimal (so-called “Goldilocks 
conditions”) [Christian et al 4-5]. Importantly, such trends towards greater complexity depend at 
the same time on “flows of energy” that not only support the creation of such new structures but 
also help maintain them for the time necessary to stabilize patterns of activity so that more 
generative interactions and processing in the service of fostering further emergence may take 
place (Christian et al 5-6) (note that these general trends towards greater complexity in various 
domains do not deny the occurrence of (the nearly-complete or complete) eradication of certain 
structures and subsystems, since “flows of energy” actually depend upon (cycles of) exchange 
between systems that rise and fall in terms of their existence, as human beings themselves are 
obliged to do).  
     While such a conceptualization of historical change may appear quite abstract, it is grounded 
in the discernment of patterns of material details that relate back to the considerations here at 
hand. For example, as these authors note, western Europe (including France and Germany) in the 
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nineteenth century became the site of an explosion of technologies and innovation because of a 
confluence of factors (“Goldilocks conditions”) that had set the stage for their emergence in that 
region. These included the colossal extent and variety of exchange networks that had grown to 
connect locales and markets across the entire globe with this area as a central hub, the related 
increasing importance of commerce, and the spark for the Industrial Revolution taking place in 
that vicinity (first in Great Britain from which it diffused rapidly). But also, and particularly 
relevant to the current discussion, there was the region’s intellectual roots in the Enlightenment 
(with its “skepticism generated by new knowledge and the conviction that knowledge should be 
sought in exploration”) and commitment to "knowledge that was global in its reach and 
application and not bound by the traditions of any particular regional culture” (Christian et al 
239). The results were epic transformations in economies (notably in the resources countries and 
their governments could procure through global contacts, the money to be made, and the rising 
power of capitalists and the middle class) that contributed to fueling incentives to innovate, along 
with changes in the nature of governments for managing the wealth and growing power of 
industrial economies.  
     As Christian and his colleagues point out, modern governance was at the same time in this 
region trending towards shifts in relationships between consensual and coercive forms of power, 
such that modern states (initiated by the historically more politically-centralized France) 
“reached more directly into the lives of [the] people” (via, for example, the growth of 
bureaucracies, policing, the judiciary, and educational systems) while at the same time promoting 
the latter’s identities as citizens. But this also led to something of a “paradox.” That is, despite 
“democratic” pressures promoting the (new) voices of citizens and encouraging expression of 
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their interests, “the reformed state was also in many ways much more powerful than the 
monarchy it replaced” (Christian et al 253-254). But this “paradox” was not just arising from 
pressures promoting new identities specifically tied to the political realm. It was also deriving 
some of its significance and strength, I would argue, from forces playing out in the realms of 
industry and commerce that were promoting new identities and behaviors in those realms as 
well. That is, a new middle class (bourgeoisie) was emerging, much of whose modus operandi 
was grounded in the exercising of personal taste and making choices among material goods. 
Thus, while increasing numbers of people were being encouraged to regard themselves as more 
“free” in the realms of politics and personal lifestyle, their so-called freedom was, in fact, being 
increasingly constrained by these very products of advancing social complexity over which they 
as individuals and their local governments had only a certain amount of control. (As Christian 
and colleagues have essentially argued, such advancing complexity has a “mind of its own,” so 
to speak, accounting in large part for, among other things, what have been deemed “arms races” 
and the emergence of the Anthropocene, defined as the latest geologic era wherein aggregate 
human activity has begun to have a significant effect on the planet’s climate and ecosystems.)       
     Together these factors (along with technological developments) which were gathering 
momentum in the mid- and latter parts of the nineteenth century caused “for the first time ever, 
wrenching social and technological change [that] could be felt by many in a single 
lifetime” (emphases added) (Christian et al 260). As already noted, this unprecedented pace of 
change cutting across so many aspects of people’s lives (in those Western locales which included 
France and Germany) could also be argued to have increased most people’s sense of 
“entanglement” in this complexity. For some, this “entanglement” arguably engendered an 
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increasing sense of what some have called “alienation,” feelings of powerlessness, and/or 
despair. Others, however, as I will be arguing Mann and Mallarmé were, responded with active 
efforts to address this growing complexity with innovative strategies aimed at trying to articulate 
some of its features, so that others might not only be more enlightened but also more empowered 
in managing these phenomena that were challenging the very integrity (integrative capacity) of 
their communities. 
     As I have been arguing, it is this perception of such evolving problems (related to the 
increasing complexity of their societies and their environments) that the various paired French 
and German writers under discussion experienced themselves and made efforts to articulate and 
address. 
    Thus, Staël and Kleist may be seen to have shared a common western European environment 
on that “brink of change” which, as described by Christian and colleagues, the Revolution and 
subsequent Napoleonic Wars further provoked by largely undermining what had been becoming 
increasingly fragile and unsustainable sociopolitical structures (monarchies, aristocracies). These 
structures had supported both artists in their youth but were now slipping away. Staël, who felt 
(and consciously recognized) the instability of her own aristocratic position paralleling the rising 
tide of commercial forces, offered a vision of a potential future social system which would be 
characterized by new kinds of “agents” that, for the first time, would ideally include women with 
voices in significant public roles who would be valued for their talents irrespective of class; 
while Kleist, still driven by his so-called “Kantian crisis” and interpersonal difficulties, 
articulated a proto-modernist vision of “agents” and their societal relational challenges that 
would manifest more obviously to others in its future “versions” as the seeming fragmentation of 
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modern and post-modern sensibilities. While recognized by some in their own time for their 
innovative sense (and now, in hindsight, acknowledged for a notable prescience of their artistic 
visions), both writers’ works were effectively prevented from gaining much social traction at the 
time by those in positions of power and authority (for example, Staël by Napoleon and Kleist by 
the Austrian Archduke Charles as well as Goethe himself). 
     After the manifestly unstable wartime period in which these artists lived, however, there was 
the relatively peaceful period during which the German as well as French communities were now 
largely preoccupied with recovery and the quite practical reorganizational adaptive challenges 
(qua problems) specific to each. A “new normal” (as we might refer to that sense of a different 
state of the world after a crisis) was emerging, continuing to be impelled largely by the 
commercial and technological forces that were altering various social structures and patterns of 
connectivity within and between (national) communities for channeling the “flows of 
energy” (per Christian et al) supporting modernization.   
     Writers Heine and Balzac offered their creative responses to these challenges in the form of 
works embodying new aesthetics that they regarded as more resonant with their times and having 
the potential to make sense to many in their communities. For Heine, unifying what he regarded 
as the sociopolitically backward territories of his beloved homeland into a unified German nation 
capable of greater participation in the increasingly “modern world” was a critical aspiration, 
while for Balzac, it was more a matter of articulating the new sociocultural details and forms of 
connectivity among the widely spatially and temporally-dispersed players in his “comédie 
humaine.”  
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     Individuals like Staël, Kleist, Heine, and Balzac were sensitive to what I have been calling the 
“problems” of their collectivities largely, I would suggest, through their sensing themselves 
simultaneously losing the supports for critical features of their own identities and being uncertain 
regarding future ones. As noted in chapter three, Peter Brooks has argued in his book Enigmas of 
Identity that “who you are—in the sense of what you can legitimately call yourself, and what 
others call you—seems to have become a problem with entry into the modern age in a way that it 
wasn’t before…identity is in fact a large problem that stamps not only novels but all sorts of 
social issues in the nineteenth century, and up to our own time” (Brooks 4). In their respective 
situations, these four seemed to have straddled a middle ground between those with the most 
power in their societies and those with the least, so that they simultaneously sensed, and were 
obliged to work at reconciling, the so-called “integration” challenges of changing identities 
within themselves over which they had some but only limited control.     
     But at the heart of the primary theme of this chapter is the notion that the very form of the so-
called “problem of identities” that Brooks and others have noted was also shifting across this 
century. Thus, social identities at the turn of the nineteenth century were in many ways under 
threat, becoming frankly ambiguous and unstable. But only a few decades later, many social 
identities were undergoing actual reshaping as some, like those of the nobility and aristocracy, 
though still extant, were faltering as their titles were increasingly tending towards nominality 
(figurehead status) only, while those of the capitalists and middle class were “coming into focus” 
as those with increasing power. 
     So, while Staël and Kleist appear to have been attuned to the “creative destruction” around 
them (Staël to what the “destruction” signified and might portend for radically new roles for 
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women in society and Kleist to the diversification and fragmentation within and between 
“agents” themselves), Heine and Balzac perceived the nascent forms of the collectivities and 
identities of their members as they were actually emerging and self-organizing around them.  
     By the late nineteenth century, however, a growing proportion of the western European 
populace, extending beyond the most elite and intellectual, appears to have actually begun to 
have some cognizable sense of these systemic sociocultural shifts taking place within their own 
lifetimes. Christian et al have described these shifts as a consequence of the relatively rapid 
increase in social complexity taking place in this locale - that is, a result of the dramatic 
development of new material forms of networking and interconnection, the exchange of 
information made possible by the latter, and the resultant collective learning that they facilitated 
in this hub space. The notion of collective learning that they employ refers to “the human ability 
to accumulate more innovation with each passing generation than is lost by the next. It has 
allowed us to exploit our ecological niches with increasing efficiency and permitted us to greater 
harness the energy flows of the planet and sun…[but it] is important not only for understanding 
human biological evolution but also areas of conventional human history as well” (Baker 77). 
And, as will be argued further in this chapter, some of the pressures on collective learning during 
this late nineteenth century period were specifically with regard to how to understand and 
manage the rapidly growing social complexity taking place.  
     A primary challenge, however, was (and remains to this day) localizing and effecting more 
enlightened managerial “control”. This is important to address because, as already noted, 
advancing complexity has a “mind of its own” (recall that complex systems tend to self-organize 
with the emergence of new structures and other consequences). There was and is no single god-
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like agent overseeing and managing the whole process (though human beings have often looked 
to one). Instead, according to this macro-historical complexity view, human beings (individual 
agents of all sorts) interact to produce their resultant social and cultural systems which then go 
on to have their own consequences. Societies have always had the potential to be managed and 
directed well (towards greater human benefit) or badly (to the detriment of many if not all of 
their members, as recent Great Wars and the collapse of great ancient civilizations can attest). 
     But, as these “big history” scholars have also noted, the increases in social complexity arising 
from the intensifying pressures of modern forces in the nineteenth century were giving rise to a 
special case. A paradox was developing. While democratic principles were circulating and 
encouraging a more consensual form of governance, the modern state was also emerging and 
effecting not only greater intrusion into but also exerting greater control over people’s lives than 
the monarchies they displaced. Thus, as I argue in this chapter, a new challenge was emerging 
(that continues unresolved to this day): how to collectively learn how to address and manage this 
apparent paradox. 
     From a complex systems perspective then, it could be argued that the increasing social 
complexity described here was promoting a new adaptive challenge, and that this challenge 
included finding narratives that could allow making sense of this growing complexity and help 
guide people in their own actions in this changing world. Essentially, a new “question” could be 
said to be taking shape; that is: “who” is responsible for managing this growing complexity and 
“how” are we/they to do it?  
     As I will try to illustrate more clearly in the discussion of Mann and Mallarmé, this new 
challenge was one that they both were trying to address. Like the writer-artists already discussed, 
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they could be regarded as innovators working in the service of contributing to collective 
learning. But in their particular cases, they were trying even more self-consciously to 
“accumulate more innovation in their generation” such that it could, in fact, be handed on and 
not be “lost by the next” (recalling Baker’s quote) because of their now added concerns about 
“integrating” the growing “diversity” of voices into stable communities. And, how did they do 
this? They did it, as I will be trying to show, by encouraging their audiences to try to reflect more 
upon themselves as individuals with psyches and personalities and consider what these might 
also mean for being able to effect social integration and stable modern communities. 
     In order to give more credence to this assertion, one may note that there are other scholars 
who acknowledge many of the same general issues, though they frame them differently as a 
result of their disciplinary vantage point. That is to say, these macro-historical complexity 
scholars (Christian et al) are not alone in viewing such a challenge as having emerged in the 
nineteenth century (and as continuing to press us during our present age). For example, social 
thought and art history scholar Andrei Pop (whose argument will be noted in more detail in the 
following discussion of Mallarmé’s work as a Symbolist) targets what he calls the “problem of 
subjectivity” arising during the late nineteenth century. While acknowledging social and cultural 
forces promoting this “problem,” his emphasis is on its philosophical aspects and what such a 
problem meant for both artists and scientists of the period. His use of the term “subjectivity” is 
therefore different from that of cultural critics who use it to refer to ways in which individuals 
must situate themselves in relations to power. Rather, it focuses more on considerations of what 
it means to be a subject (an individual who possesses conscious experiences, such as 
perspectives, feelings, and beliefs). It is akin to the sense of “subjectivity” employed by literary 
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scholar, Donald E. Hall, who makes a distinction between identities and thinking about identities. 
Thus, in his monograph Subjectivity, he says “identity can be thought of as that particular set of 
traits, beliefs, and allegiances that, in short- or long-term ways, gives one a consistent personality 
or mode of being, while subjectivity always implies a degree of thought and self-consciousness 
about identity, at the same time allowing a myriad of limitations and often unknowable, 
unavoidable constraints on our ability to fully comprehend identity” (emphasis added) (Hall 3). 
Thus, according to Pop and Hall, there is a distinction to be made between a mode of being (as a 
particular subject) and reflecting upon and thinking about that mode of being, which is a 
distinction that I propose was coming into sociocultural focus in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century; and that it’s coming into focus was a challenge that both Mann and Mallarmé also 
perceived and tried to address.   
     One other theorist who should be mentioned in this context is the sociologist and noted 
systems theorist Niklas Luhmann. While this is not the place to detail much of Luhmann’s theory 
of society, his work on the subject of social self-description is useful to appreciate for how it 
interfaces and jibes significantly with aspects of Christian and colleagues’ depiction of growing 
social complexity and with the shift from a focus on identities to so-called “subjectivity” in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century. Pointing out where and how his theorizing differs on the 
subject of social self-description is also useful, however, because it helps underscore the 
significance of employing the complexity lens of Christian et al in the remainder of this chapter. 
     Luhmann argues that a new form of social observation began to take place in the nineteenth 
century. Specifically, he distinguishes between what he calls “first-order” and “second-order” 
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observers or observing systems , which the historian Jaap den Hollander summarizes this way: 8
“…the crucial difference between first and second order observation [is that] whereas I observe 
only my own environment, other people observe me in my own environment. They notice that I 
observe the world from a particular point of view, while I am unable to see this. This means that 
second order observation introduces an element of perspectivity and contingency in our way of 
observing” (Hollander 53).  As Luhmann himself says: “deconstruction [which equates with 
second order observing] destroys this "one observer-one nature-one world" assumption” of first 
order observing (Luhmann 756). He also asserts that such deconstruction or second order 
observing began to take place in the nineteenth century because there was a shift from a social 
order with a hierarchical stratification which gave those at the top (the nobility) “privileged 
positions for observing and describing itself and the surrounding world…[that is] for producing 
ontology” to a new social order based on “the primacy of functional differentiation” that resulted 
in “the ‘world we have lost,’ the world of ontological metaphysics, the world of ‘being or not 
being,’ the world of the two value-logic that did presuppose one (and only one) observer who 
could make up his mind simply by looking at what is the case” (Luhmann 778-779). With this 
shift, as he says, “function systems” [for example, communication, transportation, educational, 
political, commercial-economic systems, etcetera] “became independent from stratification, 
organizing their own boundaries [and] their own modes of inclusion and exclusion of persons” 
and “a new semantics of modernity (the modern world, the modern states, and so forth) tried to 
catch up with the changes” (Luhmann 779). But critically, as Luhmann sees it, while “special 
Note that in the Luhmann and Hollander papers quoted from here, the punctuation differs, so that the 8
terms “first-order” and “second-order” in the former equate with “first order” and “second order” in the 
latter. When not directly quoting from either, the latter style will be employed in the discussion.
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problems such as ‘the social question” and national imperialism became controversial issues, …
framing them in terms of problems and problem solutions could not contribute much to a self-
description of the society. Only the mass media succeeded in serving this function.” (emphasis 
added) (Luhmann 780). Thus, Luhmann considers the distinction between first order and second 
order observing (that is, between simply maintaining a way of “being” or identity and exercising 
a perspective on that identity or identities) as taking place at the group/societal level. He 
discusses systems “observing” systems and does not situate “observation” at the level of 
individuals.  
     His view differs, therefore, from that of historians like Hollander (and David Christian). Thus, 
while Luhmann does identify a notable shift in the form of social organization during the 
nineteenth century (as they do) which, as he says, temporally coincided with the introduction of a 
new (second order) way of observing and means of self-description, his emphasis is on “social 
wholes” or autopoietic systems and relationships between their bounded functional subsystems 
with their own “modes of inclusion and exclusion of persons.” And, as Hollander points out, in 
contrast with personal individuality, “the individuality of social wholes…is a controversial issue” 
(40). It is this focus on second order observing taking place exclusively at this “social whole” 
level (and thereby making the media so central to his discussions of social self-description) 
which differs from the view adopted here of historian and complexity theorist David Christian.  
     Recall that in the latter’s model there is the notion of “collective learning,” which depends on 
interactions taking place at the level of individual agents which results in innovations emerging 
at the societal level. Advancing social complexity thus depends on operations at both the 
individual and societal (social whole) levels, constraining as well as feeding back on each other. 
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Hollander himself, while acknowledging the value of Luhmann’s insights at the “systems” level, 
points out that his own perspective as an historian is also shaped by his being a “self-conscious 
storyteller” so that “unlike sociologists” (like Luhmann), he “will not soon give up the individual 
action perspective” (Hollander 55). 
     And this individual action perspective is what will continue to be emphasized here, though 
some of its interactions with the systems level of influences and constraints will also be 
acknowledged and illustrated. Thus, as we proceed now into specific discussion of the writers at 
the end of the long nineteenth century, we will acknowledge that shift towards a new ontology 
which Luhmann specifies, but instead of regarding the new sources and means of self-description 
(second order observing) as being limited to the media, the focus will be on individual 
innovators (Mann and Mallarmé) who, it will be argued, regarded it as part of their personal 
mission to contribute to collective learning (à la Christian) by provoking and stimulating their 
fellows’ own second order observing and subjectivity (in Hall’s sense). 
     With these points in mind, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring some of 
the ways in which Mann and Mallarmé shifted their focus largely away from the concerns of 
their predecessors at the same time that the social-system context around them was shifting. 
Recognizing the simultaneity of these shifts is actually critical. This is because the so-called 
explosion of collective learning that took off in Europe with modernization over the prior couple 
of centuries proposed by Christian and colleagues is believed to have depended upon not simply 
the presence of a greater number of potential innovators but also on increases in connectivity 
between them (as from printing, the growth of communication and transportation systems like 
those that Luhmann describes, and the colonial expansion of Europe into a global network) 
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which allowed such innovators to share and refine their ideas (Baker 98-99). Such connectivity 
was accelerating in the latter part of the nineteenth century and facilitating the simultaneous 
presentation of alternate perspectives. 
     As noted in chapter two, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben has suggested that those who are 
most “contemporary” with their epoch, as I would assert all of the six writers under discussion 
here were, tend to exist in a singular relationship with it. As he puts it, such individuals manage 
to “firmly hold their gaze” on the “darkness” of their eras and “get a glimpse of the shadows” 
thrown by the “blinding lights” of the time (Agamben 44-45). The sense of such metaphors I 
believe may also be understood as relatable to other ones that organizational complexity theorists 
like Browning and Boudès (along with Snowden and Wieck) use when they refer to those 
persons “on the margins” of their social groups discerning not only the shape of a problem 
circulating in their midst but who then also offer a new narrative as its solution. As I have been 
suggesting and will continue to try to show, the writers here under discussion may be regarded as 
such individuals “on the margins,” who worked to address largely implicit problems of their 
times and afford them a shape which not only they but others could potentially grasp. I would 
also suggest that their “being on the margins”  actually helped them acquire and hold alternate 
perspectives in mind, akin to being able to effect that kind of second order observing that 
Luhmann describes as taking place at the societal subsystems level (via the media).  
     Staël and Kleist, and Heine and Balzac, each had their own means of acquiring (and reasons 
for embodying) multiple perspectives on their contemporary moments, as described in the 
previous chapters. And as will be shown here, Mann and Mallarmé had their own personal 
reasons too. But in their case, the social context of increasing social complexity associated with 
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growing pressures on the populace to address the issue of increasing agent “diversity” (and 
multiplicity of interests) and the challenge this posed to social “integration” (achieving stable 
community) by the century’s end, drove them as well.  And while they employed different 
literary themes and genres to address these concerns (Mann articulating his vision more in terms 
of his community’s struggles to democratize, while for Mallarmé it became (later in his life) 
more a matter of how to actually advance the appreciation of art and art-making in people’s lives, 
from a complex systems (macro-) perspective, their work may also be seen as operating in a 
complementary fashion. That is, both may be regarded as trying to help foster communities made 
up of individuals with greater self-awareness and capacity to communicate with each other in a 
spirit of greater creativity and communal problem-solving. 
     Thus, both artists may be said to have been concerned with collective learning that could help 
promote a “better” future. And, while Mann may have tended to perceive such a future in more 
frankly secular and political terms, Mallarmé did so through a highly-developed artistic lens by 
means of which he re-worked his art as a kind of new “religion” for the modern age. While 
acknowledging these category differences in whose terms they perceived and spoke of 
relationships between “the individual and the collective” in their respective situations, the 
following discussion will also attempt to show that both artist-writers’ work were comparable, 
however, in being designed to provoke their audiences and change their “thinking.” And, in both 
their cases, the change was meant to afford a different perspective (akin to second order 
observing) - one that would not only promote “self-description” (as Luhmann put it) but also 
offer the potential for finding common ground among “diverse” selves and managing the 
problem of “integrating” into a new social order with a real sense of community. 
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     While examples of these artists’ writing will be discussed in order to try to justify these 
assertions, some description of the signs of growing social complexity (as per Christian and 
colleagues) that established some of the systemic context constraining these men’s work (and the 
nature of the problems they addressed) will first be provided. And, as was done in the case of the 
previous writers, some of the details of their personal lives in this context will also be noted.  
     Proceeding now, it will likely be most useful to begin by briefly summarizing those historical 
events and their consequences that have been most widely-acknowledged as shaping and 
defining the sensibilities and social activity within what I will here call the “system-worlds” that 
Mann and Mallarmé inhabited jointly, on the one hand, and individually, on the other.  
     Undoubtably, the most momentous event in this regard was yet another war (the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-71), which took place when Mallarmé (1842-1898) was a young adult and 
officially concluded with the armistice and signing of the Treaty at Versailles the year Mann 
(1871-1950) was born. Among the war’s most obvious consequences was the fact that the 
respective language-based communities emerged from this major clash newly-defined as two 
distinct national entities. Both, however, also continued to operate in the shared context of 
increasing international competition for control of resources supporting modernization.  
     Thus, in contrast to those worlds inhabited and inherited by the four writers already discussed, 
where countries’ and their people’s interactions had been evolving primarily on the foundations 
of expanding commercial exchange networks, temporary wartime coalitions, and still-limited 
modern technologies (notably the publishing industry) for facilitating connectivity, with the 
Franco-Prussian War, the bases for emergence of a more expansive world, of greater social 
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complexity with increasingly differentiated but increasingly impersonally connected functional 
subsystems, were established.  
     The treaties and changes in communal behavior this war promoted would accelerate not only 
the internal (bounded systemic) development of a new territorially-unified German nation (so-
called modern state) now symbolically sharply demarcated (along the Rhine and at the Alsace-
Lorraine borders) from neighboring France, but also internal disruptions and generative recovery 
efforts within the latter. These consequences of the war would, in their turn, contribute to 
reinforcing these nations’ respective roles as distinct players in the ever-growing global 
competition for energy and other resources (in the service of survival in the increasingly modern 
world). 
     Thus, the newly officially-acknowledged nation of Germany could now proceed with a 
domestic program of so-called “nation-building,” which was essentially based on Enlightenment 
rationalist (but not democratic) principles and modern commercial practices. Under the direction 
of the first chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the new nation was supported in its overall 
development by the prompt institution of a networked infrastructure consisting of a common 
currency and transportation system as well as new educational policies for socializing the youth 
and imparting the new national identity.  
     Despite retaining its own distinct sociopolitical identity after its military defeat, France, on the 
other hand, underwent marked internal changes of quite a different sort. Specifically, it entered 
into another period of marked political instability (initiated by the Paris Commune in the spring 
of 1871), arising from bitter efforts at recovering from the felt humiliation of the symbolically 
important political losses of the Alsace and Lorraine border territories at the hands of the 
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Prussian army and its allies (in a spirt of revanchism) (Schivelbusch 103-187), along with varied 
attempts at re-establishing what it regarded as its long-standing competitive edge and status as a 
cultural leader in the eyes of much of the Western world. 
    Germany’s rapid leap forward with industrialization (a six-fold increase between 1871 and 
1914, which outstripped that of Great Britain) and the technical achievements (for example, 
electricity and the automobile) that it exploited, not only increased mobility but along with 
“trailblazing advances in medicine” essentially “changed the way of life” in the country (GHM 
116). These changes were also associated with a massive increase in Germany’s population, 
which now included large numbers of migrants looking for employment (an increase from 41 
million inhabitants in 1871 to 68 million people in 1914) (GHM 107). But there was a “crass 
contrast” between the often “cramped and unhygienic” living conditions of those on the lower 
rungs of society and those “ostentatious” ones of the “ambitious sector of the upper middle 
classes” such as businessmen and bankers, who were also increasing in their political influence 
and competed with the aristocracy, though the latter still managed “to hold its place as the social 
role model, in displays of status” (GHM 116). There arose then a competition for social influence 
and power (akin to that which had arisen in France earlier in the century) between an emergent 
middle class (bourgeoisie) and a nobility. But this nobility in Germany was heavily weighted 
towards army officers and diplomats so that public life was still significantly shaped by 
authoritarian conventions and a traditional military social order (which emerging avant-gardist 
voices like that of Mann’s attempted to counter). And the influence of these traditional forms of 
Prussian militarism was only exaggerated with the forced resignation of Bismarck (March 1890) 
and ascendency of the German Empire (Second Reich) under Wilhelm II.  
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     For France, on the other hand, these initial decades after the Franco-Prussian War and early 
stages of its Third Republic were fraught not only with significant social discord and notable 
political and judicial missteps (for example, the Dreyfus affair) but also with what one might call 
serious “soul-searching.” Gradually, however, there were also growing signs of (what was later 
called, in retrospect) the Belle Époque, which was sweeping western Europe but, in Paris 
specifically was expressed in the monumental reconstruction of the architectural face of the  city 
(for example, the Eiffel Tower, Paris Opera, and Metro), the massive stimulation of commercial 
enterprises that included the Grand Magasins and a specialization in high fashion which helped 
encourage tourism and the resurgence of a middle class highly dependent on consumerism and 
advertising, as well as considerable experimentation in artistic circles. 
     These broadly-sketched trajectories and new circumstances of the two neighboring nations at 
the end of the century were, however, also challenged by other sociocultural forces impacting 
them along with the wider European community. These forces have been characterized in 
different ways, but many scholars have viewed them as together provoking a cynicism, if not 
nihilism (think: Nietzche), that was becoming increasingly prevalent in the broader populace. 
     For example, French scholar R. Howard Bloch period notes that “modernity, as it took shape 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, was 
synonymous with rupture, melancholy, skepticism, anxiety, self-criticism, spiritual failure, 
nihilism, and despair, alongside the perceived loss of individual autonomy as well as the failure 
of science and technology and of liberal democratic institutions”; he also observes that “the 
development of the social sciences at the end of the nineteenth century went hand in hand with 
this philosophical despair,” specifically noting Karl Marx’s own somewhat earlier discussion of 
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men’s growing sense of alienation arising from the transition from feudalism to capitalism and 
Max Weber’s writings in the early 1900’s which “traced a similar loss of human wholeness in the 
rationalized forms of social relations that took hold in the Protestant work-oriented countries of 
northern Europe” and produced a “disenchantment of the world” which (according to Bloch) has 
continued to “course richly through the twentieth century” (Bloch 70-71). This latter point is 
particularly significant here as it points to the emergence of knowledge disciplines (for example, 
psychology and sociology) arising from further evolution of the Enlightenment project but now 
with the scientific spotlight directed even more pointedly and systematically at the individual 
psyche as well as forms of social organization. At the same time, however, their emergence could 
also be said to embody another sign of what has been described here as a growing concern with 
social “differentiation” and trying to understand both the fundamental principles of operation of 
the diverse voices so produced that were gaining in strength as well as how to “integrate” and 
organize them into (real) community.   
     As will be discussed later in more detail, Bloch situates Mallarmé and his work specifically in 
this context, asserting that the artist “may have thought himself a vessel of the crisis of faith as it 
worked itself out between the Enlightenment and the end of the nineteenth century [though] he 
emerged…from the psychological and moral extremity of his midtwenties not disenchanted but 
invigorated” (emphasis added) (71). While some have painted Mallarmé largely as an aesthete 
with little interest in social or political realities, other scholars have corroborated Bloch’s view 
that the poet-artist underwent a notable developmental transformation. From an initial 
psychologically compromised and morally uncertain state, Mallarmé moved to a more socially-
grounded one that over time involved increasing commitment to fostering community via his 
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singular vision of art in-the-world (Porter 275-280). A comparable developmental shift (but one 
with a decidedly more political tenor) has also been described in Mann’s case (Crick, 1982; 
Gunneman, 2002; Heilbut, 1998).  
     As scholars have made clear, however, these personal transformations should not be seen as 
merely the result of psychological difficulties or emotional trials that both men passed through in 
their respective adolescence-young adulthoods. Rather they are also, and perhaps better said to 
be, the result of each man’s coming into contact with cultural problems articulated as 
philosophical ones in both the art and scientific communities of the time (though space does not 
permit description of the full biographical details, Mann’s contacts arose in large part through his 
extensive European travels, while Mallarmé’s arose largely in Parisian circles and his far-flung 
epistolary network).  
     Scholar of social thought and art history Andrei Pop also discusses some of the broad 
European cultural concerns qua philosophical ones at the end of the nineteenth century with 
which Mann and Mallarmé would have been familiar, but with an emphasis on their 
consequences for art itself:  
     Scholars of the late nineteenth century have long been struck by the flourishing 
     of esoteric doctrines, and their opposition to the positivist faith in progress that 
     characterized the earlier half of the century. But focusing on the irrational  
     occludes the period’s commitment to revolutionary science, which is central to 
     its moral and political projects. It is not as a naive rejection of reality…that 
     [certain] artists…can be understood. What they have in common is rather 
     the commitment to the concrete means, aesthetic and visual, but also logical 
     and philosophical, by which reality, perceived or otherwise, is made accessible 
     to more than one intellect…The problem of subjectivity in particular, of making 
     oneself understood to others despite the privacy of one’s consciousness, had  
     to be met if collaboration in science or the sympathetic uptake of new art was 
     to take place.” (emphasis added) (16) 
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Pop proceeds to explicate the pervasive role of this “problem” in the culture of the fin de siècle, 
which influenced the sense-making (what he calls “meaning-making”) activity of many writers 
and visual artists of that period. And though his focus is on the Symbolist art movement which 
was of French, Russian, and Belgian origin and included Mallarmé as one of its leading 
members, the substance of this movement was clearly responding to forces that transcended local 
communities and national boundaries.  
     One could also characterize both Mallarmé and Mann as being “on the margins” of certain 
social groups with which they significantly affiliated, which probably enhanced their capacities 
for being “contemporary” (à la Agamben) in addition to contributing to their literary concerns 
with men’s “subjectivity.” Their marginality arose from quite different circumstances, however.  
     Despite being a native Frenchman (with a middle-class upbringing), Mallarmé’s inherent 
interest in language actually led to his spending time in London to become fluent in English, 
which he subsequently taught at various lycées in order to support himself upon his return to 
France. While he managed to maintain a fairly bourgeois lifestyle, he actually lived most of his 
life in near-poverty. Nonetheless, when he moved back to Paris from the provinces after the the 
war’s end in 1871, he came to preside over salons held at his own modest home, which became 
not just a popular meeting place for artists of all kinds but the heart of that city’s intellectual life 
for many years. Thus, Mallarmé’s being “on the margins” and developing an enhanced capacity 
for weighing alternate perspectives could be generally ascribed to his significant experience with 
a culture and language besides his native ones, generally unstable moves in the social class 
hierarchy, and a bird’s-eye view of ongoing intellectual and artistic trends in his society.  
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     Mann, for his part, was the oldest of five siblings in what became in many ways a notorious 
upper-class family dynasty, in which he spent most of his adult life engaged in a highly public 
envy-hate relationship as the outspoken “second fiddle” to his acclaimed younger brother 
Thomas. In his foreword to the Letters of Heinrich and Thomas Mann 1900-1949, Anthony 
Heilbut notes that these brothers’ “childhood had been privileged and inbred, so rarefied that 
Thomas quietly fantasized himself a prince traveling incognito through the city streets. Yet 
isolation from the masses left both brothers with a sense of marginality. Outsiders tended to find 
them excessively formal and self-effacing, the most melancholy of elitists” (Heilbut xii). Despite 
this commonality of experience and shared literary ambitions, however, Heinrich was the more 
inclined to travel and in the process became particularly appreciative of what he regarded as the 
Italian proclivity for demonstration of sociality and communal feeling. By the turn of the century, 
he emerged as the distinctly politically more liberal of the two and, in flagrant contrast to his 
brother, became openly critical of the then-popular and powerful Wilhelmine regime, which 
placed him decidedly outside of the more conservative and aggressively nationalist German 
mainstream. Thus, Heinrich Mann’s being “on the margins” could be seen as somewhat akin to 
Mallarmé’s in its being promoted by a variety of exposures to class and cultural contrasts. It also 
appears to have been distinctly honed, however, by his staking out his own public self-definition 
in opposition to his brother’s. 
    From their respective positions of being variously “on the margins,” Mallarmé and Mann were 
thus not unlike the writers discussed earlier. That is, like the social class- and gender-threatened 
as well as peripatetic Staël and Kleist, the reluctant religious convert and emigrant Heine and the 
financially-strapped yet intense (and stimulant-driven) workaholic Balzac, these talented men 
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“stood apart,” as it were, and refined highly-reflective perspectives on their societies and their 
times.  But because of their own particular vantage points of difference, Mann and Mallarmé’s  
literary responses to problems they sensed in their worlds were again (and quite naturally) 
singular in their details. They were also dynamic works-in-progress. That is, just as they 
experienced their own sense of differences from others, they were, over time, also “hammering 
out” these differences, so to speak, as a part of both defining their personal identities as artists 
and sharing their visions with others. One could also say that, as they struggled to address the 
broader cultural crisis of faith in Enlightenment wholeness and human wholeness that was now 
leading to questions of how to understand “subjectivity” (and inter-subjectivity) itself in western 
Europe, they were also enacting and giving form to this late nineteenth century “problem” within 
the constraints and circumstances of their own lives. 
     For Mann, such processes were evident largely in the context of his ongoing exchanges with 
his brother (that were suspended only temporarily because of animosities arising from their 
markedly differing ideological views of Germany’s role in the Great War). In her article on the 
Mann brothers’ early attitudes to their public, wherein she aims to “inquire how [they] separately 
and together, understood the relationship of the writer to his reader, how they themselves 
conceptually and metaphorically perceived the nature and function of the communicative act,” 
German scholar Joyce Crick underscores the significance of the literary and human context they 
afforded each other  (Crick 646). For Mallarmé, on the other hand, such identity-defining 9
relational activity seems to have taken place predominantly in the context of his personal and 
 In one of her footnotes, Crick points out that, in a critical study by another German scholar Renate 9
Werner, the latter actually refers to the two brothers as creating their own “literarisches Subsytem” (Crick 
646).
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professional interactions in his Paris salon (the “Tuesday Poets”) and the unique and highly 
poetic form of epistolary activity for which he was also famous and through which he maintained 
a widespread network of French and foreign contacts. 
     For both of these writers, it arguably then became a matter of how to use literary means 
(novels, essays, and poetry) to try to address aspects of this issue that they had worked at 
addressing within themselves but which appeared to them to be a largely unacknowledged and 
yet persistent problem for many of their fellows - that is, the problem of gaining perspective on 
and developing self-consciousness about the workings of their own minds and identities, so that 
they could act more responsibly and with greater insight in their increasingly complex world.  
     For these two (for want of a better term) “activist-artists” then, how to address the enigma of 
their contemporary fellows, whose thought and behavior appeared to them to be unsuited to their 
increasingly complex times as well as ensnared in persistent first order observing to their 
societies’ detriment? How to help provoke and stimulate their audience’s creativity? How to help 
foster a greater sense of responsibility among the people for participating in the shaping of their 
collective future? 
     With these questions in mind, the discussion will now turn to a major work by each author, 
first Mann’s novel Der Untertan (The Man of Straw, sometimes alternately translated as The 
Loyal Subject) followed by Mallarmé’s poem Un Coup de Dés Jamais N'Abolira le Hasard (A 
Throw of the Dice will Never Abolish Chance) in order to flesh out some of the notable means by 
which each writer appears to have literarily responded to them. Other writings by these artists 
(including Mann’s essay “Geist und Tat” [Mind and Action” (1910)] and Mallarmé’s prose poem 
“Conflit” [“Conflict” (1897)]), along with some of these men’s documented comments about 
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their own work, will also be considered, however, in order to help clarify some of the discussion 
points. 
     German literature scholar Karin Gunnemann has summarized the significance of Mann’s Der 
Untertan this way: 
     To this date no other work in German literature has so seriously engaged not 
     only literary critics but also historians and sociologists. In the endless investigation  
     of the problem of Germany’s historical Sonderweg, Mann’s Der Untertan still plays 
     a role today. The book is used in the ongoing intellectual debate about the origin 
     of the “authoritarian character,” the continuity of German history, and the relationship 
     between modernization and democracy. (51) 
The work has thus spoken, and continues to speak, to many audiences even beyond the German 
reading public of the time whom Mann most directly targeted. The novel primarily traces the 
youthful development and adult emergence of its main protagonist Diederich Hessling (and his 
“authoritarian character”) in a kind of Bildungsroman fashion. It is also couched, however, in a 
highly detailed social, cultural, and political setting which includes several other characters 
(among the most notable being Herr Buck, a patriot of the 1848 revolutionary era, and his adult 
son Wolfgang, a cynical and dandyish actor-turned-legal counsellor) whose own portrayals in the 
narrative contribute to illustrating significant individual differences in experience and world-
view along with much of the complexity of the societal and interpersonal dynamics of the period 
as Mann discerned it.  
     The novel has often been described stylistically as a satire whose main character Diedrich 
appears as a caricature, broadly-sketched and highly-simplified. Yet while not denying the 
novel’s satirical qualities, such a view of Diedrich’s character overlooks the deeper significance 
of (and the author’s skill in) depicting him as such a “limited” character. Mann himself later 
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recalled some of the personal experiences that sparked his creative process for this novel (which 
was eight years in the researching and the making [1906-1914]). In particular, while in an elegant 
cafe in Berlin (in 1906) he had observed “the dense crowd of the bourgeois public. I found the 
people loud, without dignity. Their provoking manners betrayed to me their secret 
cowardice” (Gunnemann 52). Thus, as Mann recalled, there were many others in his own society 
who actually appeared to him to be as coarse as the character he was in the process of creating; 
at the same time, he apparently sensed that such behavior was owing to these individuals’ lack of 
an inner robustness, that is, their “secret cowardice.”  
     Another way of framing the offensiveness, ignobility, and inner weakness that Mann 
perceived being expressed by many of those around him would be to characterize them as 
manifesting an under- if not mal-developed subjectivity. In other words, a subjectivity that (at 
least, from the kind of humanistic perspective that Mann himself maintained) was not afforded 
opportunities to achieve its real human potential, inasmuch as it lacked capacities for significant 
self-awareness, self-restraint, and self-directedness and was insensitive to the positions and 
feelings of others. From a Foucauldian perspective, such a person and his selfhood might be said 
to lack sufficient self-knowledge for effecting his emancipation and implementing much of his 
own creative potential. While from a Luhmann-like perspective, one might describe it as the 
embodiment of one who is “stuck” in what was becoming the increasingly outmoded first order 
observer role and tends to regard reality exclusively on the basis of the “one observer-one nature-
one world assumption” (Luhmann 756). 
     Diederich is portrayed as being so brutish, clumsy and limited in his range of responses 
relative to most modern standards of expected (western) behavior as to often appear ridiculous 
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(as, for example, when he abruptly terminates his relationship with his first girlfriend Agnes 
Gõppel in an argument with her father in which he decries her feelings for him, and 
paradoxically intimates that she might be rather too ‘loose’ in her affections; and then when Herr 
Gõppel departs sobbing, “Diederich fell on his knees and wept passionately…[and] that evening 
he played Schubert… [but then remarks to himself that] that was a sufficient concession to 
sentiment. He must be strong” and goes on to wonder whether his comrades Wiebel and 
Mahlmann had ever been so sentimental or had such “soft spots” in them [Mann 70]). Thus, the 
tone of the work does, at times, border on the humorous. But underlying this is a persistent dark 
undercurrent of his world being frankly out-of-joint, inasmuch as he appears to have so very little 
ability to actually “know” or think for himself that he routinely engages in self-contradictory and 
self-diminishing behavior. And while occasionally asking himself “how should I think about 
this,” “what should I do,” he limits his querying to the dynamics of “one world”; that is, he limits 
his wondering to only how his fellow military men and comrades-in-arms might think and 
behave, rather than seriously considering the perspectives and positions of others outside this 
domain (like Agnes or Herr Gõppel). 
     Throughout the novel, from its opening pages to its conclusion, we also see Diederich 
groveling and submitting to male authorities, whether in the shape of an abusive father, leaders 
among the youthful Neoteutons whose group he is invited to join, officers in the military (to 
which Diederich briefly belongs until his malingering to “save his own skin” leads to his 
honorable discharge), noblemen, or the German Emperor whom he continually lauds and whose 
proclamations he defends from afar. One can easily recognize that his character is, at the same 
time, being molded. Powerful social forces, whether personified in these male authorities or 
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imparted through the persistent valorization of (historically Prussian) militarism and the highly-
reinforced practices of commercialism and consumerism, channel his becoming a “man of 
straw.” Thus, as we see in the novel’s opening paragraph, Diederich is described as:  
     a dreamy, delicate child, frightened of everything, and troubled frequently by 
     earache. In winter he hated to leave the warm room, and in summer the narrow 
     garden, which smelt of rags from the paper factory [owned by his father]…Diederich 
     was often terribly frightened when he raised his eyes from his story book, his 
     beloved fairy tales. A toad half as big as himself had been plainly sitting on the seat 
     beside him! Or over there against the wall a gnome, sunk to his waist in the ground, 
     was staring at him! His father was even more terrible than the gnome and the toad, 
     and moreover he was compelled to love him. Diederich did love him. (Mann 5) 
Readers see that Diederich’s original temperament reflects a sensitivity and an inclination 
towards pastimes that foster his imagination and “dreaminess.” But from his earliest beginnings 
in his punitive and hierarchically-organized household (which includes a weak mother), 
Diederich’s imagination is squelched and his sensitivity distorted. HIs socialization appears to be 
being essentially manipulated by a father who takes advantage of his son’s natural fears, which 
will then later be reinforced by a social system of structured relationships operating on similar 
principles. Thus, he “was compelled to love” his “terrible” father, which immediately equates (in 
the next sentence) to “Diedrich did love him” (emphasis added). And, as a consequence, 
Diederich remains largely unaware of how he comes to value, and be attracted and attached to, 
the conditions and demands of a social life that sustains itself while diminishing his full potential 
(to be a true friend, loving husband, autonomous thinker, and so on; that is, to become a 
thoughtful man of conscience capable of considering multiple perspectives).  
     In contrast to his brother Thomas, whose conversion to democracy came rather late, Heinrich 
Mann shifted from being ideologically conservative to more liberal and generally supportive of 
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democratic principles relatively early in his adult life. His well-known interest in and greater 
receptivity to French literature and culture clearly played a part in this. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
then, Heinrich became much more of an overt social critic while Thomas remained largely a 
defender of Germany’s aggressive nationalism in the years before the outbreak of the First World 
War, which fanned the often hostile differences that the two brothers maintained in their private 
and public discourses (as in their reviews of each other’s publications) at that time.  
     But as Heinrich was trying to understand and offer an explicit form for some of the so-called 
“darkness" he perceived in his contemporary era (as per Agamben), he appears to have remained 
concerned not just with local circumstances but also that broader issue of the time that I have 
referred to as the problem of “subjectivity.” This wider modern European question of how to 
understand the shaping of and communication between minds that challenged scientists and 
artists (as Pop has noted) was in many ways also central to questions of how to promote an 
enlightened and responsible citizenry. But such a political concern actually ran counter to that of 
the Wilhelmine regime, whose policies embodied a throwback to (now) increasingly outmoded 
monarchical power structures, which traditionally operate through reinforcing themselves and 
their own relatively rigid boundaries (from top to bottom, so to speak) rather than enlightening 
the minds of individuals. But as we with the benefit of hindsight can see, such an authoritarian 
political agenda was difficult to reconcile with a socioeconomic one that was itself hell-bent on 
promoting its nation’s becoming a dominant player in the modern world of commerce and 
resource acquisition, since the latter depends in large part upon a thriving middle class 
encouraged to be “free” to consume and make various taste and lifestyle choices for themselves.  
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     Feeling some kinship with the French writer-activist Émile Zola, Mann “had begun his life as 
a writer by dreaming and handing out ‘dainty morsels’ before he became ‘a teacher of 
democracy’ who understood his work as ‘duty, mission, and battle’ for the improvement of 
humanity” (Gunneman 77). His Der Untertan was, in fact, written during this transitional period. 
But while assessments of the political dimensions of this novel have often overshadowed 
appreciation of its literary qualities, some scholars specifically praise them.  
     German scholar Mark W. Roche, for example, has shown how Mann employs multiple 
literary devices to convey ways in which Diederich’s character in interaction with those around 
him personifies “Verehrung der Macht” (worship of power) while also effecting what he refers to 
as “the self-cancellation of injustice” (Roche 72). Roche focuses on Diederich’s character after 
his very early childhood and points out that, from his youth, this character regularly enacts the 
roles of both “master and slave,” bending to the will of his superiors as he comes to occupy a 
position within a social hierarchy in which he then bullies others (in a kind of “sado-
masochistic” fashion) (Roche 72). In his desire to belong, Diederich assimilates to the extant 
power structure. But the portrayed circumstances are such and the means of assimilation so 
clearly pathological that he effectively loses his self; and, in his adulthood, this manifests as an 
over-identification with the Emperor, whose pompous behavior and political rhetoric Diederich 
often mimics. This is evident, for example, when he lords over his family members or his 
employees at the publishing company that he has inherited from his father (and with “his 
inflexible mien and speech, his commanding glance, [h]is family and his workmen were cowed 
into respectful silence” [Mann 121]). As Roche also points out, while Diederich does 
occasionally question his idolization of power, such moments in the narrative tend to be brief, 
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and his character’s emotional responses shallow. Thus, as already noted, he seems incapable of 
much insight. At the same time, Roche argues that Diederich’s claims for justifying his behavior 
(which come to the fore occasionally when he contrasts his own behavior with that of the two 
Buck characters) are based on a stance of “power positivism” (essentially “might is right”), and 
that his claims are not only inconsistent but philosophically untenable. In applauding the 
novelist’s methods and skill, Roche states that “Mann portrays the self-cancellation of this 
[philosophical] position not only in the content of the novel but in its formal aspects as well. Odd 
juxtapositions, expressions out of place, paradoxes, abrupt transitions, and non sequiturs, 
aesthetic elements that give the novel  much of its humor, function as the aesthetic corollary of 
Diederich’s self-contradictory concept of injustice” (Roche 88). 
     Thus, Mann employs numerous literary devices that not only illustrate the strangely-twisted 
quality of Diederich’s character but also the limited capacity for thoughtful and moral agency in 
the kind of self he personifies, emerging as it does in a society that encourages such opposing 
action-tendencies in its members. As Roche puts it in his conclusions, “logical structures and 
their means of illustration are what make a work of art universal. Der Untertan not only satirizes 
the peculiar vices of German bourgeois society, it ponders a universal problem” (Roche 88). And 
while Roche situates the “universal problem” that Der Untertan “ponders” largely as a 
philosophical one grounded in logic and concerned with demonstrating the unjust and therefore 
untenable position of “power positivism” or “might is right,” its ‘universal’ significance could 
also be said to arise from illustration of other structural principles and themes. Thus, from a 
macro-historical perspective like that of Christian and his colleagues, which emphasizes the roles 
of advancing complexity in the universe and collective learning by human societies in promoting 
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innovation and increasing social complexity (in our world, specifically), this novel may also be 
regarded as a significant example of the “universal” effort to contribute to such innovation and 
collective learning. 
     But Mann’s insights into the so-called “complexity” and “shadows” of his contemporary era 
and the implicit problems that they were engendering for his fellow Germans extend beyond his 
representation of Diederich’s “authoritarian character.” They appear in his detailed portrayals of 
other characters, notably the Bucks, as well. Wolfgang Buck and his father, old Herr Buck, are 
less comedic and frankly more poignant characters, as their depictions point to distinct concerns 
that some (other) Germans of the time may very well have acknowledged in themselves, but to 
which they responded ineffectually. In their contrasts and conflicts with Diedrich’s character, 
these characters help illustrate that new problem arising from the growing “diversity” of voices 
in modern societies and its contribution to the challenge of reconciling the “modern paradox” 
between coercive and more consensual forms of power (as well as that between limited first 
order and multi-perspectival second order observing) in the formation of a stable community 
previously noted.  
     In a scene midway through the novel, for example, former schoolmates Wolfgang and 
Diederich re-encounter each other and have a lengthy conversation in which they catch up on old 
times. In this exchange, the clearly more worldly Wolfgang, who is also a seeming representation 
of the then-modern man, articulates much of his character’s mindset, which abounds in 
unhappiness with the state of current affairs but also endorses pessimism so that he has become 
almost indifferent and inclined towards acting inauthentically. Thus, as he says to an increasingly 
“uneasy” Diederich, “What matters personally to each of us is not that we should really change 
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the world very much, but that we should create in ourselves a sense of life, and a feeling that we 
are causing changes. That only requires talent, and the Emperor has plenty” (Mann 146). But as 
Diederich proceeds to bluster in a defense of the Emperor, Wolfang continues: 
     You people allow him to prescribe phrases for you, and never was opinion  
     so well drilled as now. But deeds? My excellent contemporary, our age is not 
     prepared for deeds. In order to exercise one’s capacity for adventure, it is  
     necessary, first of all, to live, and deeds are dangerous to life…[and in reply to 
     Diederich’s retort questioning whether the Emperor is being accused of cowardice, 
     Wolfgang says] I have expressed no moral judgment. I have mentioned a fact 
     connected with the history of our times which concerns us all. For the rest, 
     we are not responsible. The time for action is finished for the actor on the stage, 
     for he has played his part. What more can reality demand of him? (Mann 147) 
Though Wolfgang is specifically denoted, despite his repeated shoulder shrugging throughout the 
conversation, as appearing “troubled,” Diederich bursts into a “roar of laugher” (Mann 147). 
Clearly Diederich has no appreciation of the other man’s concerns and there has been no 
achievement of mutual understanding. And while Wolfgang does subsequently actually act by 
engaging in the legal defense of someone whom he regards as unjustly accused of actions against 
the Emperor, he ultimately fails.  
     During this lengthy courtroom scene, he passionately denounces Diederich’s own falseness in 
his testimony against the accused, but not so much because he regards Diederich as having 
malicious intent but because he regards the latter as an “average man, with a commonplace 
mind” who has been “molded” by the Emperor into a “loyal subject” (Mann 167), With much 
grinning and yawning on the part of the judges, the court’s final decision is that Wolfgang as 
counsel for the defense has “overplayed his part” (Mann 170). And as the defendant is arrested 
and led away, the narrator speaking for the court spectators notes that “As for the Buck clique, 
which talked so big, their influence was over!” (Mann 171).  
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     This failure on Wolfgang’s part is complemented at this relatively late point in the novel by 
the advancing decline in power and status of his father, old Herr Buck, as well. This character, 
who appears initially in the novel as a defender of principles of the ’48 revolutions and seriously 
engaged in various efforts at social reform in his community, by the novel’s end has suffered 
several property swindles and other humiliations at the hands of Diederich. And on his deathbed 
in the book’s final pages, old Buck finally collapses under the latter’s spying gaze, as both he and 
his family “start” from a kind of “horror” - and Diederich vanishes (Mann 296). 
     Der Untertan largely works through negating the value of much of what is depicted. In this 
sense, it is provocative. Some have criticized the work, however, for seeming to lack hope or 
offering a strategy for a way out of the inhumane conditions Mann intimates existed in 
Wilhelmine society. But as Gunneman has pointed out, “[Mann] did not want to be seen 
primarily as a critical sociologist or historian, and certainly not as a mere commentator of current 
affairs. He was an artist who analyzed facts in order to suggest solutions” (Gunneman 70). That 
is, by offering such a work as Der Untertan, his aim was not so much specifically didactic as to 
encourage readers’ own activity (rather than passivity), including their self-reflection and thought 
about their own identities and responsibilities. But the forms by which he did his “suggesting” 
also varied over time. That is, he employed different genres with different kinds of narrative 
logic and audience appeal for trying to suggest “solutions.”   
     For example, while in the midst of writing Der Untertan, Mann published an influential 
programmatic essay "Geist und Tat” (1911) (translated as “Mind and Action” or “Spirit and 
Deed”) which was a “passionate call on all German writers to become ‘agitators’ and give 
uncompromising support to democracy, to bridge the gap that separated them from the people” 
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and “launched the literary movement that soon came to be known as Aktivismus (Gunnemann 
71). In this and a companion essay entitled “Voltaire-Goethe” (1910), Mann asserted that 
democracy was mistrusted and feared as an unknown and possibly uncomfortable form of life by 
German society. In a letter to a colleague Eugen Bantz regarding his work on Der Untertan, 
Mann also argued that such misgivings were significantly shaped by Germany’s own traditions, 
which fostered the admiration of widely-acknowledged “great men” (such as Kant and 
Nietzsche) who were disinclined to practical action, while they undermined the German people’s 
own humane feelings of “love, ambition, and self-confidence” (qtd. in Gunnemann 71). 
According to Gunneman’s reading of the 1910 essay, Mann even went so far as to challenge the 
traditionally unquestioned valorization of Goethe, whose love of humanity, he argued, was 
formulated from a “distant” god-like position that resisted and “feared change”; and that “social 
injustices were explicable to him as necessities of nature” (Gunnemann 71-72).  
     While such provocative statements apparently galvanized some of his readership, many 
others, particularly in the period before WWI were quite put off. While Mann had hoped to 
provoke individuals’ reflection upon and enhance self-consciousness of their own and their 
fellows’ identities and behavior with his Der Untertan, years later (after 1918) he stated that he 
actually felt the need to ‘apologize’ for underestimating that character, whose relationship to 
power he had viewed as mostly play-acting and not really capable of so much physical 
destruction and ‘slaughter of human happiness’ (qtd. in Gunnemann 69). In other words, he 
seems to have acknowledged that he had not fully appreciated either the extent of the emotional 
problems associated with the “authoritarian character(s)” of his age or the extent of their 
capacities for “destruction” and “slaughter.” Being more of a humanist and worldly modern man 
!  147
himself, he may very well have failed to sufficiently recognize and acknowledge the “reality” of 
a character who embodied the more brutal and warlike qualities of a man of an earlier age (but 
who also now had the tools of the modern age at his disposal for wreaking terrible and 
widespread carnage). In hindsight, his perception as well as his representation of the Wolfgang 
Buck character, on the other hand, may have been quite “spot-on” in their cognizance and 
depiction of the skepticism and mixed feelings regarding taking moral action in the public sphere 
that others may have had during the period. That is, there appears to have been no significant 
willingness on the part of the German populace to seriously question their subjectivity (or 
“emancipate” it in a Foucauldian sense) and by so doing work to alter the relationships between 
coercive and consensual forms of power by developing a more enlightened citizenry (as was 
beginning to take place in other modern nation-states such as France). Perhaps the seeming 
paradox regarding modernization’s tending towards states of greater complexity subject to 
“democratic pressures” (by more self-conscious and questioning agents) while also engendering 
a new kind of “reformed state” capable of managing such complexity but whose very “power 
was in many ways greater than the monarchy it [would] replace” (Christian et al 253-254) was 
too much of a “mental” challenge to accommodate (given Germany’s disinclination towards 
democratic principles). Perhaps attempting such a shift was also felt to be a potential threat to the 
power they regarded themselves as “already” wielding. Here one might also recall the historian 
Anne Applebaum’s argument for there being a “seductive lure of authoritarianism,” which she 
asserts is in part due to the “emotional appeal” of official conspiracy theories. As she puts it:  
     the emotional appeal of a conspiracy theory is in its simplicity. It explains away 
     complex phenomena, accounts for chance and accidents, offers the believer  
     the satisfying sense of having special, privileged access to the truth. But…for  
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     those who become the one-party state’s gatekeepers, for those who repeat and 
     promote the official conspiracy theories, acceptance of these simple  
     explanations also brings another reward: power” (Applebaum, Anne. “A Warning 
     From Europe: The Worst Is Yet to Come.” Atlantic, October 2018 issue, 
     www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/poland-polarization/568324/. Accessed 
     25 July, 2020.)  
One might argue that Germany’s then-clinging to its more traditional authoritarian culture was 
not only out-of-synch with the modernizing drives going on at the same time in its commercial 
and technological spheres, but that the power many of its agents saw themselves wielding arising 
from its militaristic conventions did actually mask a “cowardice” to change and venture to adapt 
to the mental and relational demands of their era’s growing social complexity (in this vein, 
Applebaum also notes in her “Warning from Europe” that meritocracies like democracy are more 
difficult to sustain and can become targets of those who do not achieve/or hold onto power in the 
merit battle).  
     Mann himself was, in many ways, constrained by his own situation within the German nation-
system (as per Snowden) at the same time that, as a worldly (and privileged) individual who had 
acquired some of his own capacity for second order observing, he came to feel personally 
responsible for trying to influence the ongoing development of his people with his democratizing 
agenda. As a late product of the Enlightenment as well, he worked intently at trying to educate 
and emancipate German minds whom he perceived to be poised on the cusp of modernity but 
limited by their own lack of insight arising from their society’s system of socialization and 
outmoded logic (now illogic). The question of how to actually engage and free (so to speak) the 
desirous and feeling processes of active minds for the betterment of individual selves as well as 
their collectivities (a problem Freud was working on at the same time in Vienna, though his 
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psychoanalytic theorizations as we now have come to recognize were also limited in many ways 
by the Victorian constraints of his social system) remained an incompletely addressed challenge.  
     Heinrich Mann’s work thus may be understood as exemplifying one creative effort at the end 
of the long nineteenth century designed to try to stimulate more critical mental activity and 
personal reflection in and among his fellows who were being challenged by an increasingly 
complex world - a world whose shaping was sensed (particularly by those most “contemporary,” 
like Mann, as per Agamben) to be under questionably capable (and moral) control. Stéphane 
Mallarmé’s work, as I will now try to show, was another. But for a variety of reasons, including 
the latter’s life-long interest in language itself and his sensibilities as a poet, the set of artistic 
strategies he employed were significantly different.  
     From a complex systems perspective, these artists’ trying to encourage such “activity” in 
others (and enact it themselves) arguably made real sense in their historical moment. The 
dynamically-interrelated complex systems (economic, sociopolitical, and cultural) in which they 
were all immersed and by which they were constrained were evolving largely on their own 
terms; that is, they were significantly self-organizing rather than being completely determined by 
top-down (political or other) activity. And, as Christian and colleagues have pointed out, such 
“mindless” self-organization need not always be in a direction beneficial to a particular group or 
species (as we see in cases of urban blight or with the climate changes emerging in the 
Anthropocene, for example). Yet it is important to recall that agents are themselves complex 
adaptive systems; and human agents in particular have come to evolve unique capacities for 
mentation and exerting intentional responses as counter-constraints on the dynamics and 
structures of their surrounding environments (systems), which may be particularly important in 
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the modern age (given the power of our technologies and degree of interconnectedness).  Thus, 
“innovators” like Mann and Mallarmé (as Christian et al would likely deem them) may be 
understood as working to stimulate their fellows to achieve greater self-awareness so that they 
might work together more effectively at “redirecting" their larger evolving systems along (what 
these artists then-envisioned as) better collective paths. 
     As already noted, while Mann’s vision of the people’s (including artists’) intervening to a 
greater extent in the future direction of their society was couched in fairly explicit political terms, 
Mallarmé’s was not. In fact, the latter’s artistic motives, as the diversity of Mallarmé scholarship 
attests, have not always been easy to discern. Some scholars, such as Jacques Rancière 
(Mallarmé: The Politics of the Siren [2011]) and Lawrence M. Porter (“The Evolution of 
Mallarmé’s Social Consciousness” [2013]) have been among those who more recently have 
perceived a real-worldly engagement bordering on a sense of duty to the collective (more often 
conceived as broader humanity than French society alone), particularly in Mallarmé’s later work. 
Traditionally, however (that is, prior to the last two or three decades [Wayland-Smith 89]), the 
broad field of Mallarmé scholarship tended to view the poet rather narrowly as an aesthete whose 
work typifies those who (akin to Wolfgang Buck) had become skeptical of having any real 
impact on the world and was inclined to withdraw from it and, in his case, focus only on the 
(variably framed) enigmatic, irrational, or transcendent workings of Mind. And while 
biographers have regularly described the poet as a man of reserved and modest character who 
acknowledged refined tastes (in marked contrast with the more bohemian and flamboyant 
Rimbaud, for example), like many literary critics, their grasp of the motivations that underlay his 
work’s roundly acknowledged “difficulty” have sometimes conflicted. 
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     Part of the challenge of grasping them may derive from Mallarmé’s own roots as a Symbolist 
in the tradition of the Parnassian poets, who were actually influenced by Baudelaire, and who 
“combin[ed] outward impassivity with the stress on intense inner emotion…[such that] the artist 
tries to be an objective observer, coldly detached like a scientist; simultaneously, however, he 
seeks within himself all the passions of which humanity is capable” (Dorra 6-7). Embodying 
such seemingly contradictory impulses and goals could present an interpretive challenge to 
others. In addition, his documented near-breakdown in his mid-twenties, to which he gave semi-
autobiographical literary expression in his only novel Igitur with its Hamlet-like main character, 
also hints at a temperamental sensitivity that some might see as predisposing him towards 
withdrawal from worldly challenges. After this youthful period and his return from the French 
provinces to Paris in 1871, however, a maturing Mallarmé became the head of the “Tuesday 
Poets” group (Les Mardistes), which drew together (at his home on the Rue de Rome) writer-
poets and artists as diverse as Paul Verlaine, André Gide, Paul Valéry, Rainer Maria Rilke, 
William Butler Yeats, Oscar Wilde, Edouard Manet, Auguste Rodin, and Edgar Degas among 
others. The intellectual stimulation and spiritual attraction inherent in the allusive and so-called 
mysterious qualities of Mallarmé's teaching points and writings apparently energized this social 
group, which became a significant cultural hub whose influence ramified widely and helped 
propel Mallarmé to fame well beyond Paris and French national borders.  
    His complicated drives and (to many others) enigmatic character thus appear to have been 
(with time, at least) well-managed and directed with carefully nourished artistic intentions and 
life-goals in mind. As he himself noted repeatedly in different contexts, there was a real 
organization and “order” (ordonnance) to his vision and his method. Wayland-Smith specifically 
!  152
notes:  "Ordonnance" and "ordonner," "corrélation" and "réciprocité" are among Mallarmé’s 
most frequently employed terms to describe the organizing process of poetic creation. By 
minutely calibrating and arranging a poem’s internal relationships (semantic, phonetic, 
grammatical, or lexical) Mallarmé sought to take the hasard of mute materiality and transform it 
into calculated thought” (90). 
    Intriguingly, such terms for a poem’s creation as a kind of process of “self 
organization” (wherein, as Mallarmé also stated, the poet himself is largely submerged and 
“eliminated” [“Crisis of Verse” in his Divagations (1897), trans. Barbara Johnson, p. 208]) are 
highly reminiscent of those employed by complexity researchers to describe some of the 
properties of complex adaptive systems (such as the brain).  And, as historian and philosopher 
Paul Michon, has pointed out, in notes he wrote for a conference to which he was invited to 
speak in England (1894), Mallarmé also suggests that poetic and world rhythms actually take 
part in a loop (recall the various feedback and looping activities present in complex systems). 
Poetry, as the poet said, is a "song" drawn "from the world in order to illuminate its fundamental 
rhythm” (Michon 1). He also employs the term rhythm (or rhythmic) to refer to human 
subjectivity itself: “Every soul is a rhythmic tangle” (toute âme est un noeud rythmique) (“Music 
and Letters” in Divagations, p. 184; here, however, one may note a specific example of the many 
challenges poetry presents to the translator, particularly poetry like that of Mallarmé’s, where 
form and word choice with all of the associative implications the latter derives from its source 
language are so critical to his poems’ effects. Consider, for example, the fact that noeud may be 
translated not only as “tangle,” but also as “node” or “junction” (words also common in the 
complexity lexicon and referring to a site where multiple forces or pathways intersect), as well as 
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“knot” or “braid.”) Allowing for these translational intricacies, one is still able to discern an 
“ordered” intentionality in his creations, which Mallarmé not only professed but critics now also 
increasingly recognize as being present in his work - that is, an “order” which is significant here 
as it arguably illustrates the creative self-organization taking place within him which he himself 
acknowledged as being only partially under his own conscious control. This process taking place 
within the metaphorical “rhythmic tangle” of Mallarmé’s own “soul” may arguably be seen, in 
other words, as another sign of complexity operating in the world, but here at the individual, 
rather than at the social systemic, level. 
    Thus, it would seem that Mallarmé himself sensed some of the complexity principles 
operating within the world (which have always existed), though he was influenced both by his 
own temperamental inclinations and the then-current state of knowledge about them, such that he 
was constrained in how he went about articulating them. But that is not to say that he was 
particularly interested in addressing the nature of complexity itself in any scientific sense. Rather, 
he is arguably better viewed as an innovative artist who was sensitive to the sociocultural 
foregrounding of some of these very complexity principles (such as self-organization, 
emergence, feedback loops) which was actually being promoted by the unusually rapid and 
concentrated advances in social complexity taking place around him (and he like Mann was 
seemingly capable of keeping his “gaze fixed” on some of these “shadows” of their age, as per 
Agamben). 
     Certainly, some of the works in the modernist style that were produced by other artists who 
followed Mallarmé might very well be perceived and judged by many to be as “difficult” in 
many ways as his own. But here again, as literary scholar Peter Howarth has asserted:  
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     [this] style is not…just a symptom of social breakdown or social retreat into difficulty. 
     Rather, we might say its distinctive character, and some of its political problems, 
     come from trying to be individual and all-embracing at once…[modernists’] adopt[ing] 
     no recognizable genres, forms. or approved artistic vocabulary…allowed the poet 
     to shape the poem according to the nature of her material, and made poems more 
     individual, and thus harder to understand. But without the border between art and 
     life which recognized genres create, the style of modernist poetry became more 
     continuous with social experience than any art before it (17-18).  
One might also say, as from the position being taken here, that such artists (like Mallarmé) were 
acknowledging some of the very “loopiness” and self-reflexiveness in the world, such that the 
”border between art and life” can seem to be lost and one’s style may actually become “more 
continuous with social experience.” And some of this experience itself, as has been being argued, 
was the feeling of oneself being subject to more “democratic” and socioeconomic pressures to be 
“free” to express one’s own personal vision as well as the perception of the more “abstract” and 
impersonal nature of the social world increasing in its complexity around them. 
     Mallarmé as a virtual modernist himself was clearly sensitive to nuances of his own social 
experience, which included being attentive to his local (personal, familial, collegial, Parisian) 
circumstances, as well as the systemic (“all-embracing”) challenges of maintaining a social order 
and stability grounded in some sense of broader community. He also recognized that some of his 
fellow poets were already motivated as he was by such concerns. As he said in a published 
interview with the journalist Jules Huret in 1891(whose proofs Mallarmé corrected himself): 
“Above all, [Victor Hugo was] unaware of this incontrovertible notion: that in an unstable 
society, lacking unity, no stable and definitive art can be created. From this incomplete social 
organization, which explains in itself the disquiet of the human mind, an unexplained need for 
individuality arises, of which the present literary manifestations are a direct reflection…,” which 
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he goes on to characterize as “present-day poets” (his fellow Symbolists) understanding that 
there is “something abnormal in the certainty of discovering, when opening any book of poetry, 
uniform and agreed-upon rhythms from beginning to end, even though the avowed goal is to 
arouse our interest in the essential variety of human feelings” (Dorra 141). A major Symbolist 
goal, in fact was to reanimate language in both its form and content to help foster a grasp of the 
real diversity (and fragmentation) of experience and feeling in their unsettled time (or, as the 
poet Matthew Zapruder has put it: the Symbolists’ poems were “designed not to be about, but to 
do…as a mechanism to circumvent our ordinary ways of making meaning, talking ‘about’ and 
‘describing’…and get[ting] us to feel the presence of higher truths, a reality that is above and 
beyond our mundane world” [Zapruder 167]).  
     While many in his era were apparently despairing of being able to “do” such work, Mallarmé 
appears to have been more optimistic about his and his fellow artists’ capacities to address the 
increasingly secular challenge of representing and conveying a sense of the proliferating and 
expanding “invisible” (complex) forces impinging upon people’s lives in their time (and thereby 
promote a sense of these “higher truths”). 
     There have been, of course, extensive references to religious and spiritual concerns in 
characterizations of Mallarmé’s work, as in Paul Auster’s observations on the poet’s lengthy (but 
unfinished) poem in honor of his eight-year-old son who died from a long rheumatic illness; as 
he says: it is “one of the most moving accounts of a man trying to come to grips with modern 
death…without God…[or] hope of salvation—and it reveals the secret meaning of Mallarmé’s 
entire aesthetic: the elevation of art to the stature of religion” (Auster xi). Or, as Elizabeth 
McCombie has stated: “Mallarmé depicts the poet as high priest, necessarily set apart from the 
!  156
mundane political process in order to learn and reveal the mysterious truth” (McCombie xi). But 
as she also notes, this being “set apart” does not signify a tendency to withdraw from worldly 
matters; instead, “the modern artist’s search to reveal ‘truth’ in Mallarmé’s eyes was not 
apolitical but, rather, radical and democratic,” such that as he himself said “At this critical hour 
for the human race when Nature desires to work for herself, she requires certain lovers of hers…
men placed directly in communion with the sentiment of their time—to loose the restraint of 
education, to let hand and eye do what they will, and thus through them, reveal herself” (qtd. in 
McCombie xi). In other words, akin to Mann, Mallarmé appears to have felt that something was 
“not right with the world,” so to speak, to which he needed to help give expression and 
encourage work that could help restore a more “Natural” order. But he (more than Mann) seems 
to have been acutely sensitive to (and concerned with) the loss of religious explanations for 
making sense of the powerful forces intruding upon and “upsetting” people and their lives in the 
world - forces which now included not only natural ones (like plagues, famines, and earthquakes, 
for example), but also abstract man-made ones (technological, bureaucratic, and so on) arising 
from increasing social complexity. 
     The details of his vision, thus, did not lend themselves well to political terminology, as they 
did for Mann, but to other framings. But whether couched in terms of membership in a “mystical 
future community” (Howarth 15), being a vessel of Nature’s expression or, as he seems towards 
the end of his life to have (also) thought of himself, a variant on the modern worker (as noted in 
the following poem), Mallarmé, like Mann, was seemingly concerned with the interrelated 
problems of increasing social diversity and reconciling such diversity within a stable community. 
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     Such concerns are evident in Mallarmé’s prose poem “Conflit,” which Lawrence M. Porter 
documents as one of Mallarmé’s last works, written at about the same time as his radically 
unconventional yet ultimately quite influential poem A Roll of the Dice Will Never Abolish 
Chance. Porter regards “Conflit” as marking the third and final phase in what he outlines as the 
“evolution” and “awakening” of Mallarmé’s “social consciousness”; as he says, “it crystallizes 
his [Mallarmé’s] social stance” (Porter 284). This several page poem appears essentially as a 
meditative reflection by the poet on his responses to a group of laborers hired to work on the 
construction of a railway line intruding upon the property of his annual summer rental in Valvins, 
a village not far from Paris on a tributary of the Seine. In the poem, he never questions that he is 
(or should be) a poet, but as we’ll see, he does grapple with how to think about being a poet and 
whether and how his work may (or may not) be comparable to and as worthy as that of manual 
laborers (and vice versa). 
     The eponymous “conflict” of the poem operates on several levels, initially as that provoked 
by men of a different social class who work with their hands (manual laborers) frankly disturbing 
him and disrupting the more contemplative work that he does: “…this time the worm-eaten 
shutter / opened on a ruckus, refrains, arguments, below: I remembered / reading about the 
invasion of workers expected in the un- / happy domicile I haunt the corner of, proceeding to 
offend / the  place where solitude had reigned for so long, with the lay- / ing of a train track. I 
remember agonizing at first—should I / go or shouldn’t I?—but overcoming my hesitation, I said 
the / hell with it, too bad! I’ll go defend the property as mine…” (41).  
     But then the conflict quickly moves into one centered more inside of himself over questions 
of what he and they might actually have in common and to what extent his work actually differs 
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from theirs. As he notes: “…This crowd goes in and out, shouldering shovels and / picks: which 
invites one to think of things in the back of one’s / mind, and forces one to proceed directly from 
notions one / tells oneself are nothing but literature…” (42). Though he then immediately refers 
to the men as “my devoted enemies,” he proceeds to appreciate that they are not only “sharing” 
much of the same physical space, eating and drinking as he does (though actually to a greater 
extent than he does), but he must acknowledge a certain “strength” in them with mixed feelings 
of “annoyance” and religiosity, so that he is “moved enough to kneel” (42). As he goes on to 
consider whether he should “dislodge the intruders,” he asks “what language should I use” as he 
recognizes “the inanity of my plight in the eyes of simple / men, who would take my speech, 
surely, rather more seriously / than the eleven citizens—neighbors—I tried it out on, who / 
immediately laughed at it. These drinkers have a sense of the / marvelous, and, after working 
very hard, they might imagine / superior delicatenesses somewhere, and understand the need to 
break out…” (43). The poet’s own sense of awkwardness and uncertainty about how to relate to 
these men is thus becoming mixed with flashes of insight into their humanity along with an 
incipient sense of fellowship with them - a sense of fellowship perhaps even greater than with his 
fellow bourgeoisie (the “citizens—neighbors” who laughed at him). 
     Though he “continues to be racked with contradictory states” (44) and notes being “…afraid; 
it is hard to be to- / gether; contact among men cannot, I fear, ever happen…,” he also  
experiences “Sadness that what I produce remains, to / people like this, essentially, like the 
clouds at dusk or the stars / in the sky, vain.“; but then shortly thereafter he has an apparent 
epiphany when he witnesses the workers drunk, fallen to the ground, essentially engaging in 
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“work stoppage” in a kind of “resistance” to the “majority” (bourgeoisie), a move with which he 
sympathizes, so that he is inspired to walk among them “freely admiring and dreaming” (45-46).  
     His concluding paragraphs then become quite changed in their tone and use of language, 
imparting a felt sense that is much more respectful and consistently reverential. Thus: “Without 
saying what it is or elu- / cidating this ceremony, they honorably reserve the dimension / of the 
sacred in their existence by a work stoppage, an await- / ing, a suicide. Out of the pride inherent 
in daily work, simply / to resist and stand tall, comes knowledge, magnified by the / pillars of a 
stand of tall trees…,” and as the narrator keeps “watch over these artisans of ele- / mentary tasks, 
I have occasion, beside a limpid, continuous / river, to meditate on these symbols of the People—
some ro- / bust intelligence bends their spines every day to in order to ex- / tract, without the 
intermediary of wheat, the miracle of life / which grounds presence” (46). Here the poet-narrator 
himself seems to have been transformed; his experience with and reflection on observing these 
Others has produced a change in his own perception (reminiscent of the consequences of second 
order observation described by Luhmann) and new insights into his own and others’ identities 
and self-description.  
     In his essay, Porter indicates that “Conflit” “replaces Mallarmé’s paternalistic relationship 
toward the poor in [his] earlier prose poems from 1864 with relationships among equals from 
different social classes” (285). But he also regards the poem as an end-of-life “ethical footnote of 
solidarity…which rejects the false consciousness of a social exclusion that would make this 
world tidier for the privileged” (287). And while he acknowledges that the poet has left a legacy 
of “artistic treasures” with his “supremely Modernist, or world-ordering vision,” he tends to 
diminish the latter for some of its details, such as the poet’s use of “constellations” and other 
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cosmological reference points (that will be noted in the discussion of Roll of the Dice to follow) 
which he regards as “flagrantly subjective” and a “specious ordering of objects unimaginably 
remote from each other, a pattern that exists only in the perceptions of an observer situated at one 
arbitrary point” (286-287). The interpretive stance taken here, however, is somewhat different. 
That is, instead of regarding “Conflit” as simply an “ethical footnote,” one could appreciate the 
work as Mallarmé’s enacted sense of broadening connection to others in his socially more 
complex world, whether they were family, artist friends and colleagues, readers of his 
challenging work, or manual laborers such as these. And while Mallarmé's stance was 
unquestionably “subjective” and emergent from an individual perspective, as we’ve seen, the 
poet himself was among the first to acknowledge that this was the case, seeing it as appropriate 
to artistic expression in his time. In other words, he recognized that diversity of perspectives and 
their expression was becoming an increasing fact of modern social life; but this increasing 
differentiation of perspectives (related to increasing social complexity) was also engendering 
certain problems requiring a response. And, as suggested here, his response was arguably 
calculated to help enable others (primarily his readers, but fellow artists as well) to become more 
consciously aware of this “fact” and begin working in concert to redress them. And, as a second 
point, it might be worth incidentally noting that employing cosmological constellations in his 
poems as patterns of order may seem “specious” to a readership such as ours (living many 
decades later) which is less inclined to perceive them anthropomorphically or as having specific 
human significance (than through a scientific lens), as Porter suggests. But if one thinks of them 
more as metaphors (which Mallarmé may or may not have done - the scholarly arguments go 
both ways), they might actually be seen as at least helpful for offering a depiction of a kind of 
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order consisting of a pattern of vast and distant arrangements that his readers could be inspired 
by and potentially employ creatively in their own imaginations and navigation.   
     As Wayland-Smith also points out in her essay “Mallarmé, Technology and the Poet 
Engineer” (2013), Mallarmé was not uninformed about scientific matters and the technological 
advances of his age. In fact, he was interested in making use of some of the latter in the very 
design of his literary projects, including his Roll of the Dice, to which we will soon turn. But in 
recalling Wayland-Smith’s point that words referring to “order” (such as “ordonnance” and 
"ordonner," "corrélation" and “réciprocité") “are among Mallarmé’s most frequently employed 
terms to describe the organizing process of poetic creation” (90), one also obtains the sense that 
Mallarmé valued patterns qua patterns for the very order they presented as well as for what they 
could do.   
    Admittedly, Mallarmé’s allusive style in his writings was itself a challenge to most others. But, 
as he affirmed in many contexts, as he saw it, that was the point. Provoking others (notably his 
readers) to exercise their capacities for analytical thinking and interpretive insight (and disrupt 
their bourgeois complacency) was a major goal. As an artist (and one with a very strong 
allegiance to the “aesthetic attitude” per Rowe), however, he was quite attuned to the importance 
of individuals’ still deriving pleasure from (and hopefully perceiving beauty in) such work. As he 
also said in his interview with Huret (1891): “The Parnassians [with whom Mallarmé had earlier 
aligned, but from whom he later broke off], who take the object in its entirety and show it, lack 
mystery; they take away from readers the delicious joy that arises when they believe that their 
own minds are creating. To name an object is to suppress three-quarters of the enjoyment of the 
poem, which derives from the step-by-step discovery, to suggest, that is the dream…There must 
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always be enigma in poetry, and the goal of literature— there is no other—is to evoke objects….
(Dorra 141-142). And, among these objects, as I have been suggesting, were new conceptually 
abstract ones (such as “the nation-state,” “systems,” etcetera) that like the invisible force of 
gravity were now being increasingly recognized as having real effects in and on the world. 
     And while Mallarmé claimed that true poetry must resist industrialized consumption by the 
masses, at the same time, a close examination of Mallarmés work “reveals it to be subtly 
informed by the very rationalizing, managerial instincts of the technological culture from which 
it takes its distance” (emphasis added) (Wayland-Smith 90). In fact, according to Wayland-
Smith, Mallarmé was struck by new scientific discoveries regarding energy and technological 
means of harnessing it being developed in his lifetime (such as the second law of 
thermodynamics, which states that there is a natural tendency of any isolated system to 
degenerate into a more disordered state; and electricity, which was emerging as a new means of 
supporting the lives of and connections between individuals, respectively). Perception of such 
seemingly opposing tendencies occurring simultaneously (that is, natural tendencies in the 
universe-world towards greater disorder [entropy] along with energy-demanding countermoves 
to create and maintain structure) are actually some of the most significant principles underlying 
the trends towards greater complexity that Christian and his colleagues have identified and which 
they and others have described as becoming increasingly evident to individuals within societies 
becoming modern in the nineteenth century.   
     Thus, according to Wayland-Smith, “Mallarmé viewed the materials of aesthetic creation 
(whether dancing bodies or words on a page), as well as the ‘material’ of human aesthetic 
consciousness, as latent energy sources to be maximally organized by the poet” (93). In other 
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words, as an artist-poet, he felt himself to be actually engaged in energy-demanding and energy-
channeling creative work. But at the same time, he felt that the emergent products of creation 
were not (or should not be regarded as) just his. As Wayland-Smith also says: “he envisioned the 
aesthetic consciousness of the audience - both individual and collective - as an energy-dense 
resource whose connective capacities had, as of yet, not been developed to the full” (emphasis 
added) (100). That is, he regarded his audience as potential co-participants in the (artistic) 
processes of creative work, though most had little experience with it. And, as has been being 
suggested here, much of his agenda may be regarded as being directed at trying to help change 
that.  
     Wayland-Smith notes in her conclusions that her perspective tends to bring together two 
traditionally disparate designations of Mallarmé, though they remain “in tension” in an (at least 
for now) rather unstable set. As she puts it, “we must learn to hold in tension [the] two 
juxtaposed images” of Mallarmé as poet, that is, as “historical isolate” or “sacred figure” outside 
“the vulgar constraints of nineteenth century mass culture,” and as so-called “engineer,” that is, 
one who embodies the “calculating, rationalizing impulse" and whose poetry engages with the 
“techno-logic of modernity” (Wayland-Smith 106). 
     And if there is any single work that would seem to personify these dual aspects of Mallarmé 
coming together in their manifest fruition, it would appear to be his revolutionary poem A Roll of 
the Dance Will Never Abolish Chance (written and first published in Cosmopolis in 1897, but not 
published in the book form he desired and for whose design details he had given precise 
instructions until sixteen years after his death [that is, in 1914]).  
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     From the moment the reader takes in its first pages, she can feel the power of the 
unconventionally organized structure of the work in the demands it places on her attention and 
integrative capacities. Though still recognizable as a poem, it is truly something of a stretch. It 
helps, of course, to know that the material work before her eyes is the output of someone called a 
poet and that he regarded it (more or less) as a poem himself. But one is also struck by what he 
does in his page and a half-long single paragraph preface to the work, which is to offer some 
though specifically limited guidance regarding how to read it (saying “let this genre become 
unified like the symphony, little by little, alongside the personal song…,” for example), while at 
the same time stating that he prefers to leave the reader to her own devices. As he indicates in the 
preface’s opening lines: “I’d prefer that this Note not be read, or that, once perused, be forgotten; 
it will teach the skilled Reader little that falls outside his comprehension: but it might be 
troubling for the naive reader having to cast his gaze on the opening words of the Poem so that 
those that follow, arranged as they are, lead him to the last, the whole without novelty save for 
the way in which they are spaced” (1). Clearly he is intending, and adamant to the end, that his 
work should be allusive and try to help stimulate the potential in others to work and co-create 
with him. This would seem to be critical because it is not as if he is envisioning offering 
pronouncements about the world but rather that he is more concerned with confronting a 
“metaphysical crisis, the constant threat of collapse into incoherence” which is at the poem’s 
center (McCombie xxvi). That is, just as he sees instability and confusion in the social world 
around him, he presents the model of a world in which he along with others must discern 
complex patterns and “let” some new kind of order self-organize and emerge (as both collective 
“symphony” and “personal song”).  
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     Thus, intentional effort and receptivity are both required, as the reader confronts words in 
different font sizes (the building blocks of this world) afforded in unprecedented arrangements 
on the page. As McCombie notes, Mallarmé had experimented with punctuation in earlier 
sonnets, but the layout here takes on a new verse form “the shape assumed by the mixture of 
‘free verse’ and the prose poem expanded in time and space, akin to symphonic structure” (xxvi). 
And while there is no underlying specific narrative to be uncovered, there are certain motifs and 
phrases that appear, sometimes within and sometimes across pages (as with the largest font 
words “A Roll of the Dice,” “Will Never,” “Abolish” “Chance”) that appear to act as structural 
clues and seeming keys to the sense of what is transpiring.  
     But, as McCombie also points out: “even as she [the reader] develops these keys, they 
dissolve, to be replaced by a different possibility. Just as a glimmer of sense is offered, it retreats 
from her grasp again” (xxvii). This very dynamic of the sense-making effort demanded by the 
form of the poem also finds support in symbolic motifs that center on rhythmic and “sailing” 
activity within it (incidentally, Mallarmé himself enjoyed sailing, particularly on the Seine). 
Thus, not only do we engender waves of sense (so to speak) from words that arc up and down as 
well as across certain pages, but we also encounter short phrase fragments (for example, “any 
thought of escape denied / far within epitomizes / the shadow buried in the depths by this 
alternate sail / until adapting / to the wingspan / its gaping depth like the hull / of a ship / listing 
from side to side” [7]) and references to “THE MASTER” (8) and “captain” with “the 
submissive beard” present in a “storm” (9) who is seemingly trying to resist the “vertigo” (17), 
which engender associations and hint at some (abstract) individual trying to navigate his way 
through this experience. But while the poet-narrator does refer on the final page to “the Seven 
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Stars of the North / as well /  A CONSTELLATION / cold because forgotten and disused” that 
one might have thought could possibly act as a reference point for guiding one home (again, so 
to speak), it is instead “watchful / doubtful / rolling / brilliant and contemplative / before 
stopping / at some final place of consecration / All Thought is a Roll of the Dice“ (22). Thus, as 
McCombie says, while the ending “appears to promise conclusion [it] in fact points back into 
what seems infinite possibility” (xxvii). One might also say that through it all and by its end the 
poet has helped readers gain greater appreciation of the dynamic, highly associative and 
contingent nature of their own thoughts (their own mental activity) which, despite effecting 
particular “rolls of the dice” (i.e, particular thoughts of various kinds), actually always retain the 
possibility (“chance”) for contributing to the next creative act.  
     R. Howard Bloch describes the poem as “mark[ing] an enormous break with the conceptual 
world in place since the Renaissance…its verbal and visual dislocations mak[ing] it more like an 
interactive poem of the digital age than like any kind of traditional verse” (27). This, I would 
suggest, is another way of saying that it was also unprecedented it what it afforded individuals 
(in Mallarmé’s case, an increasingly literate populace); specifically, it offered the opportunity to 
participate directly in a surprisingly, as Bloch says, “democratic” exercise - “an exercise in 
mastering words as a way of mastering the world” [Bloch 27-28]). But in addition to its 
unprecedented formal aspects, it also “sheds new light upon the condition of modernity…as it 
contains a great lesson in how to negotiate, after Nietzche’s declaration of the death of God, the 
treacheries of a rootless, secular world” (Bloch 29) that was also growing in its complexity in 
ways that Christian and his colleagues have described. 
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     Thus, Mallarmé appears to have been as managerially inclined (so to speak) as was Mann to 
address systemic problems of his increasingly complex society by trying to provoke his fellows’ 
thinking and foster greater self-consciousness regarding their social roles (identities) and “work” 
in the world. And, while both artists may be said to have aspired to an ideal community 
supported by more enlightened and imaginative individuals, Mallarmé envisioned this taking 
place more in the artistic realm than through direct political engagement. But as both men were 
aware, the People, whose very minds they were trying to stimulate and help develop for the 
purpose of enhancing their participation in the more democratic management of the problems 
threatening their societies, were still largely fledglings in this regard (as Foucault also essentially 
argued in his own work on “emancipation” many decades later).  And, with social complexity 
continuing to advance (and many of its engendered problems still far from resolved in our own 
time), more enlightened work was (and is still) needed. 
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Chapter 5:  
Pulling It All Together:  
Six Writers and their “Systems" in Co-Evolution  
     Reflecting on these various discussions of the paired German and French writers at three 
relatively distinct moments in the long nineteenth century, I will now attempt to bring the pieces 
together in a (hopefully) coherent view of what has been undertaken and accomplished in the 
presentation and analysis. As stated at the outset, both the form of the presentation and the 
analysis itself were intended to rely significantly on concepts taken from complexity and 
complex systems research as well as the macro-historical theoretical framework and approach of 
Christian and colleagues, who have also incorporated many of these complexity-related concepts 
in their model. As those working in this area typically acknowledge, however, the nature and 
workings of what is presently referred to as “complexity” remain incompletely understood. On 
the science side, the formal study of complexity and complex systems took shape relatively 
recently, gaining serious momentum in the early 1980’s with the founding of the Santa Fe 
Institute, a “think tank” forum for discussing and conducting the multidisciplinary investigation 
of such systems in a variety of domains (physical, computational, biological and social). The idea 
was to conduct theoretical research outside the traditional boundaries of academic departments 
and governmental funding agency budgets in order (to try) to achieve some synthesis across 
disciplines - pressing for greater dialogue and sharing of ideas with the expectation of discerning 
principles by which complex systems operate similarly across domains, thereby contributing via 
this complementary strategy to the overall advancement of knowledge. One might think of it as 
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having emerged as a late post-Enlightenment offshoot of those dual tendencies to try to 
encompass knowledge in an encyclopedic fashion, on the one hand, and refine it through 
specialized methods of rational examination, on the other. Unlike the Encyclopédistes’ original 
endeavor to gather all available knowledge, examine it critically, and use it for social 
advancement, however, the goal of those engaged in complexity research nowadays is different 
in that there is no attempt to encompass all knowledge in a single enterprise; rather it 
acknowledges that the current state of knowledge is subject to change, and that specialization 
and knowledge refinement continues to be critical but that the latter may be usefully 
complemented by more “holistic” methods that yield discernment of abstract patterns (qua 
principles or properties) by which the objective world and phenomena at different levels of 
temporal and spatial scale operate in it. 
     The present argument and the form of the discussion on which it is based align with some of 
these same motivations while also employing some of the same complexity/complex system 
principles which have emerged from such work. Because of the subject matter, however, it tends 
to align most specifically with the model afforded by the historian David Christian in his 
research. It has operated, in other words, much as he along with his colleagues from a variety of 
other disciplines do in their work within the relatively “holistic” “macro-historical” framework 
of their “big history” agenda, but in an application to consideration of relationships between 
three pairs of German and French writers and their environmental contexts across the long 
nineteenth century.   
     The form and (some of the) content of this discussion of relationships between these writers 
and their contexts has, therefore, been rather unconventional as well as somewhat exploratory. 
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Nonetheless, the methodological strategy has actually aligned in certain ways with that generally 
employed by Christian himself in the context of his own multidisciplinary collaborations with 
others in both the sciences and the humanities. These have been characterized as the use of 
analogies and metaphors in the rational application of complexity principles to historical 
phenomena taking place in different domains and operating at different timescales, thereby 
allowing for the discernment of patterns of behavior that are alike or similar to each other in 
meaningful ways in these different domains (this may be seen in their application of notions of 
“flows of energy,” “emergence of networks,” and increases in “information” and “collective 
learning,” within and between different “systems” operating at different levels of spatial scale, 
for example). Christian’s stated aims include advancing greater appreciation of some of the 
findings of complexity research, as well as furthering his and his colleagues’ larger project of 
developing an alternate “narrative” and understanding of history itself (Christian 144-149). One 
of the more distinctive features of this alternate narrative is that it situates human history within a 
longer and wider (so to speak) history of evolution of the world (and universe!), thereby, as he 
puts it, essentially integrating science into a different “creation myth” (Christian 146-149). 
     While this particular theoretical agenda exists in its early stages, it has gained some 
intellectual and scholarly traction (engaging numerous investigators at universities on different 
continents). At the same time, and as noted in the introduction, other scholars in the humanities 
have begun to direct some of their attention to formal concerns with “systems” and matters of 
“complexity” in their own (distinctive) ways as well. (Concerns with systems of various kinds 
have been present in the humanities for a long time, of course, but not in the formal sense 
referred to here). These other scholars include Foucault, whose body of work has been 
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reinterpreted by some as aligning in several ways with an intellectual trend concerned with 
understanding “complexity” (and complex systems), as well as the literary and Enlightenment 
scholar Clifford Siskin and the narrative theorist Richard Walsh.  
     One may recall that in his System: The Shaping of Modern Knowledge, Siskin states in its 
opening pages that “By engaging system as a genre - as a form that works physically in the world 
to mediate our efforts to know it - this [that is, his] book illuminates system’s role in the shaping 
and reshaping of modern knowledge” (1). Richard Walsh, for his part, focuses (along with his 
computer scientist colleague Susan Stepney) on the challenges of narrating complexity, and 
points out (in a rather long list) that, among other things, the behavior of complex systems 
includes the property of “Reflexiveness, in social systems, where narratives of the system are also 
within the system, affecting it” (319-320).  
     These notions - of system as a “form” (which Siskin deems a genre) “working in the world to 
mediate our efforts to know it” and complex social systems having the property of 
“reflexiveness” - are compatible, I would argue, with that point which the complexity and 
knowledge management researcher David Snowden also makes with his observation that “while 
these [complex adaptive] systems are constrained, the constraints are loose or only partial, and 
the nature of the constraints (and thereby the system) is constantly modified by the interaction of 
the agents with the system and each other; [that is] they coevolve” (Snowden 225). In other 
words, these scholars may be viewed as together gesturing towards the idea that has been enacted 
here, that the roles and operations of innovator-agents (such as writers) who employ narratives 
within their systems have not only been constrained by but are also working at the same time to 
have an impact on them.  
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     Thus, the argument here has explored the situations and (some of) the work of six writers in 
the long nineteenth century who, as I have proposed, stand out for how they participated in and 
themselves embodied the growing role of individuals in defining the (social) ontology of their 
societies, which were at the same time becoming more modern as a consequence of the 
confluence of circumstances that Christian and his colleagues have described through their 
“complexity” lens. 
     In order to make this more clear, recall that across western Europe’s long nineteenth century, 
from its Revolutionary beginnings  to its World-War-torn end, social, cultural, and technological 
changes which together have routinely been deemed “modernization” took place at an 
historically unprecedented rate. Christian and colleagues regard increases in complexity and the 
dynamics of complex adaptive systems to be an important explanatory lens for understanding 
many of these changes.  
     Thus, western Europe appears to have been unique in the world at that time for being a site of 
“Goldilocks Conditions”, where conditions were “just right” for something new and complex to 
emerge (in this case, “modernization”). These conditions included all those which had led over 
time to the region’s becoming a hub of interconnected global networks mediating the exchange 
of energy and resources (material as well as cultural-intellectual) in the world. This set of 
circumstance effected, in their turn, the amassing of unprecedented amounts of wealth and power 
in this part of the world that was divided up (though obviously not at all equally) among different 
countries (including France and Germany), local communities, and social groups differing in 
their degrees of privilege, according to their access to them (this process is obviously conceived 
as a self-organizing one with no “master plan” in mind). At the same time, however, (according 
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to this view) this concentration of resources sparked significant innovation in the channeling and 
use of them as well. Forms of governance were also shifting to accommodate and administer the 
management of such vast resources. Traditional monarchies and the nobility were declining in 
their overt authority and social “grip,” while those of a more entrepreneurial bent were rising in 
power and influence. As a part of this process, as Niklas Luhmann has pointed out, the very 
“social ontology” was taking on a new form in the nineteenth century as well (that is, the nature 
of “the social” was no longer completely defined by relationship to, or enforced by, those at the 
top of the traditional social hierarchy). 
     At the same time, and as Peter Brooks has stated “for the first time,” social identities 
themselves were becoming a problem. While there are likely many reasons and possible 
explanations for this, notable among them is the fact that the balance between coercive and 
consensual forms of power was beginning to be altered, as Christian et al have pointed out. 
While they have emphasized the spread of democratic principles as a significant contributor to 
this shifting balance, the rise of the bourgeoisie and bolstering of their values could also be 
argued to have been an added, if more covert (since less patently political), force. Thus, the range 
of individuals’ roles and social identities were differentiating as well as being increasingly tied to 
larger numbers of people in communities (as compared with the relatively smaller sizes of the 
“fading” aristocracies that were defined by birth, marriage, and/or rank within the military, for 
example). And thus the potential power associated with these increasingly diverse identities and 
the voices that expressed them was growing. But in the absence of a genuine democracy (or 
other communal mechanism for acting together in their interests), the diverse so-called “voices 
of the people” had no means of cohesion or communal expression. And, as discussed in chapter 
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four, by the mid- to latter part of the nineteenth century, feelings of malaise and tendencies 
towards apathy were also spreading. 
     In other words, across the nineteenth century, individuals’ sense of their place within and 
relationship to the broader collective was transforming rapidly, sometimes in the timeframe of 
decades, sometimes even within a generation’s lifespan. As many scholars (including Hartmut 
Rosa and Marshall Berman, as previously noted) have acknowledged, the rapidity of such 
changes would have made them difficult to characterize by the vast majority of those caught up 
in them. Consequently, there would have been a special need and niche for innovator-agents-
writers, such as those who have been discussed, to address and fill as modernization was 
progressing. 
     But it wasn’t just the rate of social change that presumably “drove” these writer-artists to offer 
a response to them. It was arguably also the fact that individuals - that is to say, individuals 
among “the people” themselves (or “on the margins” of their societies, so that they were at risk 
of becoming just “the people” themselves [like Staël and Kleist]) - were also on the verge of 
becoming more responsible for shaping the new “social ontology.” Recall that, as Luhmann has 
pointed out, the very “social ontology” by which European societies defined and understood 
themselves was beginning to shift at the turn of the nineteenth century, as the nobility began to 
lose its power to establish and enforce it. As we might put it nowadays, traditional authorities 
were losing “control of the narrative.” But, whereas Luhmann (a sociologist) has emphasized the 
media’s strategic role (as a functional subsystem in the broader social system) in taking on the 
task of a society coming to be able to “see” and “talk about” itself, the discussion here has 
assumed that certain artist-writers also played an important role in this task. In other words, the 
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argument here has in many ways centered on the notion that there were some individuals (with 
the writers discussed here being clear “stand outs” among them) who made efforts to address 
aspects of the adaptive challenge of “meaning making” and establishing a new “social ontology” 
capable of culturally defining “who was who” and “what was what” in their eras. By such means, 
they afforded not only a new aesthetics (which seems to have been a particularly important goal 
in the cases of Kleist, Heine, and Balzac) but also a new kind of potential sense by which others 
in their societies could objectify the so-called “shape" of their societies and make them more 
“graspable” and thus communicable and narratable.  
     There is no longer any question that the media were, in fact, becoming increasingly influential 
in the nineteenth century and playing the kind of role in society that Luhmann has suggested. But 
the point here is that in addition to those implementing media management and organizational 
operations, individual actors with “attention-grabbing” voices had some influence and impact in 
this regard as well. And those in positions of power well knew it. Printing and dissemination of 
pamphlets, books, and newspapers had obviously been going on for many years. But several of 
the writers who have been discussed here were clearly subject to having their voices 
“constrained” by the more traditional and authoritarian powers who felt threatened by them. As 
we know, Napoleon intervened and limited the publication of some of Staël’s work, while 
Kleist’s Prince Friedrich of Homberg play was initially banned in its production; and, of course, 
Heine and (Heinrich) Mann were subject to significant censorship by Prussian/German 
authorities, so that both men moved elsewhere to be able to continue their writing. But, by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, publishing had become a growing industry, which Heine and 
Balzac were among the first to be able to take advantage of in Paris as a means of offering a 
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source of livelihood and financial support. But the force of this industry’s growth appears to have 
also been unstoppable, so that it extended into Germany as well, thereby contributing to 
furthering that country’s coherence as a new nation in the latter part of the century. German 
studies scholar Kirsten Belgum details this very phenomenon of the print media contributing to 
the self-understanding of increasing numbers of people in Germany in her book Popularizing the 
Nation: Audience, Representation, and the Production of Identity in “Die Gartenlaube,” 
1853-1900 [1998]) (the latter being the first successful mass-circulation newspaper in Germany, 
founded in Leipzig in 1853).   
     But recall that, as historian Lynn Hunt has argued, “the people’s” understanding of themselves 
as playing a significant role in “the social” was emerging even earlier (at least in France) as the 
print industry began to flourish and increasing numbers of individuals of all classes saw 
themselves participating in public activities, like mass gatherings and demonstrations, by which 
they were also making a difference and effecting policy decisions in their towns and cities. As 
Hunt puts it, “words were rushing to catch up” with what people already “knew” - in this case 
regarding their increasingly instrumental roles in sociopolitical activity.  This, I would suggest, is 
also consistent with the notion that a kind of second order observing (akin to that which 
Luhmann describes taking place at the social system level) was also on the rise among and at the 
level of individuals, such that increasing numbers of people began to simultaneously question 
their roles and places in society. In other words, growing numbers of people were not only 
gaining a new kind of perspective on themselves (as their own instrumental activity became a 
new object of joint attention in their communities) but they were also beginning to appreciate 
that their roles in society actually included a new kind of significance and power. Thus, 
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individuals - like these six writers - were among those inclined to ask new kinds of provocative 
questions such as: “who am I?” and “who is or could be responsible” for “changing” our world 
and/or managing its problems for our communal benefit?”  
     From a macro-historical perspective (as per Christian et al), France and Germany and their 
native inhabitants were essentially “rubbing shoulders” throughout this many decades-long 
process. Of course, not only language differences, but also centuries-long cultural traditions had 
established them as societies in contradistinction to each other. But at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, they and others in western Europe had not just come to amass their own shares of these 
vast material and cultural resources, they also momentously engaged in fighting over them. They 
were thus becoming subject themselves to forces that transcended their own communal 
boundaries. And, as the century unfolded, they continued to jockey for their respective positions 
(with the Franco-Prussian War intervening) on the increasingly expansive world-stage in 
competition with each other.  
     The paired German and French writers who have been discussed here, from Staël and Kleist 
to Mann and Mallarmé, thus inhabited sociocultural worlds that had not only been perpetuated 
by local circumstances and boundary conditions which had defined them over their long 
respective histories, but worlds that were now also being significantly impacted by superordinate 
concerns as well that were tending to influence them both along with the broader European 
community. Thus, in addition to being constrained by local conditions, these various writers 
could also be argued (as has been done here) to have been perceiving and trying to address some 
of those consequences of complex systems’ tendencies towards self-organization which in their 
cases were effecting them virtually simultaneously and more “broadly” (so to speak) and 
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warranted new responses from them (as a part of their complex systems’ co-constraining each 
other in processes of “co-evolution” [as per Snowden]).  
     The discussion was structured, therefore, to provide some of the details of the nested contexts 
in which these artists were operating, from those most personal and singular to those that 
impacted them more distantly but simultaneously. And it was these so-called “forces of 
modernization” operating more distantly (but impacting all of those worlds at lower levels of 
scale subject to them) that arguably piqued and stimulated these various writers. 
     Thus, we can enumerate all six of them, considering them both separately and together. Staêl 
and Kleist were argued to have both been subject during the period of the Revolution and 
subsequent Napoleonic Wars to the destabilization of the social systems and impending loss of 
the social identities which had (marginally, but still) supported them in their lifetimes. Staêl, on 
her side, had her own concerns as a talented aristocratic woman foreseeing (as her writings 
indicate that she did) that her privileged position as one of the nobility was under threat, as was 
the power and influence of her entire social class; at the same time, she recognized that her future 
specifically as a woman with some voice in the say of her community, as her mother had had 
before her (notably within the space of Salons), was likely to disappear. As she well knew, 
women’s talents were often overlooked, so that women of her time were likely to be particularly 
vulnerable in any social shift tending to valorize new kinds of “battles” and aggressive 
competition in the public sphere, like those beginning to emerge in the world of commerce and 
doing business. Loathe to be seen as a “mannequin,” she worked assiduously via her writing and 
exchanges with Napoleon himself to try to build a case for women continuing to have a 
legitimate voice in the new version of society she perceived emerging on the national and 
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international horizon - a voice which she regarded as particularly adept at the rational use of 
language and forging alliances.   
     Kleist, for his part, had his own vulnerabilities to the changing social context(s) of that 
tumultuous period, though they were not so specifically gender-based. Apparently by 
temperament and intellectual inclination, he was a particularly sensitive man. And having been 
threatened by his “Kantian crisis” as well as by being either unwilling or unable to engage in 
military pursuits in an era of profound unrest and patriotic fervor, he developed his own 
passionate artistic vision of a world which, while it acknowledged aspects of his contemporary 
reality, also responded to them in an innovative fashion. Thus, he imagined a world in which 
wooden “puppets” could be understood as being manipulated by unseen forces (in a marionette 
theater) but also as figures whose natural construction allowed them to move with a particular 
grace and beauty. In the actual human realm, however, which his obviously troubled “Prince” 
inhabits and where his character is portrayed as being subject to the frequent misperceptions and 
callous judgments of others (like the Elector), beings can only work to try to transcend the 
constraining circumstances of their condition. And, as Kleist depicts this, such transcendence 
arises through an actor making his own choices about his future (as when the Prince chooses the 
“calm ethereal spheres” of “immortality” as his end [Kleist 90]). Such imaginative expressions 
have striking resonances with known aspects of Kleist’s own life, who appears to have felt 
himself subject to higher authorities who manipulated (while misunderstanding) his own artistic 
talents, so that he apparently chose to find relief/sanctuary elsewhere by acting out his own 
highly-premeditated end.  
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     Both of these individuals, in other words, seem to have had some appreciation of the “larger 
forces” impacting and threatening to disrupt their respective worlds, which had previously in 
their youth allowed them to act relatively freely and have meaningful social connections with 
others. Under the pressures imposed by the shifting circumstances at the turn of the century, 
however, both also responded with (particular) narratives that not only acknowledged some of 
the reality of these circumstances, but also suggested possibilities for a different future for their 
protagonists - ones in which individuals could adopt new roles while still maintaining human 
dignity. And, as we now know, both of their visions, which had been developed in a period of so-
called “creative destruction,” were in many ways remarkably prescient. 
    But, as detailed earlier, the subsequent post-war era in which Heine and Balzac lived most of 
their lives, entered a different phase whose larger “shape” could be said to have taken on a 
different character. It was a relatively peaceful period. Through the interpretive lens of “big 
history” which views changes occurring in the world according to complexity and systemic 
principles, this so-called phase could be viewed as largely recuperative as well as regenerative. 
In other words, and in a somewhat “ecological” sense, western European communities (including 
those of France and Germany) worked at re-establishing their worlds but not simply with a return 
to the “old order.” Rather, continuing to benefit from the amassing of power and resources in 
their part of the world which was also stimulating more innovation, and employing “seeds” of 
their respective traditions which could be built upon, French as well as German communities 
began to transform and redefine themselves. As noted, social identities mediating social 
connection and sharing of information were also transforming and becoming a real “issue.” 
Traditional social authorities were being challenged, power balances were shifting, and 
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individuals (“the people”) were beginning to become aware of themselves as increasingly 
responsible for establishing the new “social ontology.” And artists like Heine and Balzac stand 
out as being among those who ventured to innovate and “speak out” in this new expression of 
individual responsibility. Both this Rheinländer and this Frenchman, in other words, appear to 
have recognized many of the fundamental aspects of the ongoing social dynamics of their era. 
But they naturally afforded singular responses to them in the narratives they created for their 
different (intended) audiences.  
     As discussed, Heine himself was someone who was obliged to try to live with and enact his 
own uneasily-related set of social identities. Part of the solution he divined for himself was to 
emigrate to Paris so that he might avoid Prussian censors and more freely create as an artist. In 
Paris, he worked at trying to enlighten the French about the “real Germany,” but his heart 
apparently continued to reside in his homeland whose nationhood he dreamed about but 
questioned could be a reality. Thus, as he portrayed in his Deutschland epic, he aspired to 
championing his homeland’s coming to emerge on a future par with other nations (like France 
and England), but he also felt himself “wounded” and struggled to maintain hope or spell out a 
practical means for actually achieving it.    
     Balzac, for his part, was someone whose identity as an artist had also been challenged in his 
youth, though for very different reasons. Seemingly under the weight of this challenge (along 
with the need to resist financial ruin), he strove to articulate his vision of the shifting world in 
which he resided (contemporaneously with Heine) and where he saw it heading. As we now well 
know, his vision  was that of a strikingly “complete” “system” in which diverse characters 
predominantly from Paris and the French provinces interacted in a temporally-extended and 
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spatially panoramic network of relationships. In his broadly-conceived “human comedy,” he 
acknowledged but was also critical of many of the details of the era’s changing mores and 
developments.  
     In their cases, Heine and Balzac straddled the trends of earlier romanticism and increasing 
realism. Both acknowledged, each in his own way and through the lens of specific interests, an 
emerging social “order” rising on a tide of new social identities and connections (though in 
Heine’s case, these still existed more in the realm of “potential” than actuality). At the same time, 
both men worked at developing new “aesthetics” for portraying and reflecting these emergent 
social “orders” to their increasingly modern audiences - audiences whom they hoped would be 
receptive and whose tastes they also tried to please.  
     In the case of the final pair of writers, Mann and Mallarmé, the environmental contexts had 
again changed as compared with those before them. Another war involving both of their 
countries had intervened and the form of pressures toward modernization had continued to 
evolve and afford different social conditions that in many ways transcended the boundaries of 
their respective communities. Though the Franco-Prussian War was relatively short-lived, it had 
significant consequences (in addition to the many lives lost). Specifically, it propelled both 
countries along trajectories that were notable for how they were distinctive as well as for how 
they transformed them both into new kinds of actors on the increasingly international world-
stage.  
     Germany, for its part, built upon its Prussian military strengths while proceeding to elaborate 
the infrastructures (including a common currency, transportation and communication networks) 
and encourage socialization practices supportive of its becoming a commercially successful and 
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powerful nation-state (this manifestly combined effort refers primarily to what was taking place 
under the Wilhelmine regime). France, on the other hand, initially struggled to deal with the 
humiliation of its loss but gradually re-established its social order in its early version of the Third 
Republic. Both nations, however, could be said to have effectively worked to advance their 
power and status in the increasingly globally-interconnected world and did this by continuing to 
exploit and put the resources they were continuing to amass to use in these very processes of 
post-war “systemic” (re)structuration. But while there were overt material signs of what some 
deemed social “progress" (leading, in fact, to what was later referred to as the Belle Époque that 
not only involved both of these nations but also extended across much of western Europe), there 
were also growing signs, as already noted, of a significantly widespread but more covert 
psychoemotional negativity. The latter has been variously described as alienation, 
disillusionment, despair, or cynicism about “meaning,” with all leading, however, to a kind of 
indifference or apathy. These trends have been ascribed, of course, to various factors. But again, 
if one assumes the more abstract bird’s eye of so-called “big history” with its incorporation of 
complex systems considerations, one might see these seemingly opposing trends of overt 
“progress”and covert “negativity” as being the outcome of ongoing processes of self-
organization at different levels of scale that were beginning to collide with each other.  
     Thus, forces of modernization operating at more macro-levels of scale involving 
consolidating and promoting differentiated growth in this part of the world may have been 
beginning to conflict with natural capacities and interests of individuals (agents) caught up in 
them. In other words, a “problem” lay in the fact that such agents were themselves becoming 
more aware of themselves as a force contributing to changes taking place in their societies, but 
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they were at the same time differentiating (so to speak) from each other and becoming more 
diverse (in terms of their social identities and voices). That is, they lacked a coherent collective 
voice in trying to participate in their societies’ management. There was thus a new challenge in 
trying to find an integrative strategy for bringing these increasingly self-conscious and vying 
voices of differing perspective together into a workable, sustainable, and broadly satisfying 
community. 
     Assuming that such considerations are reasonable, it is no surprise that individuals, like the 
writers Mann and Mallarmé, coming from different backgrounds and life-experiences 
themselves, would have viewed and responded to this so-called “new problem” and the 
challenges it posed somewhat differently.  
     Thus, the “larger problem” from Mann’s perspective could easily be understood as a more 
frankly political one, given both his long-standing interpersonal as well as highly public conflicts 
with his brother who held adamantly nationalistic views (before the World War) and his self-
acknowledged receptivity to aspects of other countries’ cultures, including what he regarded as 
Italian proclivities to sociality and French ideals regarding sociopolitical organization. His 
perception of his society’s dysfunction appears to have centered, in other words, on his highly-
developed views of what he saw as inherent pathologies in the Wilhelmine regime and the effects 
its machinations were having on his people. His critical sense of these are evident in his Man of 
Straw, though it is formally portrayed as deriving from a clash between diverse individuals’ 
personas (as that between the throwback Prussian-militaristic “authoritarian” character of 
Diederich Hessling, who thoughtlessly reflects and enacts the values of the extant power 
structure, and the more “modern” and worldly but painfully disaffected Wolfang Buck [as well as 
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the formerly idealistic but now ineffectual old Herr Buck]). For Mann, it arguably made sense to 
press for more accommodation of democratic principles in the German society of his time in 
order to try to foster a more appropriately modern community cohering on the basis of such an 
“ideal” integrative mechanism.  
     For Mallarmé, however, “ideal” means of finding community apparently always had a 
different tenor. While clearly aware of the unsettled nature of his era and admittedly 
disenchanted with certain tendencies among the bourgeoisie and “vulgar” aspects of popular 
culture, his “ideal” forms of communication and effecting connection were not a matter of 
harnessing the diversity of voices in a political fashion as Mann’s were. Instead he appears to 
have regarded it more his mission to join them in a recognition of the power of art (particularly 
the power of language, and specifically poetry) itself. He appears to have always inclined 
towards the enigmatic and intentionally allusive (rather than explicit and direct) in his persona as 
a poet. And whether acting as organizer of Les Mardistes, a public speaker, or writer of poetic 
works for public consumption, he worked to disseminate this more mysterious yet powerful 
sense of art and “elevate” it to the “stature of religion” (as Paul Auster has noted [xi]). And, as 
his final major work Roll of the Dice suggests, he appears to have felt that “acting poetically” 
could itself afford a beacon for orienting oneself in his tumultuous and increasingly secular 
times, though it could “never abolish chance.”  
     So, while Mann and Mallarmé were manifestly quite different in many respects, they could be 
regarded as having had a broadly common aim. That is, to  try to promote their fellows’ (qua 
agents’) enlightenment and creativity in being able to integrate their increasingly diverse voices 
into an ideally more stable and satisfying community.  
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     Such characterizations of these artist-writers are thus grounded in details specific to each of 
them while they also tend towards some abstraction. These intermittent turns towards abstraction 
may be seen as having taken place for two reasons. One, it naturally derives from employing one 
of the already noted means by which Christian and colleagues also advance their particular 
narrative and discern patterns in the history of the human species beyond that documented by 
written texts (and are explain to “explain” commonalities between the conditions leading to the 
emergence of Homo Sapiens, the rise of agriculture, and the obviously more recent trends 
towards the rise of the “modern world” and the Anthropocene). That is, some of the present 
argument’s “abstracting” arises, in part, from a significant reliance on the use of certain analogies 
and metaphors as a form of reasoning and discerning patterns of commonality in how the pairs of 
writers under discussion may be understood as having made meaningful sense to themselves and 
others within the broader dynamical system-contexts of which both writers within the pair were a 
part. It also derives, however, from engaging with certain complexity considerations themselves, 
particularly that of “emergence.” As Christian et al have stated:  
     complex things have new or emergent properties…which do not exist in the 
     components of which a complex entity is made. The[se properties] emerge  
     only from the arrangement of those components into a precise pattern. They  
     arise out of the pattern as much as out of the components themselves. It is the  
     fact that the pattern strikes us as immaterial or abstract, whereas the 
     components seem to be solid and material, that accounts for the [seemingly]  
     magical quality of emergence. (emphases added) (5)  
Thus, one may view some of the commonalities across pairs of writers that I have been arguing 
were finding expression in some of their respective work as a function of these writers’ 
themselves discerning patterns in the broader social contexts that were common to both of them. 
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At the same time that they were discerning these “immaterial” and essentially invisible (to some, 
virtually “magical”) social forces emerging in their social environments and impacting them 
both, however, these writers may also be understood as expressing themselves in the works that 
“emerged” from them in the process of such discernment.   
     Hence, there are most certainly tendencies towards a certain amount of abstraction in the 
work that has been undertaken here. To some, such abstraction might appear to dilute the very 
richness of the cultural (literary) products being examined and obscure a need to never “lose 
sight” of such works’ details in the “real” appreciation of them. But, as argued here, there is also 
value in attending to both the details and the abstracted pattern of details-in-relation to each 
other because doing so can afford insights into the very creative process by which the final 
product “emerged” as well as perception of a new form of a universal truth which the grasp of 
such a pattern may provide. In a kind of kinship with the position taken by the philosopher M.T. 
Rowe noted in the introduction, if the notion of an “aesthetic attitude” is itself afforded a 
sufficiently “broad and satisfying account” (1), it may also be seen to accommodate both 
“aesthetic interest and curiosity about life” (23). In that same vein, an investigation that focuses 
on concerns of particular writers and the forms of their works at different points in the long 
nineteenth century as that attempted here may prove to be both “aesthetically interesting” and 
useful for contributing to our understanding of human beings’ place in the world and telling us 
something about creative enterprises in “life” itself. 
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